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Introduction 
Ethical challenges of globalization 
The basic fact that human experiential space is being subtly changed 
through an opening to cosmopolitanization should not lead us to assume 
that we are all becoming cosmopolitans. Even the most positive conceiv-
able development - an erosion of frontiers between cultural horizons and 
a growing sensitivity towards unfamiliar geographies of life and coexist-
ence - does not necessarily demand a sense of cosmopolitan responsibil-
ity. The question of how such a sense might become even a possibility has 
up to now scarcely been posed, let alone investigated. (Beck 2004: 154) 
The world is facing crises in global politics and international relations that 
have only recently begun to be discussed in the philosophical literature. There 
is a crisis in peace highlighted by the so-called war on terror (Sterba 2003b). 
There is a refugee crisis with people moving around the globe in unprecedented 
numbers driven by war, persecution, famine and economic hardship (Carens 
1987; Goodin 1992; Boswell 2005). There is a crisis of global justice with entire 
populations in underdeveloped parts of the world facing the threat of star-
vation owing to avoidable poverty.! There is a global environmental crisis, of 
which climate change is only the most widely debated consequence (Jonas 1984; 
Crocker & Linden 1998; Newton 2003). There is a crisis in the global economy 
with the high social costs of globalization and trade as well as threats to sup-
plies of energy resources (Sen 1999). There is a crisis in human rights with 
many regimes unwilling to honour the requirements of human dignity (Vincent 
1992; Campbell 2006; Churchill 2006). And there is the so-called "clash of civil-
izations" in which major world religions and political ideologies are implicated 
in global tensions (Huntington 1996; Caputo 2001). Because of globalization we 
all have a part to play in addressing problems of global governance, manage-
ment of the environment, maintenance of peace, equitable global distribution 
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of social goods and resources, humanitarian assistance, intercultural tolerance 
and understanding, and the protection of human dignity around the world. 
Accordingly, it could be claimed that we are "global citizens" and that we should 
develop a "global ethics" through which we can articulate and exercise our glo-
bal responsibilities as such citizens. The aim of this book is to articulate, expli-
cate and develop a normative philosophical framework for global ethics and 
international relations that has recently become widely discussed under the 
term "cosmopolitanism':2 
International relations is an academic discipline that is relatively well estab-
lished while global ethics is an emerging field in applied ethics, one that pro-
vides a meeting point between theorists of international law, political science, 
political philosophy, economics and development studies, as well as interna-
tional relations itself (Dower 1998, 2003; Amstutz 1999; Rawls 1999; O'Neill 
2000; Singer 2002). It is, however, inadequate to approach the scholarly study of 
global ethics as if it were a form of applied ethics seeking to embody the moral 
theories developed in the Western philosophical tradition (Pollis & Schwab 
1979; Commers et at. 2008). Global ethics must not just be an application of 
our Western way of thinking to global problems, but must be a form of ethical 
thinking that is itself global in its resonance and appeal. It must be an ethics 
founded on a moral framework that all thinkers and policy-makers in the world 
can accept. Accordingly, it must transcend the particular cultural traditions of 
those thinkers and policy-makers and appeal to norms inherent in humanity 
itself (Gaita 1999). We need not only an ethics for a global society, but also a 
globally valid ethics. 
Globalization 
The process of globalization has had immeasurable impacts on our daily lives 
and on international politics. Globalization includes the following set of pro-
cesses and changes: 
2 
• The world economic system has become highly complex and interdepend-
ent. Many nation-states are unable to control effectively their own eco-
nomic policies in their national interests. Many smaller states that depend 
on agriculture are no longer able to be self-sufficient in feeding their popu-
lations because they have largely replaced food crops for their own popu-
lations with cash crops grown for the international market. Multinational 
corporations, some of which have budgets larger than small nation-states, 
are able to situate manufacturing and service centres anywhere in the 
world where labour is cheapest, regulations and taxes least onerous and 
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access to markets most effective. Terms of trade between nations are dic-
tated by the more powerful states. 
• International diplomacy has been transformed from bilateral relation-
ships centred on disputes over territory or resources to a multitude of 
multilateral arrangements and agreements relating to everything from 
management of the Antarctic to the structures of international financial 
institutions. This has given rise to systems of international politics of great 
complexity involving issues of global governance through such bodies as 
the United Nations (UN) that require the creation and policing of inter-
national law. 
• There has been a greater realization that disasters and risks in one coun-
try can have global effects. This is most obviously true in relation to the 
environment and global warming, but it also applies to poverty, oppres-
sion and injustice, all of which result in cross-border flows of refugees. 
The HIV / AIDS epidemic is also an international scourge that does not 
respect borders. 
• War has ceased to be a relatively limited form of international conflict 
between specific states but has become a global phenomenon in sev-
eral senses. First, there were the two "world wars" in which a great many 
nations were involved. Secondly, there was the "cold war" during which 
the world was divided into two mutually antagonistic armed camps that 
pitted capitalism against communism. Thirdly, there is the almost constant 
presence in the contemporary world of armed conflicts at a more local 
level, ranging from civil wars, violent political struggles and ethnic cleans-
ing to humanitarian interventions. These conflicts become the concern of 
the world community through the UN, which is charged with maintaining 
peace globally. 
• As a result of the terrorist attacks in the USA of 11 September 2001 and 
the growth of terrorism more generally, there has been a greater realiza-
tion of the impacts of culture on world politics. Whether this is under-
stood as a conflict between "civilizations" (Huntington 1996) or as a clash 
between religions (Armstrong 2000), the world is increasingly seen as 
divided between modern liberal societies and traditional theocracies. 
Whatever the accuracy of this analysis, it is clear that global conflict is 
based on more than economic or territorial rivalries and that cultural dif-
ferences between civilizations can have volatile effects. The so-called "war 
on terror" has forced many people to become more aware of the condi-
tions in which people live in other parts of the world. 
• International travel is fast and available to anyone with the funds for the 
relatively cheap fares. Whether through tourism or more purposeful 
travel, most people in the richer parts of the world are able to experience 
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countries and cultures different from their own by visiting them at some 
time in their lives. 
• Communication is now so speedy that events anywhere in the world can 
be brought into our living rooms during the evening news. The internet 
and new forms of mobile telephony make it possible to communicate 
instantly with family, friends or business colleagues no matter where they 
are located. 
• As a result of these changes, a global culture has emerged that corresponds 
to the global market, with many brands being recognizable anywhere in 
the world and with television programmes and films being seen in most 
parts of the world simultaneously. Modern cities around the world are 
becoming architecturally indistinguishable from one another and even 
popular music is becoming homogenized. A counter-movement is the 
interest being shown in local and regional cultures and artistic produc-
tions on the part of affluent consumers in metropolitan centres. 
• Many political, charitable or advocacy groups, such as aid organizations, 
feminists, environmentalists and peace activists, have responded to these 
changes by giving their campaigns a global scope and by establishing inter-
national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to pursue their goals 
internationally. 
• As a result of all these changes, a new realization is emerging that we live 
in a world community as well as in our own countries. We are not citizens 
just of specific nation-states, but are also citizens of the world. We should 
be concerned not just for our compatriots but for all human beings, espe-
cially those who are suffering from poverty, war, religious intolerance or 
injustice. 
Cosmopolitanism 
It is this last claim that will be the focus of this book. This claim articulates what 
is meant by the term "cosmopolitanism': Cosmopolitanism is the view that the 
moral standing of all peoples and of each individual person around the globe is 
equa1.3 Individuals should not give moral preference to their compatriots, their 
co-religionists or fellow members of their demographic identity groups. The 
famous words of the American Declaration of Independence to the effect that 
"all men are created equal" also highlight the centrality of this notion of equality. 
Thomas Pogge has described cosmopolitanism in this way: 
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Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, individual-
ism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons - rather 
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than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, 
nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in 
virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, universality: the 
status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being 
equally - not merely to some sub-set, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, 
whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: this special status has global force. 
Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone - not only for their 
compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like. (1992: 48) 
But cosmopolitanism is not just another name for egalitarianism or liberal 
humanism. What it targets are forms of discrimination that arise from the vic-
tim's being of a different nationality, ethnicity, religion, language, race or any 
other form of identity that is used to classify people into discrete groups. When 
commentators speak of a "clash of civilizations" or of a clash of cultures, they 
may not be using national boundaries in order to define the groups that are 
said to be clashing, but they are alluding to sources of identity, including nation-
ality, religion and ethnicity, that serve to define a community as distinct from 
another. Such definitions can then become the basis for prejudice or exploita-
tion. Although debates about human rights often refer to them, gender, age and 
sexual preference do not usually constitute group memberships in this way. 
Gender, age and sexual preference are certainly possible sources of prejudice 
and exploitation but they fall under a different heading. They do not categorize 
people into definable national, ethnic or cultural groups. Rather, it is national, 
ethnic or cultural groups that differentially define the normative status of gen-
der, age and sexual preference in various communities around the world. It is 
identity as established by national, ethnic or cultural groups that is the more 
basic. As a result, it is the divisions between people that are created primarily 
by religion, race, nationality and ethnicity that are of central concern to cosmo-
politanism. Moreover, such divisions often provide the historical, demographic 
and geographic bases of nation-states so that they too are subject to cosmo-
politan scrutiny. 
The view that all human beings have equal moral standing despite their group 
identifications might be called a negative characterization of cosmopolitanism: 
one that urges us not to discriminate on inappropriate grounds. A more posi-
tive conception of cosmopolitanism would be one that urges us to accord all 
people equal respect. Once again, this does not imply that we should ignore the 
differences between people on the bases of which it is legitimate to discriminate 
between them, such as their accomplishments, but it does suggest that even the 
least deserving should be given a level of respect that rules out, for example, 
exploitation or neglect. Another way in which these ideas have been formulated 
is by using the language of human rights. The claim that everyone has inalienable 
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and basic human rights can be interpreted in the negative sense that no one 
should be discriminated against, and in the positive sense that everyone should 
be accorded a basic level of respect. The idea that everyone enjoys, and should be 
acknowledged as having, what is called "human dignity" also captures this idea. 
Yet another way of expressing these intuitions is to speak of "global humanism'; 
which is the view that we all share a quality called "humanity" and should respect 
each other's rights or meet each other's needs on that basis. Lastly, cosmopol-
itanism may be expressed as the view that there exists a global community of 
which all people, by virtue of their humanity, are members. If such a community 
could be said to exist, then membership of it would ground both responsibilities 
and expectations between members of such a community. 
In contrast, Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006) has described cosmopolitan-
ism as primarily an openness to, and tolerance of, the cultural and historical 
differences that constitute the identities of different peoples. For him a cosmo-
politan is one who takes a keen interest in the cultures and ways of life of other 
peoples as well as taking their interests to heart. A cosmopolitan does not just 
tolerate cultural differences, but acknowledges them and is prepared to enter 
into respectful dialogue with them (Shapcott 2001). If political progress is to 
be made in international relations and if debates to that end are to be engaged 
in by appealing to readily acceptable understandings of the human condition, 
then cosmopolitans, with their interest in, and knowledge of, the cultures of the 
world, will be uniquely placed to contribute to such debates. 
Historically, the most important contrasting position to cosmopolitanism 
was a mixture of nationalism and racism. It was a deep form of racism that 
made both slavery and colonialism possible because it allowed people to think 
of the victims of those practices as inherently inferior to their masters. Failure 
to respect the religious beliefs and cultural practices of foreign peoples encour-
aged the more powerful societies to exploit those peoples. Empires everywhere 
have depended on denigrating the human status of those whom they conquer. 
Inextricable from such forms of racism was nationalism. Nationalism holds 
that national interests may override the universal humanitarian demands of 
cosmopolitanism. It affirms the rights that stem from state sovereignty. While 
this can sometimes be a crude form of political "realism" - the view that rejects 
the influence of any moral considerations within international politics - more 
sophisticated anti-cosmopolitan positions highlight the local moral and cul-
tural traditions that shape people's attitudes and moral commitments in order 
to suggest that the individualism inherent in cosmopolitanism is inappropriate 
for global ethics. 
This "communitarian" position would insist that respect should be shown 
to those cultures in which the autonomy of the individual is not a regulative 
ideal and that cosmopolitanism hides an imposition of Western liberal cultural 
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hegemony. The rights of societies to maintain their sometimes non-liberal tra-
ditions and identities must also be respected (Walzer 1983; Taylor & Gutman 
1994; Rawls 1999). This critique argues that cosmopolitanism is a form of glo-
balliberalism that seeks to apply globally the stress on individual liberty, politi-
cal rights and individual conceptions of the good life that are the hallmarks of 
Western liberal thought. Charles Beitz (1999b) takes individual liberty to be a 
central value in this way, and Kok-Chor Tan (2000) espouses a "comprehensive 
liberalism" that takes autonomy as a central value and as the benchmark against 
which cultural practices and political arrangements around the world are to 
be judged. However, along with many others, Bernard Williams (2005) has 
noticed that this is a case of cultural imperialism. It seeks to impose the value 
of autonomy universally and asserts that any practices in other cultures that 
reduce autonomy are not to be tolerated. The problem with this position is that 
comprehensive liberalism is not value-neutral. Even a procedural form of lib-
eralism such as that of John Rawls (1972) or Jiirgen Habermas (1973), while it 
attempts to withhold allegiance to any core value apart from fair procedures or 
uncoerced communication, still ends up espousing autonomy. It has to be said, 
of course, that for anyone thinking within a post-Enlightenment culture, this is 
unavoidable. We moderns simply do give high regard to autonomy. However, it 
must not be assumed that other cultures will think this way or that they would 
welcome this value being imposed on them. Autonomy, it might be argued, is 
a concept that belongs to a self-assertive and individualistic culture and is, like 
liberalism itself, tied to capitalism, free-market ideology and a consumerism 
that valorizes choice. 
It ought to be possible, however, to develop a conception of cosmopolitan-
ism that is not simply a projection of Western liberal and modernist political 
thought. We should not imperialistically impose our own commitments as if 
they were universally valid. But nor should we accept that the evils that foreign-
ers do is of no concern to us on the basis of a pluralist stance that sees moral 
norms as deriving only from local traditions. In this book, reflecting on the 
basics of human life and the essential requirements of human dignity will serve 
to avoid conceiving of cosmopolitanism as a form of Western ideology. 
While many moral philosophers discuss cosmopolitanism from the point of 
view of the individual so as to identify and expand the range of moral responsi-
bilities that an individual bears towards others (Singer 1972; Chatterjee 2004), 
thinkers in the fields of international relations and global politics see cosmo-
politanism as especially relevant to the actions of states and of national and 
international leaders and to the design of international institutions (Beitz 
1979; Shue 1996). Such thinkers argue that the traditional presumption that 
the national interest should trump international or global concerns such as the 
environment, global justice or world peace must be called into question in our 
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globalized world. The first of these strands of thought has been called "ethical 
cosmopolitanism'; while the second is "political cosmopolitanism':4 In either 
case, it will be clear that cosmopolitanism is a demanding moral position. It 
urges us, whether as citizens or as occupants of positions of political leadership, 
to embrace the whole world into our moral concerns and to apply the stand-
ards of impartiality and equity across boundaries of nationality, race, religion or 
ethnicity in a way that would have been unheard of even fifty years ago. 
The focus of this book will be on ethical cosmopolitanism and it will discuss 
international, political and institutional structures and norms only as exten-
sions of the personal responsibilities of individuals. The distinction between 
ethical and political cosmopolitanism cannot be sharp. Many cosmopolitan 
responsibilities of individual citizens can be exercised through political action. 
In democratic states the minimum requirement is that citizens vote so as to 
influence their governments in the pursuit of the good. More active participa-
tion in political processes such as joining political parties or engaging in pub-
lic debate is also called for. A newer form of political and social participation 
has emerged through the emergence of "civil society'; which comprises a great 
many NGOs ranging from trade unions, business organizations, charitable 
societies, international networks, activist networks and lobby groups of various 
kinds, churches and so on. All of these provide opportunities for influencing 
the policies of decision-makers and require ethically informed participation. 
Citizenship is a concept that is both far-reaching and ethically demanding at 
the national level, and global citizenship is even more so. Moreover, global 
ethical awareness is necessary not just for citizens, but also for individuals who 
work in business. Business organizations that operate in the global context 
need to be willing to accept arrangements about working conditions, social 
justice and human rights even when they threaten profits. In the absence of 
sanctions, such a willingness must be motivated by moral commitments. 
Accordingly, cosmopolitanism is a moral position applicable to several fields 
of concern. It speaks to us individually of our duties to others by arguing that 
demographic, national or cultural identity does not constitute, of itself, a mor-
ally valid basis for making moral distinctions between people. And it suggests 
a range of virtues that the cosmopolitan individual should display: virtues 
such as tolerance, justice, pity, righteous indignation at injustice, generosity 
towards the poor and starving, care for the global environment and a willing-
ness to take responsibility for change on a global scale (van Hooft 2007; see 
also Turner 2000). This is the field of individual ethics and of the existential 
commitments that individuals and their communities make towards the world 
at large. Cosmopolitanism is a virtue. 
But cosmopolitanism does not speak only to the ethical lives of individual 
world citizens. It also speaks to the moral stances that, arguably, should be 
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adopted by politicians, business leaders, governments and organizations that 
operate across borders. People who have power in our globalized world can-
not avoid facing such questions as: do states have a responsibility to pursue 
global justice and to assist in the development of poorer nations? Do states 
have an obligation to help people in other states who suffer from man-made 
or natural disasters such as famine or earthquake? What controls if any should 
be placed on multinational corporations as they exploit natural resources and 
poorly paid and policed working conditions in developing nations? Should the 
human rights record of a state be considered relevant to the shaping of bilateral 
relationships with that state? When is it appropriate to intervene in the domes-
tic affairs of another sovereign state? When is war justified and how should 
it be waged? What roles should states play in global governance and interna-
tionallaw? These are moral questions that differ from individual and existential 
questions in their scope and in the moral agent to which the question is being 
addressed. They are addressed to collective bodies such as nation-states, busi-
ness corporations or international NGOs. But it is still individual persons who 
have the responsibility to answer them. 
Putative cosmopolitan practices 
Accordingly, this book will understand cosmopolitanism in terms of the moral 
outlooks that it embodies rather than in terms of the practices, institutions 
and customs that contingently overcome any normative division between one's 
own people and "others': Such practices have occurred from time to time in 
human history and some scholars have described them as "cosmopolitan': So, 
for example, it has been argued that cosmopolitanism was a form of life in the 
medieval period in Islamic Spain. At this time, when the Moors ruled large 
tracts of that country, there was considerable contact been Muslims, Jews and 
Christians, and their respective communities lived side by side in harmony. 
Thinkers such as the Muslim scholar Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126-98) and 
the Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), along with notable 
Christian theologians, engaged in debates and discussions on matters of faith 
and morals. Tolerance was also a feature of the rule of some Mogul emperors 
on the Indian subcontinent, such as Jalaluddin Muhammad Akbar, who allowed 
Hindu and other religious communities to enjoy the same rights within their 
states as their co-religionists (Sen 2006: ch. 4). In later centuries such mutual 
tolerance and rapport existed among intellectual elites in the Ottoman Empire: 
in Istanbul, Cairo and Alexandria, in which cafes and other urban spaces pro-
vided a setting for the influx of European ideas (Zubaida 2002). While tolerance 
of the cultural, religious and practical traditions of other peoples is a virtue 
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central to the cosmopolitan stance, it is remarkable how fragile the histor-
ical instances of such tolerance have been. The completion of the Reconquista 
with the conquest of Granada in 1492, marking the end of Muslim rule in the 
Iberian peninsula, put a brutal end to such forms of coexistence there, while 
contemporary Islamists regard the kind of urban and urbane cosmopolitanism 
enjoyed by the elites of the Ottoman Empire as a corruption of the purity of 
their faith (Armstrong 2000). Deep divisions among Hindus and Muslims on 
the Indian subcontinent led to the partition of India and Pakistan amid horrific 
bloodshed in 1947. 
Another form that cosmopolitanism has taken is the sharing of common 
languages. Examples would include the spread of Latin in early Europe and the 
use of Sanskrit throughout south Asia. The first occurred because of the spread 
of the Roman Empire, while the second was a more voluntary adoption of a lit-
erary vehicle on the part of the intellectual elites in countries surrounding the 
Indian subcontinent (Pollock 2002). The widespread use of English in the world 
today would be a contemporary example. However, one could ask of this last 
example whether it occurred because of a newly emerging sense of global soli-
darity and cultural understanding or whether it arose because of the hegemony 
of English-speaking peoples in the world. It is clear that the earlier spread of 
Latin was associated with the spread of Roman power. It is interesting to note 
that many nationalist movements or struggles to maintain the identities and 
cultures of oppressed peoples focus on the restoration and maintenance of their 
vernacular languages. Perhaps the only language that is genuinely cosmopolitan 
in spirit is Esperanto, which is an artificial tongue developed in the late nine-
teenth century in an attempt to overcome the language-based divisions between 
European peoples and is now used only by a small group of aficionados. 
Another practice that both encourages the outward gaze of a people and 
serves to define what cosmopolitanism is for some modern commentators is 
trade. If the only contact that a particular people has with another is based on 
conflict - if all that one group does in relation to another is raid it for its goods 
or its women - then the people of the two communities concerned are indeed 
likely to see each other as barbarians and as threats. And if the languages, 
customs and even physical appearances of the two peoples are different, this 
seems only to deepen the distrust between them. On the other hand, if the 
two peoples trade with each other they will derive mutual benefit from their 
relationship. Traders and merchants, rather than soldiers, will travel from one 
community to the other and establish contact. Knowledge of one another will 
grow and, while one community may still find the customs of the other strange 
or even repugnant, their relationship, being based on mutual advantage and 
cooperation, will enhance understanding and tolerance. The philosopher and 
economist Adam Smith (1723-90) was neither the first nor the last to point 
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out that free trade had this humanizing advantage, even though his focus was 
on the commercial value of such trade (Smith 1976: bk 4). 
Indeed, more recent thinkers in the tradition ()f Smith have urged that 
cosmopolitanism should be thought of primarily in economic terms. Rather 
than concerning ourselves with the role that governments should play in inter-
national relations and in regulating international trade through tariffs and trade 
rules, they urge that the globalized market is the best and most efficient means 
whereby international commerce can be encouraged and thus cooperative rela-
tions between peoples established. While this represents an attempt to rob 
cosmopolitanism of its moral content, there is no doubt that a great deal of 
international cooperation has emerged in the wake of global trade and other 
pragmatic relationships between peoples. As a result, international norms 
already exist in a great variety of mundane fields. International financial rules, 
standards of measurement and electronic connectivity, the international date 
line, aviation rules, laws of the sea and many more such instruments are all 
global normative arrangements that resulted from international agreements. 
However, these norms express forms of "internationalism" rather than cosmo-
politanism in that they are entered into by, and are binding on, nation-states. 
Even colonialism has been described as cosmopolitan. As distinct from 
empire, in which one powerful nation conquers and assimilates another politi-
cally, colonialism imposes rule by a foreign power while leaving a great deal 
of the local cultural and political infrastructure in place. So long as economic 
advantage can be secured, the social and political hierarchies of the colonized 
people can be left untouched. Many European colonial powers in the nine-
teenth century differed in the degree to which they replaced local political 
structures with their own, but if we take as an example the case of British 
colonialism in India, we can see that local systems of rule were largely pro-
tected even as they were subsumed within a British military and economic 
command structure. The way in which such systems of rule could be said to 
be cosmopolitan - at least in the eyes of the colonizer - is that they involved 
superimposing a wider, allegedly global culture on more local cultural prac-
tices. This was often justified as an attempt to bring civilization to the natives. 
A kind of ersatz benevolence was expressed in the rhetoric of the colonizers, 
in which the local populations were seen as more or less primitive savages in 
need of the benefits of Western civilization. The improvement of the lot of 
the natives was seen as "the white man's burden': In this way the Eurocentric 
outlooks of the colonizers were expanded to include a regard for the welfare of 
those who were "other" and foreign. Moreover, if cosmopolitanism is marked 
by a genuine curiosity about the ways of other peoples, it could be suggested 
that the science of anthropology, which flourished in the wake of colonialism, 
was an expression of a cosmopolitan impulse. In this context, a cosmopolitan 
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is seen as the opposite of the parochial person in that he is open to, and sym-
pathetic with, the otherness of exotic peoples, and interested in their ways of 
life (van der Veer 2002). 
Another allegedly cosmopolitan practice is religious missionary activity, 
through which many religions seek to propagate themselves globally. This was 
much easier in the colonial period than it is now because then the missionaries 
were backed by the armed power of the colonizers. Moreover, given the appar-
ent superior strength of the colonizers, colonized peoples were inclined to think 
that they too could acquire such power if only they converted to the ways of 
thought of their masters. However, even without the backing of colonial powers, 
most religions take themselves to have the mission of bringing others to their 
faiths. It seems endemic in the human condition that, if you have a deep moral 
or metaphysical conviction, you will want to share it with others. Whatever 
we might think of the appropriateness of acting on this impulse, there seems 
no doubt that the people who have it will feel themselves entitled to see it as 
cosmopolitan. It is a reaching out to others irrespective of their cultural and 
historical backgrounds in order to benevolently bring them the "good news" of 
whatever the missionary's particular prophet has announced. However, whether 
it be the attempt by Christian missionaries to bring exotic peoples to Christ 
or the attempt on the part of Islamists to establish a global caliphate, the mis-
sionary quests of most religions have the potential to bring them into conflict 
with each other and with the people they seek to proselytize. Accordingly, other 
religious thinkers take this notion of cosmopolitanism in a different direction. 
There have also been quests for a spirituality that transcends organized religion 
and seeks input from many faiths so as to give expression to what is thought 
to be common to all of them. Theosophy is an example of this, as is the form 
of yoga taught in the West in the nineteenth century by Swami Vivekananda.5 
Once again, these quests have been described as cosmopolitan. 
The notion of cosmopolitanism has also been used as a pejorative term to 
describe people who are deemed to lack an appropriate degree of patriotism. 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, young and urbane city dwellers were 
thought to be more interested in international cultural movements and fash-
ions than in the national cultural traditions of their native countries. Their 
cafe-based lifestyles in the great urban centres of the West were all of a piece 
and paid scant regard to the links to the land and language of their forebears 
and elders. Jews, socialists and socialites were equally tarred with the brush of 
"cosmopolitanism" and their loyalty to country and tradition was called into 
question by their more conservative compatriots, Jews because they adhered 
to a "foreign" faith, socialists because they espoused international solidarity 
among the working classes and socialites because they felt equally at home in 
the salons of London, Berlin, Paris and New York. In 1931, a German intellec-
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tual, Werner Ackermann, created a short-lived "Cosmopolitan Union" com-
prising people who had voluntarily renounced their national citizenship and 
claimed the right to remain stateless (Ackermann 1931). Contemporary global 
entrepreneurs who work for multinational corporations or NGOs and think 
nothing of flying to several countries in a week are also deemed footloose and 
rootless in a way derided by the more patriotic, as are tourists who regard the 
whole world as their playground. 
These "cosmopolitan" entrepreneurs and tourists are seen to represent the 
most visible form of the economic power of the countries from which they 
come: a power that is no less imperialistic in effect than are the conquering 
armies of previous centuries. These imperialistic trends within cosmopolitan 
practices are summed up by Timothy Brennan as follows: 
If we wished to capture the essence of cosmopolitanism in a single for-
mula, it would be this. It is a discourse of the universal that is inherently 
local - a locality that's always surreptitiously imperial. Its covert appeal 
is most powerful when, in a double displacement, its political sense is 
expressed in cultural forms. Typically, cosmopolitanism constructs politi-
cal utopias in aesthetic or ethical guise, so that they may more effectively 
play what often proves, on inspection, to be ultimately an economic role. 
(2003: 45)6 
Critiques of this kind have given rise to a vigorous academic debate about the 
moral significance of cosmopolitanism. The contrasting position has been put 
by such writers as Seyla Benhabib, who remarks: 
Cosmopolitanism is not equivalent to a global ethic as such; nor is it 
adequate to characterize cosmopolitanism through cultural attitudes and 
choices alone. I follow the Kantian tradition in thinking of cosmopolitan-
ism as the emergence of norms that ought to govern relations among 
individuals in a global civil society. (2006: 20) 
In order to understand the terms of this debate and develop an ethically 
positive conception of cosmopolitanism, I would suggest that the use of the 
term "cosmopolitanism" to describe the practices listed above is inappropriate. 
I would suggest that the following phenomena, which have sometimes been 
called cosmopolitan, are not genuinely so: 
• liberalization of global trade; 
• colonialism and imperialism, whether through military conquest, cultural 
hegemony, neo-liberal trade policies or religious missionary activity; 
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• quest for a single global culture, language or religion; 
• rejection of any state-based citizenship; 
• following of international fashion trends in an urbane cafe society; 
• growth in tourism and international travel; 
• consumer interest in exotic products, clothes, world music and so on; 
• Western liberalism with a global agenda; 
• imposition of Western morality in the form of moral universalism; 
• advocacy of a single world government. 
I shall discuss the last three points on this list more deeply in the pages to come. 
For the moment I need to justify my rejection of the practices and outlooks on 
this list as genuine examples of cosmopolitanism. I do so by briefly exploring 
the etymology of the term "cosmopolitanism" and how the idea originated in the 
thinking of some ancient moralists, and then describing the central twentieth-
century embodiment of the idea. 
Stoic origins 
Cosmopolitanism is a response to a number of ethical and social problems 
relating to strangers, foreign peoples and other countries. The default pos-
ition in human existence, it might be argued, is one of local allegiance. In the 
distant past, because the opportunities for geographic exploration for most 
people in most places were extremely limited, the worldviews and the range 
of practical concerns for most people were confined to the village, the sur-
rounding forests and seas, and those who could be reached with at most a 
few days' travel. Even as villages grew into cities, the range of a moral agent's 
concerns remained focused on what the ancient Greeks called the polis: the 
political community that was centred on the immediate social environment 
or city of that individual. The identity of a civilized person was shaped by the 
city or community of which he or she was a part and by the responsibilities of 
participation and contribution to which he or she was committed by virtue 
of birth or physical location. While many people were aware of other cities 
and lands and of the various customs and gods that were followed there, they 
identified themselves with their own polis and regarded strangers as people 
who were "other': When they were within the polis, strangers were embraced 
into the ethical category of guests and treated in accordance with the norms of 
hospitality. When they were outside the polis, they were regarded as barbar-
ians who could be enslaved, conquered or exploited (Westermarck 1912: ch. 
24). People from across the river or across the mountains were to be feared 
if one's own people were weak and attacked if one's own people were strong; 
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moreover, their beliefs and customs were often considered too strange to be 
given respect. 
The first recorded use of the word "cosmopolitan" was when the philosopher 
Diogenes the Cynic in the fourth century BCE was asked where he came from. 
He replied that he was a citizen of the world (kosmopolites) (Diogenes Laertius 
VI 63). This reply could be interpreted as suggesting that Diogenes felt himself 
to owe no allegiance to the polis in which he was resident at the time, that he 
should give citizens of that polis no preference in his concerns or that he should 
take no part in the politics of that city. But it is more likely that, without being 
unmindful of local concerns, he took the universal concerns of humankind to 
be more important and binding than local concerns. His was a philosophical 
position rather than a political one, which implied that, however important 
they might be, the concerns of one's polis should be seen in the context of a 
more binding and universal set of values. Commenting on Diogenes' state-
ment, Martha Nussbaum suggests: "Diogenes knew that the invitation to think 
as a world citizen was, in a sense, an invitation to be an exile from the comfort 
of patriotism and its easy sentiments, to see our own ways of life from the point 
of view of justice and the good" (1996a: 7). 
The Stoic philosophers in ancient Greece and Rome are credited with being 
the first to develop this idea that a person might be a citizen of the whole world 
and hence that her concerns and responsibilities might extend to everyone 
irrespective of whether they were compatriots or strangers. The Greek his-
torian Plutarch (c.45-125 CE), referring to a book by Zeno of Citium (c.335-
262 BCE), describes it this way: 
Indeed, the much admired "Republic" of the founder of the Stoic sect, 
Zeno, is all directed towards this one summary point: that we ought not 
to dwell in cities or in districts, dividing ourselves up into local systems 
of justice, but instead come to think of all human beings as fellow citizens 
of the same district, making a single life in this single cosmos, like a herd 
that pastures together and is ruled in common by a common law. 
(De Alexandri fortuna aut virtute, quoted in Brennan 2005: 162) 
Although the word "citizen" will not be exactly right in this context since 
there is no world state of which one is a citizen, it seeks to capture the idea that 
the kinds of allegiance, loyalty and solidarity that mark a person's relationship 
to the polis should now extend to the whole world. Indeed, the word "world" is 
not quite right either since it was not just all the known lands to which this new 
form of identity related itself, but the universe itself. For the Stoics, the universe 
was an entity of considerable moral significance. The universe was that over-
arching reality that established the forms of order in accordance with which 
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we were to live our lives so as to live them ethically. The ethical task of each 
individual, according to the Stoics, was to live in accordance with "Nature': 
By this they meant that we were to live in accordance with the rational order, 
which marked the forms and cycles of the universe as a whole: forms and cycles 
that had been established by the gods and expressed their wisdom and love of 
justice. It is this idea that later gave rise to the concept of natural law: a moral 
law that was not dependent on the established law or customs of a given com-
munity for its normativity or for its applicability to us. Accordingly, the identity 
and range of responsibilities of an individual were seen as no longer dependent 
on the historical and regional contingencies of a particular polis, but rather on 
the eternal and global necessities of the universe itself. For a cosmopolitan, the 
cosmos was the polis. 
The Roman philosopher Cicero (106-43 BCE) summed up the theoretical 
position in this way: 
Since reason exists both in people and God, the first common possession 
of human beings and God is reason. But those who have reason in com-
mon must also have right reason in common. And since right reason is 
Law, we must believe that people have Law also in common with the Gods. 
Further, those who share Law must also share Justice, and those who share 
these are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth. 
(On the Laws, Bk 1) 
From the Stoics, then, we have acquired the idea of cosmopolitanism as a 
stance of personal virtue grounded in a metaphysical conception of human 
beings as all equally under the sway of a universal moral order ordained by 
the gods. This stance entailed a devaluing of local loyalties so as to leave room 
for a benevolent regard for other people no matter what their national, ethnic, 
religious or cultural backgrounds might be. Anyone who acknowledged and 
followed natural law in this universal sense became part of a global community 
of right-thinking people. 
Twentieth-century developments 
The tendency of people to identify themselves with their nations conquered 
cosmopolitanism to such an extent during the nineteenth century that we can 
today think of it as a newly emerging tendency despite its venerable history. 
However, the resurgence of cosmopolitanism today is not due to philosophical 
developments or the advocacy of ethical thinkers in various parts of the world. 
Cosmopolitanism today has emerged in the form of political and institutional 
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arrangements that reflect a global pursuit of lasting peace, human rights and 
global community. During the twentieth century cosmopolitan concepts have 
become embodied in international institutions and declarations. 
After the horrors of two world wars, many nations came to see that peace 
and human rights could only be secured by forms of international cooperation 
that were institutionalized and grounded in law. The first attempt at estab-
lishing such institutions was the creation of the League of Nations in 1919 
after the First World War. However, despite some successes in settling disputes 
between states involved in regional conflicts, it soon became clear that the 
most powerful nations - those that had won in the conflict of 1914-18 - were 
able to act without restraints or sanctions despite the league. Accordingly, after 
its failure to prevent the Second World War had been tragically demonstrated, 
the final meeting of the league was held in Geneva on 18 April 1946. It was 
replaced by the UN, which was established in 1945 and today embraces as 
members all the nation-states in the world that are recognized as such. The 
primary task of the UN is to establish and maintain world peace. This task is 
pursued through the establishment of a forum for member states to forge inter-
national agreements. In this respect the UN is not a cosmopolitan institution 
that focuses on the needs of individuals, but an internationalist institution that 
presupposes the existence and sovereignty of nation-states. 
However, the nations of the world that established the UN gave it the further 
task of protecting human rights. This new kind of mandate for international 
institutions arose from a wholly unprecedented situation after the allied victory 
over Germany and its allies in 1945. In the course of the conquest of Germany's 
territory, the allies discovered the death camps and their horribly emaciated 
survivors, and realized that they were faced with a situation that went beyond 
that of war crimes. A war crime occurs when soldiers flout the rules of war by 
killing prisoners, looting cities or attacking non-combatants. There had been 
numerous such crimes on both sides of the war that had just ended. But the 
crimes that were evidenced by the death camps were of a different order. They 
were seen as attempts to wipe out entire groups of people because of who they 
were. The most notable of these was the attempt to eradicate all Jews from the 
lands that the Nazis had occupied. This gave rise to the new notion of "crimes 
against humanity" used in the trials of many Nazis in Nuremberg from 1945 to 
1949. These trials treated the accused not as soldiers charged with departures 
from the rules of war but as common criminals. They were not heroes who 
had overstepped the bounds of soldierly behaviour and whose deeds might yet 
be mythologized, but ordinary people who had committed horrific and inex-
cusable crimes. Later thinkers saw that it was important that the trials not be 
seen to be applying "victor's justice" by imposing the moral convictions solely 
of those who had won the war (Arendt 1968; see also Habermas 1997). The 
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trials were to be seen as representative of humanity itself upholding its stand-
ards of decent behaviour. Crimes against humanity were cosmopolitan crimes 
that were to be tried by cosmopolitan courts upholding values and norms that 
were universal in scope. Further, it was important that the perpetrators be held 
personally accountable and not be allowed to plead innocence on the basis that 
they were obeying orders. This too expresses the cosmopolitan nature of the 
thinking involved in conducting these trials. It would be assumed that any indi-
vidual was sufficiently autonomous and responsible for his or her actions that 
any plea to the effect that only higher-level authorities should bear responsi-
bility would be rejected. No claim that group loyalty or membership of a larger 
collective could lessen an individual's responsibility would be entertained. Even 
if a nation were at war in accordance with international law, its soldiers could 
be held personally liable for any crimes they might commit in the course of 
fighting such a war. Indeed the context of war was not essential. Crimes against 
humanity could be committed even where no state of war was in existence. 
Subsequent examples of ethnic cleansing or genocide include cases where no 
state of international war existed but where the motivations towards violence 
were political, religiOUS or racial. 
In so far as the concept of crimes against humanity was distinguished from 
that of war crimes as defined by international law, the new concept was a first 
step towards what the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) had called 
"cosmopolitan law': Such law transcends international law by appealing directly 
to universal human values and rights that are held by individuals and to uni-
versal norms and standards of behaviour that apply to individuals. These rights 
and standards are rights held by any human being no matter what their citizen-
ship or membership of a defined community. Whereas international law binds 
states in their relationships with each other, cosmopolitan law binds individu-
als globally. 
The international community, through the UN and other agencies, has 
enshrined these principles and practices in an International Court of Justice 
and, more recently, an International Criminal Court. While not every nation 
has cooperated with these institutions or supported them, the concept of 
crimes against humanity and the concepts of cosmopolitan law or human 
rights that underpin it are now widely accepted in the world, at least in opera-
tional terms. The most notable expression of these concepts is the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which the UN proclaimed in December 1948. 
Subsequent work by the UN between 1966 and 1976 has resulted, after ratifi-
cation by a sufficient number of individual states, in according binding status 
in international law to the International Bill of Human Rights, which consists 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on 
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Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols (Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 1996). 
The moral or political theory required to give intellectual foundations to 
these concepts in a way that would be globally understandable may be lacking, 
but the institutional endorsement of those concepts through UN declarations 
and international courts is sufficient to give them operational legitimacy in the 
world today. Accordingly, cosmopolitanism is not just an ideal or an aspira-
tion in the way that, for example, pacifism might be thought to be. It is a set of 
norms embodied in international institutions and in international law. 
Plan for the book 
In this book I shall focus not on the institutional forms that cosmopolitanism 
might take, or on the global institutions that might embody it, but on the ethical 
values and norms that it encapsulates. I shall argue that the following features 
mark the genuine outlook of ethical cosmopolitanism: 
(1) measured endorsement of patriotism; 
(2) opposition to nationalism and chauvinism; 
(3) willingness to suspend narrow national interests in order to tackle global 
problems such as those of environmental degradation or global justice; 
(4) respect for basic human rights as universally normative; 
(5) acknowledging the moral equality of all peoples and individuals; 
(6) respect for the peoples of the world as united by reason, sociability and a 
common humanity; 
(7) belief in a globally acceptable concept of human dignity; 
(8) benevolence to all others irrespective of race, caste, nationality, religion, 
ethnicity or location; 
(9) willingness to come to the aid of those suffering from natural or man-made 
disasters, including extreme poverty; 
(10) commitment to justice in the distribution of natural resources and wealth 
on a global scale; 
(11) global solidarity with struggles for human rights and social justice; 
(12) commitment to the liberalization of immigration and refugee policies; 
(13) acknowledging the sovereignty of nation-states while insisting on limi-
tations to that sovereignty in order to secure human rights and global 
justice; 
(14) quest for lasting world peace; 
(15) respect for the right to self-determination of peoples; 
(16) preparedness to prosecute crimes against humanity internationally; 
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(17) acknowledging the rule of international law; 
(18) commitment to open and participatory political processes globally; 
(19) religious and cultural tolerance and an acceptance of global pluralism; 
(20) dialogue and communication across cultural and national boundaries; 
(21) seeing the world as a single polity and community. 
It is the task of this book to explicate the features listed above. Chapter 1 will 
explicate the features 1-3, while Chapter 2 will deal with 4-7. I shall discuss 
features 8-12 in Chapter 3 and features 13-16 in Chapter 4. The last chapter 
will discuss features 17-21. What I hope will emerge from this analysis is a 
fully articulated conception of the ethics of cosmopolitanism to which any-
one in the world can subscribe irrespective of their cultural, religious or moral 
background. 
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Cosmopolitanism and patriotism 
Love of a particular liberty ... is not exclusive: love of the common liberty 
of one's people easily extends beyond national boundaries and translates 
into solidarity. (Viroli 1995: 12) 
The first three features of cosmopolitanism that I identified at the conclusion 
of the Introduction were: 
(1) measured endorsement of patriotism; 
(2) opposition to nationalism and chauvinism; 
(3) willingness to suspend narrow national interests in order to tackle global 
problems such as those of environmental degradation or global justice. 
According to Ulrich Beck (2002), nationalism is one of the chief enemies of 
cosmopolitan societies. In order to explicate why this is so, we need to distin-
guish patriotism from nationalism, and to understand how they relate to each 
other and to cosmopolitanism. 
The Nussbaum debate 
Martha Nussbaum wrote an essay on patriotism, "Patriotism and Cosmo-
politanism'; that was published in the Boston Review, a widely read intellectual 
journal in the United States, and was later republished with a series of responses 
and replies (Nussbaum 1996a). It critiqued the perceived insularity of American 
education and accused it of failing to produce citizens who are knowledgeable 
about, and thus concerned for, the wider world and its peoples. The educa-
tion that Nussbaum advocated would involve not only expanding the scope of 
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students' interests to distant peoples, but also considering global justice and 
human dignity: values that have no borders. Nussbaum argued that students 
should be taught that they share the world with the whole of humanity and 
that their being American does not entitle them to a privileged position in the 
world. Such an education would allow students to learn more about their own 
way of life by seeing it compared to that of other cultures. It would allow them 
to see that many problems, such as global poverty and the despoliation of the 
environment, can be solved by international cooperation, and that the moral 
values they hold dear as Americans can and should be applied in other parts of 
the world. They would come to see that such values as human dignity, distribu-
tive justice and human rights should be realized globally. In a new introduction 
to the book that she wrote after the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, 
Nussbaum also highlighted the role of compassion, which should extend to the 
whole of humanity. 
Among the several authors that Nussbaum discusses in the essay is Richard 
Rorty. Rorty supports patriotism or nationalism on the grounds that it is pref-
erable that Americans define themselves according to their national identity 
rather than in terms of their ethnic, religious or other more local allegiances. On 
this view, patriotism is a positive emotion because it enlarges its holders' out-
looks from their religious, ethnic or other "tribal" identities to that of the nation. 
Rather than highlight the many differences between people within America, 
a nationalist sentiment serves to unite people into a common allegiance with 
common social aspirations. However, Nussbaum considers that this wider alle-
giance is still too local. It leaves out what we all share universally as human 
beings. A politics of nationalism still involves sectarian interests because it still 
says "America first'; even if it does not say, for example, "Catholic first': Against 
any form of patriotism or nationalism, Nussbaum says: "Only the cosmopolitan 
stance ... has the promise of transcending these divisions, because only this 
stance asks us to give our first allegiance to what is morally good - and that 
which, being good, I can commend as such to all human beings" (1996b: 5). 
The replies to Nussbaum's essay are written by a veritable who's who of 
authors who have written on multiculturalism, identity politics, pluralism and 
communitarianism. Most of them are. critical of Nussbaum's position. For 
example, Benjamin Barber argues that cosmopolitanism is a "thin" commitment 
based purely on intellectual conviction and lacks the appeal to the heart that 
parochial allegiances do.! As developed by Kant, it is a commitment arrived at 
by "pure reason'; which lacks the motivational pull of love of "home and hearth" 
or of nation. As developed by social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes 
(1588-1679), it conceives of individuals merely as rights-bearers able to enter 
into nothing more emotional than pragmatically constructed civic relation-
ships with others. Accordingly he argues that "What we require are healthy, 
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democratic forms of local community and civic patriotism rather than abstract 
universalism and the thin gruel of contract relations" (Barber 1996: 31). This 
point raises an issue that has been discussed ever since Kant developed his 
moral theory. Is morality a matter of purely intellectual conviction, or does it 
also involve the emotions? Kant rejects the emotions as irrelevant to morality 
on the grounds that they are unreliable, confused and inconsistent with the 
freedom of the will to act only on the deliverances of pure reason. Any moral 
theorist who rejects the moral relevance of the emotions will therefore also 
reject the emotion of patriotism. But they will then be left with a purely intel-
lectual moral conviction centred on an abstract notion of persons as bearers 
of rights or holders of human dignity. Barber takes Nussbaum to be proposing 
such a purely intellectual commitment to the moral equality of all people. 
But there is a tradition in moral theory that is an alternative to Kant's. This 
tradition stems from David Hume (1711-76), who highlighted what he called 
the "feelings of humanity': These included sympathy, compassion, the pleasure 
we feel when we see others flourish and the pity we feel when we see others 
suffer. Such feelings come upon us without deliberation - and so cannot be the 
object of moral imperatives - but they are morally laudable. They motivate us 
to act well. By highlighting compassion in her later introduction, Nussbaum 
places herself in this tradition. Many of her critics, including Barber, would see 
themselves as belonging to this tradition as well. For them the question is not 
whether emotions as such matter morally, but which ones do. For Nussbaum, 
compassion is a morally positive emotion, while patriotism is a morally nega-
tive emotion. In contrast, Barber, like Rorty, considers patriotism to be ethically 
positive. 
Robert Pinsky (1996) also sees patriotism as a positive emotion. For him both 
patriotism and cosmopolitanism are states of love. They are commitments that 
arise from our insertion into specific cultural and historical contexts and reflect 
our positive responses to them. But, according to Pinsky, Nussbaum's cosmo-
politanism is in fact parochial in that it is the ideology of the globally mobile 
managerial class. It grows out of a kind of rootlessness that lacks grounding in 
specific communities. To critique nationalism as a form of "jingoism" is to fail 
to see the love of place and of community that is expressed in it. 
Another of Nussbaum's critics, Amy Gutmann, sees positive value in nation-
alism because we need the nation-state as a context for teaching students to 
pursue justice. It is only through the teaching of democratic citizenship in the 
largest community they are in - the state - that students can be taught the 
universal value of human rights. According to Gutmann (1996), the world is 
not a community in the relevant sense and the cosmopolitan focus on the 
world as such does not encourage a respect for justice in any concrete form. In 
a global context, the concept of justice becomes too abstract and intellectual 
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to be motivational. We need the value debates that membership in a demo-
cratic political community encourages to teach us what justice is so that we 
can then take that lesson out beyond our nation's borders. Making a similar 
point, Gertrude Himmelfarb rejects cosmopolitanism on Aristotelian grounds. 
She argues that every person must belong to a "polity': We are inherently social 
beings and require a sense of belonging to a political community with which 
we can identify. She thinks cosmopolitanism is a dangerous illusion because, in 
positing a global form of citizenship, it neglects the situated and communi tar-
ian bonds of each individual. "What cosmopolitanism obscures, even denies, 
are the givens of life: parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, his-
tory, culture, tradition, community - and nationality. These are not 'acciden-
tal' attributes of the individual" (Himmelfarb 1996: 77).2 For his part, Charles 
Taylor (1996) stresses the need for social and political solidarity in liberal states, 
in which the citizen's allegiance is to a common national enterprise of seeking a 
good life. Such enterprises ought to include concern for outsiders but it would 
not help to replace them altogether with a purely cosmopolitan vision.3 
Appiah endorses cosmopolitanism but argues that there is also a place for 
nationalism. For Appiah, a nation is an appropriate object of moral commit-
ment, allegiance and loyalty. He sees a nation in the way that Taylor does: as 
a body of people united by a collective social project and by national senti-
ments that arise when a people lives together in state-like arrangements. Such 
a nation could include people of differing ethnicities, religions and cultural 
backgrounds, provided they are united by the common project of living in a 
political community. "Loosely and unphilosophically defined, a nation is an 
'imagined community' of culture or ancestry running beyond the scale of the 
face-to-face and seeking political expression" (Appiah 1996: 27). Many multi-
cultural societies in the world today have difficulties in creating a nation with a 
single social project in this way. Moreover, since the state is an institution nec-
essary for the ordering of social life and since it exercises coercive power that, 
at least in the case of liberal democratic societies, has moral justification, it is a 
moral good. Appiah (2005: ch. 6) thinks that states are actually more important 
than nations (where nations are defined by the common ethnicity or traditions 
of its members) because they are the embodiment of the political project of 
making laws and a common life and so demand our civic allegiance in a way 
that national or ethnic traditions do not. 
A further critic, Michael W. McConnell, reminds us that moral education 
begins with love of parents and spreads out to specific others through emo-
tions such as admiration. The heroes of a nation are concrete role models, our 
emotional attachment to whom allows us to grow in moral responsibility. He 
repeats Barber's claim that cosmopolitanism is too thin a conception to serve 
this educative role. He quotes the English social philosopher Edmund Burke 
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(1729-97): "To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we 
belong to in society, is the first pr:inciple (the germ as it were) of public affec-
tions. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed toward a love to our 
country and to mankind" (McConnell 1996: 79). Even while advocating uni-
versal concerns, it is necessary to invoke the values of one's national culture or 
religion. In liberal societies, these values should include tolerance and a respect 
for the differences in the cultures and traditions of other peoples. In contrast, 
McConnell argues that, as cosmopolitanism is a commitment to abstractions 
such as "global justice': "human rights" or "humanity': it can lead to moralism 
and intolerance. According to him, "The moralistic cosmopolitan, therefore, is 
not one who everywhere feels comfortable but who everywhere feels superior" 
(ibid.: 82).4 This point expands Himmelfarb's warning that cosmopolitanism is a 
dangerous illusion by suggesting that it is an imperialistic attempt at imposing 
Western values on the rest of the world. 
In her reply to these critics, Nussbaum returns to the question of how 
upbringing impacts on moral education. She addresses the claim that moral 
education and the moral outlook it produces should be understood on the 
analogy of an expanding circle.s This analogy suggests that one first learns to 
love and respect one's parents and one's family and only then can one learn 
to love the wider community. One learns to love and respect one's own co-
religionists or the members of one's own ethnic, linguistic or cultural groups 
before one is able to love and respect one's nation and, finally, global humanity. 
Whether one thinks that the nation is the limit of one's moral affections or that 
moral concern for the whole of humanity is psychologically possible, the model 
used for theorizing the question is that of an expanding circle of moral concern 
in which moral education consists in the widening of this circle to its furthest 
limits.6 This account of moral education assumes that the centre of the circle 
:- the individual self - is already shaped as a moral agent with fully formed 
moral motivations lacking only an appropriate object for its moral concerns. 
Such an agent finds itself initially alone but complete, and then learns to attach 
itself to its mother, its family, its community and so on. If the expanding circles 
were drawn in illustrations as a set of concentric rings defining zones of moral 
concern - representing family, community, neighbourhood, nation and then 
humanity - the rings themselves would represent "and then" in a sequence of 
developmental stages. This is the model implicit in the critiques of Gutmann, 
Himmelfarb, Taylor and McConnell. Nussbaum, however, understands the 
matter differently. 
Nussbaum reminds us that developmental psychologists describe the pro-
cess of moral education as one in which the infant comes to recognize itself 
at the same time as it recognizes others. Its identity is not pre-established but 
develops as its relationships with others develop. It is the acknowledgement 
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and love given it by its parents that help shape the infant into the moral agent it 
will become. Moreover, this process is not only positive. The infant experiences 
pain, hunger and distress and, as a result, forms deeply ambivalent bonds with 
its primary carers. It is needful and also angry at being left needful. It then 
seeks to atone for this anger by love. The expansion of its compassion to others 
is not driven by moral teaching or ethical exemplars but arises because the 
child can empathize with needfulness. A multitude of childhood experiences, 
including stories such as fairy tales - which, Nussbaum reminds us, are sel-
dom geographically or nationally specific - shape the child into a being who 
can empathize with those others who are needful in the same way as it is. 
Accordingly, the circle of compassion does not expand, but is all-embracing 
from the very beginning. It is not an expanding circle but an unlimited one. Of 
course, it is confined to what the child is familiar with, but it does not entail an 
"other" that is not yet included in its scope. According to Nussbaum: 
All circles develop simultaneously, in a complex and interlacing move-
ment. But surely the outer circle is not the last to form. Long before chil-
dren have any acquaintance with the idea of nation, or even of one specific 
religion, they know hunger and loneliness. Long before they encounter 
patriotism, they have probably encountered death. Long before ideology 
interferes, they know something of humanity. (1996c: 142) 
Nussbaum's point is that the love of humanity is not a further stage of moral 
development that comes after one learns to love one's family or community, but 
is always already present in love of parents, community, tribe, race or nation. 
All of these illustrate what it is to be human and constitute concrete forms of 
the love of humanity. One does not have to learn to love one's country in order 
thereby to learn to love humanity later. One learns to love humanity even as 
one learns to love family, community and country. In loving one's family, one's 
friends or one's community, one has been loving humanity all along. If there are 
people who think that others from outside their family or community are less 
worthy of moral respect it will be because they have been taught by an exces-
sively insular or nationalistic education to think that way. 
However, there are other issues raised by Nussbaum's critics. Is cosmopol-
itanism a "thin" commitment lacking the full-bodied and emotional attach-
ments that typify love of family, community and country? Is patriotism a 
positive moral emotion? Can cosmopolitans also love the country in which 
they live? What is the role of the nation-state in the life of a cosmopolitan? Can 
it be a context in which global concerns are developed and expressed? Does a 
cosmopolitan's commitment to human rights and global justice make her blind 
to local differences and intolerant of unusual social and political practices? Can 
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the whole world be considered a polity - if not a community - in which we can 
learn what justice requires of us and what love and compassion demand of US? 
To answer these questions, let us make a fresh beginning. 
Patriotism 
The following phenomena could be used to illustrate patriotism, nationalism, 
chauvinism or all of them combined: 
(a) Each year, on 26 January, Australia celebrates a national holiday called 
Australia Day. The date marks the settlement of the continent by British 
forces who established a penal colony housing convicts sent from over-
crowded prisons in Britain. The Australian nation has sprung from these 
humble beginnings. 
(b) Each year, on 25 April, Australia celebrates a national holiday called Anzac 
Day. The day commemorates a defeat of Australian and New Zealand 
forces at the hands of Turkish troops during the First World War at 
Gallipoli in the Dardanelles. Australian and New Zealand soldiers were 
said to have earned the respect of the world for their courage during that 
doomed campaign. 
(c) There is occasional debate in Australia as to whether it should sever its ties 
with the United Kingdom and become a republic, and whether the Union 
Jack (the flag of the United Kingdom) should be removed from Australia's 
flag. 
(d) During a news broadcast, we are told that an Australian athlete won a 
silver medal at the Olympic Games. We are not told who won the gold. 
(e) During a news broadcast, we are told that seventy people died in a plane 
crash in South Korea. We are told that one victim was an Australian but 
are told nothing about the other sixty-nine. 
(f) At the annual beer festival in Munich, small but rowdy groups of inebriated 
men wearing green and gold outfits (Australia's national colours) are heard 
loudly singing the well-known Australian song "The pub with no beer': 
(g) Like many small townships founded by German settlers in South Australia 
during the nineteenth century, the town of Hergott Springs changed its 
name during the First World War: Hergott Springs became "Marree': 
(h) The national anthem is sung before major sporting events. 
(i) On winning a gold medal at the 1994 Commonwealth Games, Kathy 
Freeman, an Australian athlete of Aboriginal heritage, carried an Australian 
and an Aboriginal flag during her lap of honour. As a result, she was 
heavily criticized by some commentators for disloyalty to Australia. 
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(j) A political party is formed with policies inimical to immigration and the 
rights of indigenous people which calls itself "The Australia First Party': 
(k) Just prior to the Australian federal election in 2002, a Norwegian freighter 
picked up a number of asylum seekers from the Middle East in open 
waters off the north-western coast of Australia. The prime minister of the 
day refused them permission to land in Australia, saying, "We will decide 
who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come" 
(Howard 2001). His party wins the election. 
(1) In December 2005, riots involving over 5000 people broke out on the 
beach at Cronulla, near Sydney. The fighting was between Australian 
youths, some draped in Australian flags and shouting racist slogans, and 
youths from Lebanon and other parts of the Middle East. Sporadic skir-
mishes continued in the area for several days between youths of Middle 
Eastern appearance and youths of Anglo- or Celtic Australian heritage. 
(m) Australian consumers are urged to "buy Australian" in order to support 
Australian farmers and manufacturers. 
(n) During debates about global warming during 2006 and 2007, the then 
prime minister of Australia said that he would not enter into any inter-
national agreements to limit carbon emissions if this compromised the 
competitive advantage of Australia's coal industry. 
(0) Australian soldiers serve alongside American forces, together with other 
members of the "coalition of the willing'; in Iraq and in Afghanistan. 
Australian soldiers are also deployed in peacekeeping missions in East 
Timor and the Solomon Islands. They are praised as heroes and as 
patriots. 
(p) Australian expatriate workers or emigrants feel nostalgia for home. 
(q) Australian musicians, artists, writers and film-makers describe themselves 
as giving expression to an Australian sensibility and way of life through 
their art. 
(r) Australia is described as having a civilizing and enlightening role in its 
geopolitical region by virtue of its heritage in British traditions of democ-
racy and the rule of law. 
(s) Australian egalitarian virtues such as "mateship" and "a fair go" are lauded 
as characteristics that distinguish Australians from others. 
(t) Applicants for Australian citizenship are required to pass a "citizenship 
test" in which they are quizzed on Australian political processes and val-
ues, and also on the life of Australian cricketing great, Don Bradman. 
(u) Politicians and other social commentators sometimes describe those with 
whom they disagree as "un-Australian': 
(v) In February 2008, at the beginning of the first sitting of the new Federal 
Parliament after the election of 2007, the new prime minister of Australia 
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offered a formal apology to the Aboriginal people of Australia for past 
government policies that removed Aboriginal children from their families 
for racist reasons. 
The present author is Australian and all the examples offered above relate 
to Australia. 
These examples range from what could be seen as cynical uses of nationalist 
jingoism to illustrations of the way in which many people think of patriotism: 
namely, as "love of one's country': In what follows I shall question the appropri-
ateness of the concept of "love" and also highlight the ambiguity of the notion 
of "country" that occurs in such definitions of patriotism. 
According to Stephen Nathanson, patriotism could be described as an atti-
tude that involves: 
• special affection for one's own country; 
• a sense of personal identification with the country; 
• special concern for the well-being of the country; 
• willingness to sacrifice to promote the country's good. (1993: 34-5) 
The first of these features suggests that patriotism is an emotion. It is a positive 
feeling of affection that we have for our country. Accordingly, some writers sug-
gest that it is not rational or based on a considered judgement (MacIntyre 2002; 
Oldenquist 1982; see also Primoratz & Pavkovic 2007). We do not survey the 
countries of the world and make a judgement as to which of them is worthy of 
our allegiance or affection. If we have such a feeling, we simply find ourselves 
with it. Love is not a feeling that is rationally based. In a romantic context, we 
do not choose whom we might love, but find ourselves falling in love with them. 
If love were based on a rational appraisal of the beloved, we would be apt to 
change our affections if we met someone who fulfilled our criteria for romantic 
excellence more fully than the one we actually loved. But if we were inclined to 
do this we would not really be in love. If patriotism were a form of love it would 
also be irrational in this way. We would just find ourselves having such a feeling 
without any rational basis and without any judgement having been made by us 
about the worthiness of our country. 
In all but the most unusual cases, the country that we have the feeling for 
is our country. For most people this will be the country of their birth, but 
for many it will be their adopted country or the country to which they have 
migrated. To explain the logical point that patriotism is love of our country, 
we can use the analogy of parental love. Parental love is love for the parent's 
own child. It is not a love of children generally that happens to be applied to 
one's own child. It is not love of childlike qualities such that because the parent 
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happens to find them in their child they then focus their love on that child. It 
is the love of that particular child simply because that child is their child. In a 
similar way it is said that patriots love their country simply because it is their 
country. Using the parental love analogy shows that it is true by definition that 
the country a patriot loves is their own country. They might love or admire 
other countries for one reason or another but those loves are not cases of patri-
otism, just as loving another's child is not a case of parental love. 
The explanation for parental love being necessarily directed on the parent's 
own child is clear. Most often it is based on blood ties and sometimes it is based 
on a bond that is created through adoption or a second marriage. If we endorse 
the theory that patriotism is a special case of love, and if we agree that there is 
no rational basis for such love, we might nevertheless give an account of how 
patriots come to love their country. If it is not on the basis of reasons, then it 
will be a causal and psychological matter. It seems to be a psychological fact 
about most people that, in the course of their upbringing, they come to love 
their countries. Most basically, this will be because their own country is the 
country that they are most familiar with. If their country is the country of their 
birth, their country will also typically be the place where their most formative 
and valuable experiences have taken place. It will be the country whose history 
they have studied in school and celebrated in public events and holidays. At 
school they will often have taken part in rituals such as saluting the flag. The 
achievements of their country's citizens will have been most celebrated in their 
news media. The communal values that they have acquired will be linked to the 
traditions of that country. Much of their experiences of art and entertainment 
will have come to them with a significance that speaks to them of their country. 
(This explains why some Australians think it important for new citizens to be 
aware of Don Bradman, even though such knowledge, along with knowledge of 
the game of cricket, seems very incidental to loyal and responsible citizenship.) 
In some countries they will have heard stories about ancient links between the 
people and the land: between the race and its ties to the very soil on which the 
country is based. In other countries they will have heard stories about settlers 
carving a new and civilized life out of the wilderness, or about the battles that 
were necessary to establish the nation in the face of opposition from invaders 
or internal threats. 
For migrants, on the other hand, the experiences that lead to love of country 
might be different. In such cases, there will be stories of families saved from 
economic hardship, political oppression or religious persecution, and of how 
the new country has been a source of refuge or opportunity. Migrants tend to 
have split feelings about their countries. Many continue to feel links to, and 
take an interest in, the country of their birth, while also finding themselves with 
positive feelings towards the country in which they have settled. When they 
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return to the country of their birth, whether to visit friends or enjoy a holiday, 
they often feel a special connection to their old country despite many years of 
separation. They might feel themselves torn when the football team of the old 
country meets the football team of the new. Whom will they support? One 
British politician is reported to have said that it should be part of an English 
citizenship test that migrants support England in such cases (Sen 2006: 153). 
1he crucial point here is that we are talking about feelings and affections that 
cannot be artificially produced by rational decisions or certified by loyalty tests. 
1hey are a product of experiences that are inevitably embedded in a specific 
country. 
As plausible as the social psychology account sketched here might be, I 
do wonder whether the picture of patriotism as love of one's country that it 
gives us is accurate. Is patriotism to be understood as an irrational and socially 
caused affection for one's country? Are the analogies with romantic love and 
parental love appropriate? One of the ethical implications of such analogies is 
that such a love should withstand negative judgements about the beloved. The 
love of a spouse should survive most misdemeanours that the spouse might 
commit or blemishes in beauty or character that the spouse might suffer from. 
Parents should not reject their children when they fail to fulfil expectations or 
even turn to crime, but must continue to support them out of their love for 
them. If love of country is like this, does it follow that patriots must continue to 
love and support their countries even if their governments abuse human rights 
or engage in unjustified wars? Is there no point at which a rational appraisal of 
one's country's moral and political status should counter the positive feelings 
that upbringing will have produced? If rationality plays no part in one's love of 
country, then it would seem not. Accordingly, if patriotism is a special affection 
for one's country, I doubt that we should call it "love" understood on analogy 
with such irrational forms as romantic or parental love. 
Let us consider what is meant by the second clause above: "a sense of per-
sonal identification with the country': "Identification" is an important concept 
in this context. It refers to how persons understand themselves and what self-
images they have. It refers to what persons will find important and to what 
they will give priority. It refers to the norms they internalize and how strongly 
they feel themselves to be bound by them. If persons identify themselves as 
Catholic, to use an example not directly linked to patriotism, they will see 
themselves as living a life dedicated to achieving salvation and union with God 
in heaven through participation in the sacramental life and theological beliefs 
of the Catholic Church. They will give priority to the rituals, observances and 
practices of the Church and think of themselves as Catholics to the extent that 
they fulfil those requirements. If they are in situations of ethical conflict, they 
will follow the guidelines of Catholic moral theology and will feel themselves 
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to be sinners if they should fail to follow those norms. Their identification 
with their faith will lead them to hold very strongly to their moral convictions. 
Presented with an option or a temptation that is contrary to the norms of their 
faith, they will reject it, not only as a violation of those convictions but also as 
an affront to who they are. They will also take part in public demonstrations 
of their religious commitment, whether it be through processions in the city 
streets or participation in pilgrimages to places sacred to the faith. Moreover, 
they will relate themselves to the central stories of their religion, seeking to live 
a life that imitates that of Jesus in relevant respects. 
How would what we have learnt about what it is to identify oneself with a 
group in the case of religion apply to patriotism? What would "a sense of per-
sonal identification with a country" amount to? What does it mean to under-
stand oneself, or announce oneself to the world, as an Australian? It would 
seem to imply that one relates oneself to the story of Australia and that one 
would want to participate in the rituals that mark one as an Australian. The his-
tory of a country is an ongoing saga with a vast cast of participants. But there 
are some people who are participants and others who are not. In calling oneself 
an Australian one is saying that one is a participant in that story and not the 
story of some other country. In this way one can take pride in the achievements 
recounted in that story, feel shame at the wrongs that have been done in it, and 
be committed to the progressive continuation of that story into the future and 
to playing a positive role in it. One associates oneself with other Australians, 
whether it be sports heroes, stars of entertainment, successful business entre-
preneurs or soldiers serving in other parts of the world. This is illustrated by 
the first two examples at the head of this section. Australia Day and Anzac 
Day are ritual reminders of Australia's past that celebrate the achievements of 
Australians' predecessors and that invite Australians to join them in the unfold-
ing Australian story. 
Whereas the theory that patriotism is love of one's country would say that 
the processes of psychological formation, including engagement with these 
rituals and memorials, create affection for one's country, I would say that 
what they produce is identification with one's country. If the story of one's 
country is predominantly a positive one, this identification will tend to pro-
duce in the patriot a feeling of pride. The processes through which a person 
comes to identify with his or her country produce, not love for, but pride in, 
their country. One can feel pride in one's country to the extent that one iden-
tifies with it and with its achievements. Of course, there is a negative side 
to this. The story of Australia also includes shameful episodes, especially in 
relation to the dispossession of the Aboriginal inhabitants and their subse-
quent treatment. While the ideological apparatus that seeks to create positive 
feelings for one's country will stress the positive achievements or will seek to 
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turn even such defeats as that suffered at Gallipoli into a positive demonstra-
tion of the pluck and persistence of Australia's young fighting men, the neg-
ative episodes must also be dealt with. That is why example (v) above was 
so important. It allowed Australians to once again feel pride in their country 
because it had acknowledged and apologized for the wrongs that it had com-
mitted in the past. 
We can interpret many of the other examples at the head of this section in 
terms of pride more readily than in terms of affection. Debates about whether 
Australia should sever its ties to the British monarchy mentioned in example 
(c) are about the image of Australia as an independent and mature nation no 
longer reliant on adherence to the ancient institution of the British Crown 
for the legitimation of its political system. Example (d) illustrates the way in 
which Australians will identify with, and take pride in, Australian athletic 
champions and sports heroes. The same applies to Australian high achievers 
in other endeavours, whether these be the arts, entertainment or business. 
Because the achievers are Australian, Australians identify with them and take 
pride in them. Their achievements are felt to enhance those of all Australians. 
Even in competitions centred on individual effort, such as a Grand Slam tennis 
tournament, the nationality of the individual tennis player will be mentioned 
and groups in the crowd will cover themselves in the national colours and 
support their compatriots. Sometimes the behaviour will become unpleasant, 
as in example (f). But here too we see the need that people apparently feel to 
gather in groups defined by nationality and then express what they consider to 
be the most notable - if not always admirable - national characteristics of that 
group. In this case it is national pride expressed in boorish behaviour, but it is 
pride nonetheless. Singing the national anthem at major sporting events would 
clearly be an expression of pride if the event is an international match of some 
kind, but it is sung even at the grand finals of national competitions. In such 
cases, I would interpret it as a ritual of identification in which not only pride 
in one's country is expressed but also a commitment to those of its values that 
relate especially to sport - values such as "mateship" and "a fair go" - along 
with such universal values as fair play and competitiveness. 
Our identity is a framework from within which we see the rest of the world. 
I think about the world and my obligations within it as an Australian, as a male, 
as someone well-to-do, as an atheist, as a member of a specific family, as white, 
as "Western" and so on. Accordingly, when I am called on to assist others in 
need, the fact that one of the possible objects of my concern is an Australian 
has the effect of drawing my attention to that person in a way that it is not 
drawn to another. This is why in news reports, when seventy people are killed 
in a disaster, Australians have their attention drawn to the fact (or drawn by 
the fact) that one of them was Australian. This is clearly not a matter of justice, 
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which ought to be impartial. But it is a matter of human psychology, whid 
structures and expresses our identity in these and other ways. 
If pride is a predominant expression of national identification in a self-
confident country such as Australia, identification can take other forms in 
countries or communities that have been oppressed or humiliated in the course 
of their histories. Recent commentary on the causes of Islamist terrorism, and 
on religious fundamentalism more generally, has described the victim mental-
ity that often grows out of stories of national defeat or religious persecution 
(Ali 2007: ch. 7; see also Armstrong 2000). To identify with a defeated people is 
often to court resentment and anger and to feel that only violence can restore 
the pride of one's people. 
Interpreting love of one's country in terms of pride and identification helps 
to explain the very close link between patriotism and militarism. As a socio-
logical fact there is no doubt that there are very strong and frequent links 
between the two. Soldiers march at almost all of the rituals and celebrations 
that forge the identification of Australians with their country and such events 
are a global phenomenon. Australian soldiers posted abroad are said to be serv-
ing their country even in cases where the foreign policies being pursued are 
ultimately those of the USA or when they are serving as part of a UN mandate. 
The bodies of war casualties and even of those who died by accident or friendly 
fire in foreign campaigns are brought home in coffins draped in the national 
flag. As mentioned in example (0), to be a soldier and to face danger in uniform 
is seen as the quintessential example of patriotism. The stories that constitute 
the historical lore of a nation will most often be stories of battles fought and 
won in order to establish and then defend the national borders. These stories 
invite contemporary compatriots to identify themselves with the brave sol-
diers whose past exploits have forged the nation and its national character. 
Soldiers put their lives at risk and those of us who sit comfortably at home 
readily identify with them in order to swell our pride. The sacrifices made by 
soldiers also highlight the fourth of Nathanson's explications of what love of 
country might mean: namely, "willingness to sacrifice to promote the country's 
good': Soldiers are seen as being willing to make the ultimate sacrifice, and 
many do. Whether they do so explicitly or self-consciously for the sake of their 
countries or whether their soldiering was just a way to escape unemployment 
or meaninglessness is immaterial. The rhetoric of patriotism will ensure that 
their deaths or wounds are interpreted as gifts to the nation with which their 
compatriots can identify. 
Nathanson's third explication of what love of country might mean was "spe-
cial concern for the well-being of the country': This might be thought to extend 
to a special concern for one's compatriots as exemplified in example (e). But 
it is mainly illustrated by examples (m) and (n). Here we see "the well-being 
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of the country" being understood as the economic prosperity of the country. 
In the case of being urged to buy Australian products, the benefit is envisaged 
as flowing to the whole national community. It might begin by being the pros-
perity and profitability of the Australian companies whose goods are being 
favoured, but through secure employment and contributions to taxation in an 
equitable system of social welfare, this prosperity should flow through to the 
whole country. 
Example (n) raises significant issues of balancing the national commercial 
interest against global responsibility. Global warming is a threat to Australia 
just as much as it is to the rest of the world, and a pursuit of the national inter-
est should be prepared to make short-term economic sacrifices to gain long-
term environmental advantages. Moreover, national governments should be 
prepared to suspend the pursuit of purely national interests in order to exer-
cise global responsibilities. It was the Australian prime minister who framed 
the issue as one in which national interests were seen as threatened by global 
pressures and one in which he would defend the national interest against such 
"foreign" threats. If "special concern for the well-being of the country" leads to 
such policy positions it would be a very suspect sentiment. 
These examples raise the question of what might be meant by "the national 
interest': In capitalist countries it seems to include national prosperity based 
on successful private enterprise, along with protection of the borders and the 
state's territorial integrity. National security is often said to be central to the 
national interest, but this frequently extends from protecting the nation's ter-
ritory and economic resources at home to enhancing commercial opportu-
nities and securing natural resources abroad, whether by diplomatic or by 
military means. But the more important question is whether the objects of 
these interests correspond to what is loved when we speak of "love of coun-
try': By and large the national interest corresponds to the interests of the elites 
that dominate the nation-state. Given that the nation-state is a legally defined 
jurisdiction over which a government holds responsibility and within which 
commercial enterprises and individuals engage in their pursuit of prosperity 
and pay taxes, there can be no doubt that there is a close link between every 
individual's pursuit of happiness and the success of the national economy and 
of the government in protecting it. However, is this what we love when we love 
our country? Is this what we take pride in when we identify with our country? 
Is this what we are concerned for when we display a "special concern for the 
well-being of our country"? There may be some instances where we take pride 
in the achievements of our country's entrepreneurs just as we do of our coun-
try's sporting champions, but this will be because they are conspicuous high 
achievers with whom we can identify rather than because they have contrib-
uted to the country's prosperity. Many people admire them even if the profits 
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they have generated go offshore. It is enough that they are our compatriot 
and that they are successful. Our pride and identification are based on thei 
being successful compatriots rather than on the benefits they may have givel 
our nation-state. It seems, then, that love of country is not coextensive with 1 
special concern for the national interest. 
Let us return to the phrase "love of one's country': I have suggested that 
"love" should not be understood on analogy with romantic or parental love 
but that it is better understood as a form of identification that ideally leads to 
pride in one's country and concern for its well-being. But what do we under-
stand by "country"? Do we mean the nation-state of which we are citizens, in 
whose political and commercial life we participate in one form or another, and 
whose laws structure our lives? The social psychology account given above 
seems to suggest a different answer. It suggests that our bonds of loyalty are 
forged with our historical people, its language, culture and traditions. We may 
love the ethnicity that has shaped us and our outlook on the world. We may 
feel an attachment to the land on which we are born and whose very physi-
cal features have engrained themselves on our hearts. We may relate to the 
religion of our forefathers or to the music and iconography we experienced as 
children. None of this may bear any direct relationship to the national citizen-
ship with which we find ourselves. National borders are notoriously arbitrary. 
Borders often split peoples who share traditions and languages into different 
states, not only in countries that were once colonies of European powers, but 
even in countries with long histories of autonomy and political independence. 
Consider the Belgians, the Kurds, the Basques or the Tibetans. The most egre-
gious example is Africa, in which hardly any borders correspond to the home-
land of a people united by cultural traditions and ethnic identities. So what 
is the object of patriotism? Is it one's country defined as the nation-state of 
which one is a citizen? Or is it the ethnic, religious or cultural group with 
which one identifies?7 
In his contribution to the Nussbaum debate, Appiah had argued that even 
though its borders might be historically arbitrary, the state is not a morally 
arbitrary political structure. It is the basis of the community that constitutes 
a modern nation. One's nation in this modern sense is a matter of both senti-
ment and political commitment. Membership of such a nation is voluntary to 
a greater degree than is membership of a community into which one is born 
because one can apply for nationality in a country to which one has migrated. 
Appiah (1996: 28) argues that a nation, understood in this sense, is morally 
valuable and that it is morally appropriate to feel allegiance to it. People should 
be allowed to choose their nation if that is their autonomous choice. Many 
people value their nationality, do not consider their nationality to be arbitrary 
and consider it morally significant in their lives. If the object of patriotism is 
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the nation in this sense, then it would seem to be a morally appropriate object. 
However, if only for the sake of terminological darity, I would suggest that, in 
talking about the nation in this way, Appiah is actually talking about the mod-
ern nation-state. 
According to Anthony Giddens: 
The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a 
set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative 
monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule 
being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and 
external violence. 
(1985: 121, quoted in Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 34-5) 
The notion of one's "country" could refer either to this purely administrative 
notion of the nation-state or to one's community bound together by history, 
ethnicity, language or a common social project. Many states contain a number 
of such communities (and sometimes not as wholes). It seems, then, that the 
notion of "country" as the object of one's affection or identification is ambigu-
ous. It follows that the notion of patriotism is ambiguous. It can mean iden-
tification with one's traditional, ethnic, religious or national community, or it 
can mean loyalty to the bordered political community or nation-state of which 
one is a citizen. Nathanson's use of the term "country" obscures this ambiguity 
and the true nature of the object of one's loyalty or allegiance that he describes 
as "love of country': But in so far as he places stress on emotions such as affec-
tion, it seems to me that the proper object of the patriotism he describes is the 
cultural community with which one identifies rather than the nation-state of 
which one is a citizen. 
One should not adopt an inflated conception of one's nation-state or of one's 
nationality. One's nationality is nothing more than one's membership of the 
nation-state of which one is a citizen. When Appiah talks about nationality, he 
is actually talking about citizenship. In so far as nationality is a status that can 
be applied for in law, it is tied to the legal institutions of the state and hence 
to citizenship of that state. It is simply what is indicated on one's passport. If 
it is morally valuable it is for the same reasons that one's citizenship is morally 
valuable. One's nationality understood as citizenship shapes one's moral com-
mitments as a matter of pragmatic convenience and reciprocal justice. All that 
is needed in even the most multicultural of societies is that all the individu-
als and communities that constitute it respect the rule of law, contribute to 
the common good by paying taxes and participate in its political processes in 
appropriate ways. This is what is meant by a "polity': One's nationality is one's 
membership of a political community to which one has moral obligations as 
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a citizen. Any deeper form of loyalty such as "love of country" is an optional 
extra. It seems either artificial or ideological to speak, as Taylor (1996) does, 
of a common project of seeking a good life or, as Appiah does, of an "imagined 
community" (1996: 27). The polity of which one is a member is a political real-
ity that has legal and pragmatic effects, while one's community is the object of 
one's affections and the source of one's identity. 
Nationalism 
The idea of a nation as an "imagined community" united by a common 
national project, culture or ancestry contributes to the ideology of national-
ism. Nationalism became prominent in Europe during the nineteenth century 
and was used by rulers of European states in order to foment hatred of other 
nation-states and to encourage people to enlist in armies to engage in military 
adventures against each other (Cobban 1969). As an ideology it served the inter-
ests of ruling classes in their colonial expansion and in their competition with 
other nations for wealth and glory. It also served their interests by redirecting 
social unrest and quests for social justice into hatred of foreign powers. This led 
to the emergence of the modern European idea of a nation as a territory and 
a population coextensive with administrative borders and legal jurisdictions 
reinforced with a mythology that spoke of the destiny of a people as defined by 
those borders. "Nation building" - at least in its nineteenth-century European 
forms and also its postcolonial forms in the emerging world - involved the 
attempt to bind people to the nation-state by bonds that were more than just 
pragmatic or based on shared interests or reciprocal duties. Even in the absence 
of a unifying tradition, religion or ethnicity, what such processes seek to cre-
ate is allegiance and loyalty to the nation that go beyond merely instrumental 
forms of membership. 
Accordingly, the psychological phenomenon of nationalism occurs when 
one's identity-shaping community and one's nation-state are felt to correspond. 
For a nationalist, the connection that one has to one's nation-state will not 
feel arbitrary or merely pragmatic. It will be felt as an inseparable part of one's 
identity. It is an object of commitment. The nationalist transfers the bonds he 
feels with his ethnic, linguistic or religious community to the nation-state of 
which he is a citizen. Cosmopolitans would be highly suspicious of these kinds 
of allegiance or loyalty and would see them as forms of nationalism that ought 
to be avoided. Loyalty to one's identity-forming community is a valid form of 
belonging, but nationalism is a dangerous ideology.8 
But why is it important to avoid nationalism? Is there anything morally ques-
tionable about feeling a high degree of identification with one's nation-state? 
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Would such a degree of identification lead to morally reprehensible forms 
of tribalism? To begin to explore this question, let us return to Nathanson. 
Nathanson speaks of what he calls "extreme forms of patriotism'; which 
involve: 
• a belief in the superiority of one's country; 
• a desire for dominance over other countries; 
• an exclusive concern for one's own country; 
• no constraints on the pursuit of one's country's goals; and 
• automatic support of one's country's military policies. (1993: 29) 
I would suggest that this sketch accurately describes nationalism. IfI am right in 
this, then nationalism would be distinguished from patriotism not only by hav-
ing a distinctive object - namely, the nation-state - but also by being a different 
kind of stance towards that object - namely, an irrational commitment border-
ing on fanaticism. I would suggest that, if love of country or identification with 
one's country takes this form of nationalism, it is not a morally valuable stance 
or one that should take priority over the outlook of cosmopolitanism. 
The five attitudes above that constitute extreme patriotism or national-
ism are irrational. First, if everyone around the world believed that their own 
country was the best, most of them would have to be wrong, since only one 
country can be the best. Secondly, the desire that one's country have domi-
nance over others is the same desire for glory and status that has led rulers 
and kings into battle with each other for centuries. Whether such battles are 
fought in contemporary business boardrooms or the cabinet rooms of govern-
ments, the logic of such competitiveness leads inexorably to war. In a world of 
finite and diminishing resources, competitiveness can only lead to struggles 
over access to such resources. Thirdly, to be concerned for one's own country 
at the expense of others, or even to the exclusion of others, is simply a case 
of selfishness writ large. Just as selfishness is morally vicious if it is pursued 
at the expense, or through the exploitation, of others, so national interest, if 
pursued at the expense, or through the exploitation, of other peoples is ethi-
cally reprehensible. It is also irrational in that it will lead to resentment and 
thence to international instability. Fourthly, anyone who thinks that there are 
no constraints on the pursuit of one's country's goals is someone who would be 
prepared to break both civil and international law, and also any moral norms, 
in order to secure their country's interest and power. Fifthly, the link so often 
made between patriotism and militarism can often lead to automatic endorse-
ment of a country's military policies. No matter how unjustified a war might 
be, anyone who questions it will be deemed disloyal or a traitor. Any dissent 
will be deemed an insult to the sacrifices made by the soldiers brought back 
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in body bags. Any consideration of the humanity or of the interests of "the 
enemy'; or the deaths and injuries suffered by their civilians and soldiers, will 
be deemed cowardly and treasonous. 
It should not be necessary to take much time to show that these attitudes 
are irrational and unethical. However, if one has conceived of nationalism as 
an extreme form of patriotism and of patriotism as love of one's country, and 
hence as an emotion not subject to the scrutiny of reasonable reflection, then 
it is very difficult to say how this irrational form can be avoided. If national-
ism is an extreme form of patriotism and if patriotism is an irrational emotion, 
then how can reason and common sense be deployed in order to prevent this 
extreme being reached? 
We now have a number of intersecting distinctions. We have Nathanson's 
distinction between patriotism and extreme patriotism, along with my sug-
gestion that this extreme patriotism should be thought of as nationalism. 
Nathanson clearly disapproves of extreme patriotism but not of what he calls 
"moderate patriotism': Then we have my suggestion that patriotism is itself an 
ambiguous notion referring to both a form of pragmatic and legal citizenship 
of the nation-state of which one is a member, and to allegiance to the people 
with whom one identifies and whose traditions one feels oneself belonging to. 
I have already explicated this form of patriotism through the process of identity 
formation rather than through the analogy with irrational love. I must now ask 
what moral judgements should be made about such processes and about the 
attitudes and allegiances they produce. 
In order to do this, let us use a different analogy. Imagine that you are a fan of 
a football club. Your parents supported the club before you were born and took 
you to its matches from an early age. You now take a keen interest in the club's 
activities. You attend all the matches you can, even travelling long distances in 
order to do so. You dress in the team's colours and give friendly greetings to 
strangers dressed in the same colours. You enjoy talking with other supporters 
about past premierships and heroic deeds performed by star players. At the 
matches you cheer loudly, abuse the umpires, argue with the supporters of the 
opposing team, sing the club anthem vigorously, regard any free kicks awarded 
against your team as unjust and any awarded against the opposing team as 
thoroughly deserved and so on. When the team wins you are elated and when 
they lose you feel crushed. You have done nothing more than add your voice 
and enthusiasm to the large crowd of supporters, but when your team wins you 
bask in its glory. When it loses you feel despondent. When its players cheat 
you feel real shame and when they display the virtues of sportsmanship you 
feel pride. You are a law-abiding citizen so you do not become drunk and dis-
orderly during or after the game and you do not engage in any hooliganism or 
violence against opposing supporters or their property. Nevertheless, you are 
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hearty and boisterous in support of your team. In discussions with others you 
will claim that yours is the best team, prevented from taking the premiership 
only because of bad luck or bad umpiring decisions. You give money to the 
team through club memberships and raffles. You give priority to going to the 
matches over most other social events, and you read the sporting pages of the 
press avidly every day for news of your team's players. In short, you love your 
team, are irrationally committed to it, take great pride in it and identify yourself 
with it. It is easy to see how this sketch offers a suitable analogy for patriotism 
and even for nationalism. All the features of those phenomena listed above are 
present. This allegiance came to you as part of your upbringing and is now part 
of your social and existential identity. You love your team and are prepared to 
make sacrifices for its well-being. 
The way in which many people passionately follow their sports teams or 
sporting heroes tells us something about the human condition. Friedrich 
Nietzsche argued that all of life - and thus human life also - involves strug-
gles for domination. He called this "will-to-power" (Nietzsche [1886] 1966). 
Animals compete against one another not only for access to food and resources 
and thus for survival, but also for dominance in their groups and for access to 
mates. In the context of human life, this competitiveness is sublimated and 
transformed into a struggle for status, self-affirmation, self-differentiation and 
dominance over others. We all want to shine. We want to be unique. We avoid 
merely fitting in with the mass of people. We pursue activities that require high 
levels of ability and we often create formal competitions to decide who has 
acquired the greatest skill. Alongside sporting competitions, we have musi-
cal talent quests, beauty pageants and business competition. We are restless 
to succeed and to be better at our chosen calling than anyone else. Of course, 
these inclinations are tempered somewhat by ethical rules and constraints of 
etiquette so that the achievements that flow from them are turned to the benefit 
of others. Without these constraints human life would be a cut-throat struggle. 
Even if it is not always a matter of acquiring power over others, will-to-power 
is often a pursuit of recognition and of status. We want to be acknowledged 
and we want our achievements praised. But we do not only want this for our 
individual selves. We also want it for the groups we identify with. We want our 
people or our club to be acknowledged and recognized. Moreover, we bask in 
the glory that our club or our people might achieve. Being a fan of a sporting 
club illustrates this well. We identify with the club. The basis of this identifica-
tion might be historical- our parents and their parents also followed that club; 
or geographical - we live in the town of which that club is the representative; 
or arbitrary - we like the colour of their uniforms. But once we have made 
the commitment and identified ourselves as a fan of that club, the successes 
of the club become our successes and its failures become our failures. Our 
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enthusiasm for the club is an expression of will-to-power mediated by psycho-
logical identification with that club. 
My first suggestion is that the emotion of patriotism, both in its moderate 
and extreme, nationalist forms, should be understood as a form of will-to-
power in the same way as being a fan of a football club can be. 
But there is a crucial difference. However intense your enthusiasm for a 
football team or a sports hero and however total your commitment to them, 
you are always able to say to yourself that it is only a game. If you are a rational 
person, you will be aware that none of the excitement, ritual, legends, heroes, 
victories and losses of a football club are of ultimate importance. You might 
not ever say this to yourself and the rhetoric into which you have immersed 
yourself may seem to speak of ultimacy, but you would not be prepared to kill 
anyone to defend the honour or interests of your team. You would not refuse 
to attend your spouse's funeral if it were held on the afternoon of a match, even 
if it were a championship decider. Joking with friends over a few drinks, you 
might swear that nothing is more important to you than your team's fortunes, 
but you would secretly know that you were acting out a part. You would be able 
to laugh at yourself. You would enjoy your commitment as a kind of play-acting 
or a charade. Taking it seriously and avowing its ultimacy is part of that game. 
You identify yourself as a team supporter and you would play out the role that 
this gives you, but you would be subliminally aware that it is a role. Your com-
mitment would be ironic.9 
Such irony is not appropriate in the context of love. You do not love your 
spouse with the secret thought that it is only a game. You do not love your child 
with an implicit laugh at the role you are playing as a parent. 
According to Harry Frankfurt (1988), human freedom consists in the abil-
ity to not only have desires, emotions, motivations and intentions that lead 
to actions and make them voluntary, but also to reflect on them and to ask 
ourselves whether we are content to have them. This second-order level of 
reflection allows us to distance ourselves from our caused emotional states, 
bracket their motivational power and alter the degree of influence they have 
over us. If the intensity of our emotional states and commitments overwhelms 
this capacity to reflect we lose our freedom as human agents. The irony that 
football fans ought to embrace is not a lessening of commitment, but a reten-
tion of this kind of second-order freedom. 
My second suggestion is that patriotism should be understood through the 
analogy not of romantic or parental love, but of being a football fan. If the 
irony and hidden detachment that marks a sensible commitment to a football 
team could be applied to one's commitment to one's country or one's people, 
then patriotism could be seen as an ethically harmless commitment and the 
excesses of nationalism could be avoided. Nationalism or extreme patriotism 
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arises when the commitment to one's country becomes absolute and inflexible 
so as to override any moral constraints, any norms of reasonableness, and any 
capacity for critical reflection. This suggests that a morally acc~ptable form of 
allegiance to country - whether in the form of the nation-state or in the form 
of one's people and its traditions - is a form that is attended by flexibility and 
an absence of absolutism: that is, by irony. Just as a rational person would judge 
that a football team has no ultimate importance, so one needs to consider how 
important the object of one's patriotic allegiance should be. My love for my 
spouse has an object that is highly significant and demanding, and any degree 
of irony would be inappropriate. I would say the same in relation to my child. 
But of my country we can certainly ask how important it is and what the degree 
and scale of our commitment should be. In so far as nationalism or extreme 
patriotism is a form of commitment that smacks of fanaticism, any degree of 
irony will destroy it. And so it should. 
But does this mean that the milder emotional form of patriotism that 
Nathanson has described and which he espouses can be endorsed by a cosmo-
politan? While I think such patriotism is as harmless as cheering on a football 
team, I do not think it should be given much ethical significance or normativity. 
In and of itself one's country is of little importance. Both patriotism and nation-
alism become pernicious if the special focus on one's country that they espouse 
elevates that country into having an importance of its own and militates against 
the scope and urgency of one's concern for human rights and social justice on 
a global scale. The ethical commitment of a cosmopolitan is to human rights 
and global justice. Because the cosmopolitan's own country has a role to play 
in the pursuit of human rights and global justice both in its internal policies 
and in its foreign policies, she pursues her global ethical concerns through the 
political processes of her own country and therefore has a pragmatic commit-
ment to those processes. to 
Political patriotism 
Accordingly, what we need is a political conception of patriotism. I define "polit-
ical patriotism" as loyalty to the polis of which one is a member.ll It was Socrates 
in Plato's Crito who first articulated this form of social and political loyalty and 
respect for the rule of law. Offered the chance to escape from prison and from 
his judicial execution, Socrates refuses on the ground that "the Laws" have been 
of service to him by establishing the society in which he was able to flourish and 
have thereby earned his loyalty and commitment. To subvert the rule of law by 
escaping would be to undermine the political consensus on which Athens had 
established its social order. Whereas other cities were ruled by power, force and 
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fear, Athens was a polity that depended on the cooperation of its members. This 
cooperation is an instance of political patriotism: a practical stance towards the 
political structures of which one is a part based on the extent to which those 
structures protect human rights and produce social justice. 
In the modern European tradition this idea is best expressed by the notion 
of a social contract through which both the legitimacy of the state and the 
citizen's obligation to respect the rule of law are established by an implicit 
acknowledgement of the contract-like practical commitment of both to social 
justice. Allegiance to the state is secured by the state's adhering to its part of 
the implicit bargain when it protects citizens from foreign incursions or from 
domestic criminality and when it secures a just distribution of social goods. 
And this allegiance to the state is expressed by a willingness to contribute to the 
common weal by paying taxes, serving in the military, contributing to the econ-
omy and participating in political decision-making. This form of patriotism 
may be most readily elicited in a modern, pluralist and liberal state, but it can 
also arise in other forms of political organization in which rights are protected 
and laws applied impartially. Such patriotism defines the political community 
as an object of one's allegiance. The willingness to participate in political pro-
cesses in accordance with civic duty is a form of that allegiance. However, the 
political community is seen not as an object of ultimate importance or of blind 
loyalty, but as a means for securing the political goals of justice and the protec-
tion of human rights. This form of patriotism is not seduced by the romance 
of the nation or constrained by the sanctity of tradition. Nor does it imagine 
that the demands of human rights or of justice stop at the borders of the state 
of which one is a citizen. Political patriotism could even be seen as a practical 
and localized form of cosmopolitanism. 
Nathanson's argument against militaristic forms of patriotism provides an 
unintended hint of this idea. He argues that it is a mistake to admire as patri-
otic only soldiers who are prepared to, or actually have had to, give their lives 
for their country. We should be prepared to praise as patriotic anyone who 
sacrifices something to promote the country's good: people like firefighters, 
nurses and teachers. According to Nathanson, businessmen who pay their 
taxes, judges who administer the law with impartiality and politicians who seek 
the people's good without fear or favour are all patriots in this sense. I would 
respond by arguing that the term "patriot" has now become too broad. What 
these ethically admirable people are doing is pursuing a range of values that 
are good in themselves. The national identity of these values or of the people 
who benefit from them is irrelevant. Safety from fire, social justice, impartial-
ity in the rule of law, education and health care are all values that it is good to 
pursue. But they are not values that depend on any identification with a nation 
or a country. It is admirable to pursue them and we should praise those that 
44 
COSMOPOLITANISM AND PATRIOTISM 
do so, but it adds nothing to expressions of that admiration to call those that 
one admires in such contexts patriotic. It is commitment to people, to justice 
and to human rights that motivates such virtue. One's country has nothing to 
do with it. 
And yet it does at a political level. If we interpret "one's country" as the 
nation-state of which one is a citizen or legal resident, then we can acknow-
ledge the political system of this nation-state as the forum in which we can 
pursue the moral values of human rights and social justice. The nation-state 
has a role to play. The administrative concept of a state is a social and histor-
ical necessity (Glazer 1996),12 The territorial boundaries of legal jurisdictions 
need to be defined. The range and scope of government responsibilities need 
to have borders. And the capacity of political institutions and participants to 
effect change is limited and defined by such jurisdictions and boundaries. If the 
citizens or government of a state wanted to effect a change in another state for 
humanitarian reasons, they would not have the jurisdiction to do so and would 
have to act on a government-to-government basis or through international 
political institutions such as the UN. The issue of humanitarian intervention 
is a vexed one and I shall discuss it later, but my point for the moment is that 
any actions taken in the pursuit of social justice or for the protection of human 
rights around the world need to be taken through governmental and political 
institutions in one's own state and in the other relevant state. Even cosmopoli-
tans have to acknowledge the practical importance of the state in the pursuit 
of both cosmopolitan and national goals. It is this necessity that grounds that 
form of patriotism I have called "political patriotism': 
Igor Primoratz has argued that patriotism may consist in pride in one's 
nation-state based on the moral accomplishments of that state rather than on 
its successes in international competition, whether in the fields of commerce 
or war. Primoratz (2008) calls this "ethical patriotism" and describes it as a 
concern for the ethical status of one's country and of its moral standing in the 
world community. This position pursues not the political, economic and cul-
tural advantage of one's country, but its moral interests. It asks a country to 
take a cosmopolitan stance in its foreign policies. What one is committed to 
when one is an ethical patriot in this sense is the value of global justice and the 
importance of human rights both within one's own nation-state and beyond it. 
One's nation-state is a vehicle for pursuing those values. The pride one might 
feel in one's citizenship of an ethical state will serve to motivate the political 
engagement that ensures that one's state acts as a good global citizen. But the 
state is not, of itself, an appropriate object of nationalist or patriotic fervour. 
There is one qualification that I need to make to my rejection of national-
ism as extreme patriotism of the form expressed in such slogans as "My coun-
try, right or wrong!" and of even moderate patriotism understood as "love of 
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country': Nationalism can have politically progressive effects as well as belli-
cose and competitive effects. As Immanuel Wallerstein (1996) has argued, 
solidarity can be a weapon of the weak against the strong. When a people 
united by language, culture or tradition is subjugated or colonized by a more 
powerful people or state, its sense of itself as a people and the way in which 
individuals identify themselves with their language, culture or tradition can 
become a powerful political force. Struggles for national liberation or for self-
determination on the part of peoples are seen by many commentators as legiti-
mate and are frequently acknowledged by international law. The UN affirms 
the right of peoples to self-determination, although it acknowledges that it is 
neither practicable nor desirable for all peoples united by language, culture 
or tradition to become sovereign states. Self-determination needs to be given 
form as political autonomy within federated states or other political structures 
acceptable to all concerned. Whatever the difficulties that arise from strug-
gles for self-determination, my point is that they are motivated by a form of 
nationalism that is politically legitimate. Such forms of nationalism are political 
expressions of linguistic, religiOUS or cultural forms of identity and, as such, are 
deeply motivational. They are yet another form of Nathanson's "love of coun-
try': While I would consider that a dose of irony is morally required with even 
these kinds of nationalisms so as to avoid the bellicose forms of national pride 
that might emerge after self-determination has been achieved, I would con-
sider them legitimate bases for political engagement and struggles for human 
rights and social justice in those cases where a people is unjustly subjugated 
or oppressed. It is at such points as these that identification with one's people 
combines with political patriotism to produce a valid form of nationalism. 
With the clarification of the concepts of patriotism and nationalism that we 
have now achieved we can reflect on the examples with which we started this 
section. 
(a) Not only does Australia Day provide a reminder of the foundation story of 
Australia but, by celebrating it as a holiday each year, Australian citizens 
are encouraged to take pride in that story and imagine themselves as par-
ticipants in its continuation. In this way they come to live that story as their 
own and to identify with the nation that had such a humble beginning. 
(b) Anzac Day operates much as Australia Day does in forging the identification 
of Australians with their history and national pride. But on this occasion 
it is soldiers rather than convicts and their guards who are memorialized. 
On this occasion it is war with its power to forge the national identity that 
is celebrated. It is on such days that the willingness to give up one's life for 
one's country in battle is offered as a model for civic virtue. It is on such 
days that the link between patriotism and militarism is forged. 
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(c) The republican debate in Australia is said by many to be merely symbolic. 
The British Crown has very little influence on Australian political affairs 
even though the British queen is Australia's head of state. That the queen's 
representative in Australia, the governor-general, has the power to dismiss 
a government - as was done in 1975 - is due to the Australian constitution 
rather than to any prerogatives held by the British monarchy. Nevertheless, 
it is felt by others that the issue is important because it represents a growth 
in national maturity in which ties with the "mother country" can be cut 
and a public affirmation of independence and self-determination made. It 
is argued that a more vigorous and committed participation in political life 
on the part of citizens can develop if citizens feel greater "ownership" of the 
polity than would be the case if that polity were subject to the Crown. Here 
symbolism ties in with will-to-power. Self-affirmation - both individually 
and collectively - is expressed as political autonomy and self-determination. 
It is also argued that a fully autonomous nation will have greater prestige 
and influence in Australia's geopolitical region. Status and self-image are 
not merely symbolic issues because they are deeply motivational and influ-
ence the degree to which citizens see themselves as involved in the political 
life of the nation-state. If republicanism means not having an overlord and 
if it is expressed in high levels of political participation (Pettit 1997), then 
becoming a republic is an important and practical issue. What I have called 
"political patriotism" is encouraged by just such symbolic gestures. 
(d) That we are not told who won the gold medal during a news broadcast, 
even when we are told that an Australian athlete won a silver medal at the 
Olympic Games, illustrates the insularity that many forms of patriotism 
produce. On this view, a patriot is interested only in the affairs of com-
patriots. This example also illustrates how apt the football fan analogy is 
for understanding patriotism. Just as a fan takes an inordinate amount 
of interest in the goings on of their team, so a national patriot takes an 
interest in the successes of those with whom she identifies. Even if she is 
not all that interested in athletics, the fact that the medal was won by an 
Australian is enough to make the event interesting. 
(e) That events are more interesting if they involve compatriots is also illus-
trated by the air crash example. But here there is the further element of 
caring about the victims of a tragedy. We often care more about com-
patriots even though all those who are killed leave behind grieving rela-
tives and shattered lives. The tragedy is not less for a non-Australian than 
it is for an Australian. Nationality should be irrelevant to our feelings of 
sympathy and should also be irrelevant to our willingness to help. 
(f) Rowdy behaviour at beer festivals, sporting events and the like is a wide-
spread phenomenon. That it often takes the form of flaunting the national 
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colours and shouting national slogans and songs indicates that what is at 
stake for the participants is national identity. As uncouth as the behaviour 
is, it expresses a pride in being Australian and an insistence that others 
notice one's nationality. It is will-to-power as public display and does not 
carry much moral value. 
(g) For the patriotic citizens of what is now Marree, the name of the South 
Australian town of Hergott Springs sounded too German when national-
ist fervour inspired a hatred for everything associated with the wartime 
enemy. This illustrates the ideological use of nationalism for fomenting 
hatred of those who are not on one's side. 
(h) The singing of the national anthem before major sporting events is also 
a display of national pride and a means whereby participants identify 
themselves with their nation. In cases where the sporting events are inter-
national competitions there is the added frisson for the audience of staking 
one's nation's reputation on the outcome of the competition. Once again, 
it is an expression of will-to-power but one that has no more importance 
than the victories of one's local football team. 
(i) Kathy Freeman's display of both an Australian and an Aboriginal flag dur-
ing her lap of honour is a much more interesting event. Had she carried 
only an Australian flag I would make the same comments as with the 
previous example. Like all national flags, the Australian flag is a power-
ful symbol of the nation-state to which many people avow great loyalty. 
Soldiers are said to have died fighting under this flag and it is said to 
represent everything that is noble in the nation. It is considered a crime 
to desecrate the flag in any way. It is not without interest to note the link 
between flag-waving and militarism. Flags were originally signs for iden-
tifying who was on whose side in military formations and which navy 
a ship belonged to, and they served as banners around which soldiers 
would rally during battles. They are carried in military parades and given 
military salutes as they are raised on flagpoles. National flags take on an 
almost sacred value as symbols of the nation-state. The Aboriginal flag, 
in contrast, is not the flag of a nation-state and has never been used for 
military purposes. It was created relatively recently as a rallying point for 
the many and disparate Aboriginal activist groups seeking social justice 
for Australia's indigenous peoples and a higher degree of self-determina-
tion for Aboriginal communities. As such, the Aboriginal flag also has 
a highly charged symbolic value, but an oppositional one. Conservative 
voices in Australian politics would regard the Aboriginal flag as subversive 
and as threatening to Australian national unity. Whereas Kathy Freeman 
was expressing pride both in her nation and in her Aboriginality by car-
rying both flags, her critics saw her as seeking to undermine the pride 
48 
COSMOPOLITANISM AND PATRIOTISM 
that mainstream Australians feel in their nation by reminding them of 
unresolved social problems arising from the treatment of Australia's first 
inhabitants. They saw her as being unpatriotic. 
0) For "The Australia First Party'; being patriotic means showing allegiance to 
a concept of Australian nationhood in which the traditions of the English 
masters and Irish convicts are given pride of place. Aborigines and migrants 
who do not look, speak or behave like the first English and Irish settlers 
are outsiders or latecomers who do not share the cultures and traditions 
that define one as a true Australian. Clearly, such a stance is definitive of 
chauvinism. The party is also suspicious of welfarism, especially to the 
extent that welfare benefits are given to Australians who do not fall into the 
acceptable category of cultural conformity. The major target for this politi-
cal movement is multiculturalism, and it seeks to define patriotism and 
nationalism in chauvinistic terms so as to exclude any groups that are not 
of the narrow range of ethnicities that it defines as genuinely Australian. 
This and the following examples also illustrate the close link between patri-
otism, nationalism and racism. So long as the nation to which patriots are 
urged to be loyal is defined as a people with a specific ethnicity or cultural 
tradition rather than as an administrative nation-state, patriotism will lead 
to chauvinism, jingoism, racism and xenophobia. 
(k) Immigration and refugee policies are a test case for the cosmopolitan 
outlook. In rejecting refugees and developing punitive policies of deten-
tion for asylum seekers, the Australian government saw itself as acting in 
the national interest and in defence of the national borders. Leaving aside 
the cruelty and administrative injustices that accompanied the implemen-
tation of the policies, the central point is that they exemplify a central 
dogma of state-based nationalism: the difference in legal status between 
citizens and non-citizens. Once again there is something inevitable and 
necessary about this distinction. If a state is defined as an administrative 
unit with a defined range of legal jurisdiction, then there will be some 
who fall within this range and some who fall outside it. But we might 
ask whether a government should not accept the responsibility to exer-
cise hospitality towards strangers, especially when those strangers are in 
dire need. I shall discuss this issue at greater length in Chapter 3. For the 
moment it is important to see the political role that the ideas of patriotism 
and nationalism play in this issue. Policies of exclusion are justified on the 
basis that the government has responsibility only for Australians and for 
protecting the national borders. The claim is that it has no responsibility 
for outsiders. It would be unpatriotic to take any other view. "Australia for 
Australians" is a slogan that expresses chauvinistic forms of nationalism 
and patriotism. 
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(1) The Cronulla riots were a further expression of chauvinistic or extreme 
forms of patriotism. But a further element is present here also. In the 
wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA and in the wake of a highly 
publicized gang-rape trial involving Lebanese youths in the area, an anti-
Muslim xenophobia was developing in the Australian community. Add 
some local hooliganism into the mix and the disturbances bec;:ome layered 
with a new level of meaning. It becomes a case of Australians defending 
their way of life against "foreign" attack. Once again, the threat is to multi-
culturalism. The use of Australian flags and symbols seeks to identify one 
side of the fight as Australian and the other as foreign. For their part, the 
youths "of Middle Eastern appearance" also define themselves by their 
ethnicity and the nationality of their families. What is, at base, criminal 
behaviour is dressed up as an expression of patriotism. It is, in fact, tribal-
ism at its worst. 
(m) The "buy Australian" campaign is a response to economic globalization. 
The many economic and social effects of globalization include the demise 
of Australian business, the loss of Australian jobs and the repatriation of 
profits earned in Australia to multinational business corporations. This is 
seen as inimical to Australia's national interest if that interest is defined in 
terms of Australian profits and jobs in the affected industries. The form of 
patriotism that is being evinced here is a quest for Australian economic 
self-sufficiency. Globalization involves not only a redistribution of global 
wealth and opportunity but also a great degree of economic interdepend-
ence between nation-states. As independence, self-determination and 
self-sufficiency are typical goals for traditional nationalism, it is thought 
to be unpatriotic to open Australia's economic system to global influences 
(Falk 1996),13 
(n) Australia's hesitation about entering into agreements to limit carbon emis-
sions or reduce reliance on coal for the sake of slowing global warming is 
another example of economic patriotism or nationalism. It illustrates how 
the national interest can become conflated with the economic interests 
of companies based within the legal jurisdiction of the nation-state. As 
Pogge (2002a) has argued, it is not legitimate for national leaders to pursue 
unfair advantages at the cost of others in the international sphere, even if 
they do so on behalf of their own countries. Moreover, the threat of global 
warming affects all countries and peoples globally. The problem that this 
raises is whether national governments have responsibility just for their 
own national interests or whether they should also have global interests at 
heart simply because they are global interests. Whereas an international-
ist or a political realist might argue that governments should cooperate 
to prevent environmental degradation because it is in their own national 
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interests to do so, a cosmopolitan would argue that the interests of all the 
peoples and ecosystems of the world are proper objects of governmental 
responsibility. 
(0) That Australian soldiers serving overseas are praised as heroes and as 
patriots demonstrates once again the link between patriotism, national-
ism and militarism. Militarism involves valuing soldiering as an expression 
of nationalistic hubris. However, the matter becomes more complicated 
when it is noted that many of the missions in which Australian soldiers 
serve are peacekeeping or humanitarian missions endorsed by the UN. 
In this their service has less to do with making war than with policing the 
world's trouble spots or providing life-saving assistance. Such actions are 
laudable. But it is unnecessary and misleading to describe such actions 
as patriotic. It is sometimes necessary to reinforce the quest for justice, 
the defence of human rights and the protection of people from crimi-
nals in international settings with military force. The aims of such mis-
sions can be endorsed by cosmopolitans as being universally valid goals, 
such as the alleviation of suffering and the protection of human rights. To 
describe such actions as patriotic is nothing more than an attempt to iden-
tify oneself with them and to take pride in them. This has no more moral 
value than glorying in the achievements of one's nation's international 
athletes. 
(p) That Australian expatriate workers or emigrants feel nostalgia for home 
illustrates my thesis about the psychological bases of "love of one's coun-
try': The land in which we are born or have our most important formative 
experiences is always going to have a special place in our hearts. Just what 
follows from this as to the moral duties we have towards our countries or 
peoples beyond them is not clear. The basis for our obligations to obey 
the law and contribute to the social and political life of our nation-state is 
a separate issue from any emotional attachment that we may have to the 
peoples, lands or traditions of that nation-state. 
(q) The claim that artists give expression to an Australian sensibility and way 
of life through their art relies on there being an Australian sensibility and 
way of life. There is no denying that there are sensibilities and ways of life 
that arise and occur in Australia. If they are interesting there is value in 
presenting them in artistic or narrative forms. But their interest is uni-
versal. Any profound human experience or compelling human story is of 
human interest and would potentially be of interest or edification to any-
one anywhere. If Australians take a special interest in Australian art, music, 
literature and cinema, it is so that they can achieve self-understanding in 
terms of the traditions, ethnicities and languages through which their 
identities are shaped. 
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(r) Australia's being described as having a civilizing and enlightening role 
in its geopolitical region by virtue of its heritage in British traditions of 
democracy and the rule of law is a form of neo-colonialism. While there is 
no doubt that Australia is a beneficiary of inherited traditions of democ-
racy and the rule of law, it is chauvinistic to suppose that they could have 
arisen only from Britain (although as a matter of historical fact, they did) 
or that they could not arise in indigenous forms in neighbouring states 
and communities. This view is a local version of the moralistic universal-
ism that assumes that Western liberal democracy is the only valid form of 
political organization and that it should be spread to the rest of the world, 
by force of arms if necessary. This is a matter to which 1 shall return in 
Chapter 5. 
(s) The lauding of allegedly distinctive Australian egalitarian virtues such as 
"mateship" and "a fair go" is an example of the kinds of misleading gen-
eralization and oversimplification of national characteristics that calls 
Scotsmen skinflints, Italians cowardly or Irishmen stupid. Such stereo-
types deny the variability of the human condition and suggest people's 
characteristics can be defined by their nationality.14 There is no empiri-
cal evidence to support such sweeping statements and they feed into the 
chauvinism and racism that so often characterize extreme patriotism. 
Moreover, the concepts of "mateship" and "a fair go" are notoriously ill 
defined. 
(t) That applicants for Australian citizenship are required to pass a "citizen-
ship test" would be valid if it could assure their political patriotism as 
defined above. Some knowledge of, and commitment to, Australian polit-
ical processes and values would be relevant to this, although how these 
could be measured by a simple quiz is not clear. But to require know-
ledge of such cultural information as the achievements of Australian 
cricketing great Don Bradman is to devalue Australia's multiculturalism. 
Not everyone in Australia cares about cricket or about its champions. 
There should be no requirement that, to be a genuine Australian, one 
must be interested in specific sporting, cultural or social phenomena. 
To lack such interests and the knowledge that goes with them is not 
unpatriotic. 
(u) The epithet "un-Australian" assumes that there is a clear set of ethi-
cal and cultural criteria for what it is to be "Australian': This is a false 
assumption not only because Australia is a multicultural society, but also 
because, even if it were not, people are still so different from each other 
in terms of their preferences and ways of being that no single set of char-
acteristics could capture what it is to be Australian or, contrariwise, what 
it is to be "un-Australian': If this phrase is meant to capture a way of 
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being or of behaving that is to be morally disapproved of, then it should 
appeal to moral norms that are of general validity rather than being 
valid only in Australia or for Australians. Is there a distinctive Australian 
way of being a cheat, a liar, an adulterer or a murderer such that such 
behaviours could be described as "un-Australian"? Such failures are 
breaches of moral norms that apply anywhere. Perhaps it is being sug-
gested that Australians are more moral than anyone else, so that to act 
immorally is to be un-Australian. This may be a patriotic thought, but it 
is a false one. 
(v) The Australian government's formal apology to the Aboriginal people of 
Australia for past government policies that removed Aboriginal children 
from their families for racist reasons illustrates the importance of cre-
ating a national ethos with which people can identify. If national celebra-
tions such as Australia Day and Anzac Day create myths through which 
Australians can take pride in their nation and their nationality, past events 
can also leave them with shame. Moreover, the Aboriginal victims of the 
government policies in question feel both grief at their loss of family life 
and anger at the injustice that has been done to them. Reconciliation 
through an apology comprises two movements. It tells the victims of gov-
ernment policies that the present generation disowns those policies, is 
ashamed of them and will seek to overcome them, and it allows the mem-
bers of the present non-Aboriginal community to put aside the shame that 
their forebears have caused them so that they can, once again, take pride 
in their nation's history. For both communities this will produce a new 
commitment to political patriotism. 
(w) It is because I am Australian that all the examples offered above matter 
to me. I feel the need to belong to this community and to participate in 
its social, cultural and political life. I feel the need to take pride in being 
Australian and to feel attached to this country even though I was not born 
here. Events of moral significance that occur in other countries concern 
me also, but I can engage with them only through the political and social 
means that are at my disposal in Australia. My motivation to use these 
means is driven not only by my concern for the global issues that are in 
question but also by my sense of belonging to this political community. My 
political patriotism locates my political engagement in Australian politi-
cal institutions and focuses my loyalty and allegiance on Australian laws 
and processes. But this does not limit the scope of my moral concerns. 
My quest for social justice and the protection of human rights knows no 
borders. I am an Australian cosmopolitan. 
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Conclusion 
We are now in a position to return to the Nussbaum debate and, particularly, to 
the claim of Barber that cosmopolitanism is a "thin" moral commitment while 
patriotism is a "thick" allegiance based on heartfelt attachments. My answer 
is that cosmopolitanism can also be seen as a heartfelt attachment - albeit an 
attachment to a humanity not confined to any of the specific communities in 
which all human beings live. I agree with Nussbaum's claim that one's commit-
ment to humanity can be "thick" in the required sense, whether that humanity is 
embodied in one's family, community, nation or the world as a whole. Moreover, 
I can accept one idea that Nussbaum's communitarian critics insist on: one 
does need to be a patriot in order to be a cosmopolitan because one must oper-
ate within one's polity. But this is political patriotism rather than nationalism. 
Nationalism leads too easily to chauvinism, militarism and the prioritizing of 
one's national interests over global responsibilities. The kind of patriotism that 
cosmopolitans can endorse includes the kind of irony that understands one's 
political community in pragmatic and instrumental terms rather than as an 
object of blind allegiance. There need be no incompatibility between cosmo-
politanism and patriotism if patriotism is understood to entail a political com-
mitment to human rights and social justice that is not confined to local loyalties, 
but that can extend to global responsibilities. It is to an understanding of the 
objects of such a commitment that we must now turn. 
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Human rights 
Today, in general, "human rights" means rights that human subjects mutu-
ally grant one another in order to guarantee a life that meets the neces-
sary conditions of "dignity" and respect; the guiding notion here is that a 
morality of social existence minimally demands that all others are equally 
able to lead a human life. (Honneth 1997: 168) 
Of the many components of the idea of cosmopolitanism listed at the end of 
the Introduction, I want in this chapter to explore the philosophical founda-
tions of the following: 
(4) respect for basic human rights as universally normative; 
(5) acknowledging the moral equality of all peoples and individuals; 
(6) respect for the peoples of the world as united by reason, sociability and a 
common humanity; and 
(7) belief in a globally acceptable concept of human dignity. 
The discourse of rights has very wide currency today and is an inescapable 
aspect of debates in international relations. As I mentioned in the Introduction, 
the most important articulation of the idea of human rights is the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) proclaimed by the UN in 1948.1 The 
UD HR does not have the force of law but it does express an international con-
sensus on the social and political aspirations of the members of the UN after 
the horrors of the Second World War. Since then, there have been legally bind-
ing agreements such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966). The concept of human rights also appears in the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), the International 
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Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (1984), the Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Most recently there has been 
a UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007). 
What are human rights? 
Given all this, it will be important to understand the concept of a right. There 
have been many suggestions as to what rights are, including: one's basic entitle-
ments; reasons for others to act in certain ways towards one; one's moral power 
to produce obligations in others; one's power to invoke sanctions or force to 
induce others to do what one requires of them; or socially constructed expecta-
tions.2 Although the concept is most often used in relation to individual people, 
it can apply to groups or peoples and to nation-states as well. Rather than seek 
a definition of rights, however, I shall begin by exploring what difference the 
concept makes in our thinking. 
Let us imagine a scenario in which the people of a rich nation - through 
their government or through NGOs - are offering assistance to the people of 
a poor nation in the latter's pursuit of economic development. It might be an 
aid programme that centres on providing health care or other social services, 
or it might be a programme that forgives national debts accumulated by previ-
ous governments of the recipient nation. Whatever the details, we are asked to 
imagine that the people of the donor country give the assistance through their 
government or through NGOs without any conditions that serve the interests 
of the donors, such as tied loans or demands for economic restructuring. There 
are at least two ways of understanding the relationship between the people of 
the donor country and those of the recipient country. The first sees donors as 
acting with generosity or charity. In this understanding, the government and 
people of the donor country respond to the poverty, morbidity and mortality 
rates, and economic underdevelopment of the recipient country by deciding 
to rescue the people of the recipient country from the troubles and premature 
deaths that their poverty is causing them. This is a fine and noble stance for 
people in the donor country to take and the world would be a better place if 
more nations did the same. However, it sees the people of the recipient country 
as recipients of charity. People in the recipient nation are supplicants. In more 
everyday language, they are beggars. They must beseech the richer nations for 
lssistance and when they receive such assistance they must show gratitude. 
The relationship between the two peoples is therefore morally unequal as well 
is being materially unequal. Not only are the recipients poorer, but they are 
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also of lesser dignity. They are the beggars in the relationship, while the donors 
are the magnanimous givers of aid. The relationship of charity is one that ele-
vates the status of the donors and diminishes that of the recipients. Of course, 
this may not be the most significant feature of the relationship. After all, the 
urgent needs of the population of the poorer nation are being met by the aid 
programme and this is a good that should not be gainsaid. It is good to be gen-
erous and we rightly admire those who are charitable towards those who are in 
need. In technical terms we describe their actions as "supererogatory": that is, 
as morally admirable but not strictly required as a moral obligation. To act gen-
erously is to act above and beyond the call of duty. This is why the charitable 
person can feel a high degree of self-esteem. She feels that she is acting in a way 
that is better than those who act merely to fulfil their obligations. However, a 
negative side effect of this extra level of self-esteem is that it creates the danger 
that the generous person might also think of herself as superior to others and, 
in particular, those others who are the object of her charity. While such an atti-
tude is not inevitable, and while the truly virtuous person will avoid falling into 
such a way of thinking, the problem is entirely absent when the relationship 
between donor and recipient is thought of in terms of rights and of justice. 
The second way of conceiving of the relationship between the two peoples 
in my scenario involves the concept of rights. If we say that the recipients have 
a right to the assistance that they receive from the donor country, the moral 
quality of their relationship is quite different. In this way of thinking, the recipi-
ents are not supplicants but claimants. They claim the assistance they receive 
as a matter of right and hence of justice. They claim that they are entitled to 
the aid and that it would be wrong or unjust for them not to receive it. This is 
a claim that needs to be justified, of course, but what such a justification might 
be based on is a question I want to leave aside for the moment. The key point 
is that the moral quality of claiming assistance as a matter of right is different 
from the moral quality of begging for it. Moreover, the moral quality of the 
act of giving on the part of the donors is different. Whereas when they gave 
out of a spirit of charity we could describe them as being generous, we now 
describe them as being just. The moral quality of the relationship between one 
who claims assistance as a matter of right and one who gives assistance as a 
matter of duty is one of equality. The system of relationships that is established 
between people or nations under the rubric of rights or of justice is a system in 
which each node is defined as having an equal moral status as defined by the 
principle of impartiality. 
The discourse of rights is part of a moral framework in which justice decrees 
that the same benefits and privileges are owed to each and every person unless 
there are morally relevant differences between them. For example, if a rich 
nation were faced with a natural disaster in two neighbouring poorer states, 
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and if it had the resources to help both of those poorer states, it would be 
unjust for it to direct its assistance solely to one of those states on the grounds 
that it, and it alone, shared a cultural history with it. That the rich nation shares 
a heritage or a religion with one of the stricken countries but not with the other 
is not a relevant reason for withholding the assistance that it could give to the 
second nation if it had the resources to do so. To act in that way is not merely 
to fail to be generous and admirable: it is to fail to do what justice requires. It is 
unjust to discriminate on such grounds when the needs of the people in both 
stricken countries are equally grave. The principle of impartiality applies when 
the action being envisaged is a duty or a moral obligation, or falls under the 
rubric of justice or of rights. If the donor country were being generous rather 
than responding to the call of duty, it could reasonably extend its generosity to 
only one of the disaster-affected countries. A merely generous agent is entitled 
to extend her largesse in any way she sees fit. We might still think that to do so 
selectively was somewhat less than admirable, but we would have no grounds 
for saying that the act of discrimination was wrong or unjust. If you choose to 
be good over and above what duty requires, you can also choose whom you are 
going to be good to, and the nation or person who does not receive your assist-
ance has no basis for complaint. However, impartiality is required when one is 
acting within a framework of justice because, in this context, the moral status 
of all parties to the relationship is one of formal moral equality. 
This point helps us understand the sense of grievance that arises if rights are 
not honoured. If it were a matter of receiving something out of the charity of 
the donors, would-be recipients would not be justified in complaining if it were 
not given to them; whereas, if people have a right to something, they would be 
justified in feeling aggrieved if they did not receive it. They have a right to claim 
it as a matter of justice. When such a claim is denied or ignored, a feeling of 
grievance3 is justified to the same extent as the system of justice that grounds 
the claim is justified. This notion of grievance is important in political thinking 
because it distinguishes the hurt that comes from not getting what one wants 
from the hurt that comes from not getting what one is entitled to. To not get 
what one wants may be merely a matter of bad luck. But to not get what one 
has a right to is a matter of injustice. I shall return to this distinction between 
rights and wants presently. 
There is a formal complementarity between rights and duties. In the con-
ceptual framework of justice, when one person or nation has a right, another 
person or nation has a duty. As Onora O'Neill puts it: "Once we start talk-
ing about rights, we assume a framework in which performance of obligations 
can be claimed. Rights have to be allocated to specified bearers of obligations: 
otherwise, claimants of rights cannot know to which obligation bearer their 
claims should be addressed" (1998: 96). It is part of the "logical grammar" of 
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the way these terms are used in the discourse of justice that rights and duties 
go together. If one has a right, then another has a duty to provide, protect or 
restore what the first has a right to. And if one has a duty to another, then that 
other has a right to receive what the first has a duty to provide. This point is 
well illustrated by a commercial contract. As a result of a contract to pur-
chase a bag of potatoes, for example, the vendor has a right to payment for the 
potatoes and the purchaser has an obligation to pay for them. Again, if the pur-
chaser has paid for them, she has a right to receive the potatoes and the vendor 
has an obligation to supply them. It would seem from such homely examples 
that there is indeed a symmetry between rights and obligations and that they 
emerge together: in this case, from the existence of a contract. 
The contract example also serves to illustrate what kind of reality a right is. 
A right can be said to have a moral reality, and claims to have the right hon-
oured can be said to be justified if there is a contract or agreement in place that 
establishes the right and that allocates to others relevant and specific duties to 
provide what holders of the right are empowered by the contract to claim. A 
right is real only to the extent that the relevant rights claim can be justified and 
the corresponding duties allocated. But if these points are relatively clear in the 
case where there is a contract that has been agreed to, and that specifies what 
parties to the contract are entitled to and what they are obliged to do, can we 
find such clarity in the case of putatively universal, basic human rights of the 
kind enunciated in the UDHR? Is there a kind of global contract or agreement 
on which the validity of human rights claims can be based and duties allocated? 
Or do we need some other kind of moral or metaphysical grounding for such 
claims? 
The legitimation of human rights 
We should distinguish the legitimation of human rights from their justification 
(Maffettone 2007). The justification of human rights is a philosophical process 
that makes use of concepts that are deemed to be both fundamental and rational 
in order to secure belief in the reality of such rights. Such concepts and argu-
ments will derive from the value commitments and traditions of those who pro-
pose them and may therefore differ from one culture to another. Accordingly, it 
may be unreasonable to expect universal agreement on such justifications. The 
legitimation of human rights, on the other hand, is a political process involv-
ing public debate and historical struggle directed towards establishing a list of 
human rights that will be effective in influencing political decisions both nation-
ally and internationally. Such a process would be exemplified by the formation 
of the UDHR and subsequent covenants. Given that the UN has propagated 
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those rights by due process, those rights are legitimate whatever justification 
we might give them. The world's nation-states have agreed to them and have 
established quasi-legal institutions to monitor and propagate them. There is, at 
a formal level, global agreement on their validity and all nations have agreed, 
in formal terms, to abide by their requirements and accept the obligations they 
imply. Accordingly, respect for human rights is now a legitimate part of the offi-
cial fabric of international relations and an accepted basis for global ethics. 
Cosmopolitanism argues that there is a global framework of international 
law in which all nations, peoples and individuals participate. While this frame-
work does not have the positive formality of a contract, jt is sufficiently well 
established to count as the kind of agreement appropriate to establishing the 
normativity of relevant rights and duties. It is the historical fact that nations 
have signed up to the UDHR and further UN covenants that constitutes the 
contract-like legal framework on which human rights and the corresponding 
obligations are based. Every nation, people or individual has rights and duties 
within this framework. We have yet to explore what moral or human con-
siderations these agreements and declarations are based on and what justi-
fications can be offered for their normativity, but the first claim that I shall 
explore is that this moral framework is legitimate and has global applicability. 
Cosmopolitans would argue that no nation, people or individual can opt out 
of this global framework of justice and exempt themselves from its require-
ments. Unlike charity, which is optional, the protection of the rights demanded 
by global justice and the performance of the duties that correspond to those 
rights is incumbent on all nations, peoples and individuals around the world. 
Cosmopolitanism would argue that human rights are universal in the sense 
that every person universally is entitled to claim them and every person univer-
sally has the obligation to honour them irrespective of the political and cultural 
traditions in which such persons find themselves. 
But not everyone agrees with this. It has been alleged that the UDHR does 
not articulate rights that are applicable or understood universally, but rather 
that they express a distinctly Western conception of rights. They are said to 
be indiVidualistic and to pay too little regard to the community-based norms 
with which traditional societies constrain individual freedoms. Moreover, in 
the context of various international struggles, including the cold war and the 
struggle for independence and economic self-sufficiency on the part of emerg-
ing nations in the third world, it has been claimed that the rights proclaimed 
in the UDHR aid the processes of capitalist expansion at the cost of the social 
aspirations of developing and socialist nations (Pollis & Schwab 1979; see also 
Tharoor 1999/2000). Some have even said that the UDHR is part of an attempt 
on the part of Western capitalist nations to increase their hegemony over the 
world and pursue their imperialist aspirations. Even so eminent a statesman 
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as Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a former secretary-general of the United Nations, 
is reported to have described human rights as "an instrument of interven-
tion to serve the political objectives of the developed world" (quoted in Traub 
2006: 73). 
If these are empirical claims, they are easily proved wrong by investigat-
ing the historical circumstances of the development of the UDHR. The docu-
ment was drafted by a committee set up by the newly formed UN, chaired by 
Eleanor Roosevelt, and comprising representatives from Australia, Belgium, 
Byelorussia, Chile, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Lebanon, Panama, the Philippines, 
Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the USA, Uruguay, the USSR and Yugoslavia. 
According to a historical study by Micheline Ishay: 
To help the work of the human rights drafting committee, a question-
naire had been commissioned from a UNESCO philosophers' commit-
tee to study various rights traditions, including Chinese, Islamic, Hindu, 
American, and European worldviews on human rights as well as their 
customary legal perspectives. (2004: 219)4 
There were seventy responses to this questionnaire from eminent persons 
around the world, including Mahatma Gandhi, the Muslim poet and philoso-
pher Humayun Kabir and Chinese philosopher Chung-Shu Lo. The final draft 
was prepared by Eleanor Roosevelt working with "the Chinese philosopher, 
diplomat, and commission vice-chairman Pen-Chung Chang, the Lebanese 
existentialist philosopher and rapporteur Charles Malik, and the French legal 
scholar and later Nobel Prize laureate Rene Cassin" (ibid.: 220). It would seem, 
then, that representatives of the major religious and philosophical traditions of 
the world - Muslim, Hindu, Christian and Chinese - along with contributors 
from capitalist countries, socialist countries and developing countries, all had 
opportunities to shape the final document. 
It has to be admitted, however, that cold war rivalries had an impact on the 
drafting of the declaration. Led by the USSR, the socialist countries wanted 
to stress social values and welfare rights, while the USA and its allies placed 
greater emphasis on the political rights associated with liberalism. There was 
a great deal of argument and compromise before the draft was finalized but, 
on 10 December 1948, the declaration was adopted by the then fifty-eight 
members of the UN with no votes against. However, eight nations abstained: 
Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Ukraine, the 
USSR and Yugoslavia. Apart from Saudi Arabia and South Africa, who had 
internal reasons for opposing the spread of human rights into their own co un -
tries, the other abstainers were members of the communist bloc. It is clear, 
therefore, that voices of dissent were raised against the declaration from the 
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very beginning and that these voices represented a conception of human rights 
and of human well-being that differed from those current in the capitalist West. 
That said, the endorsement of the declaration was overwhelming and it contin-
ues to represent the highest aspirations for human flourishing expressed by the 
world community. It should also be noted that, apart from Saudi Arabia, the 
representatives of the abstaining countries came out of the Western philosoph-
ical tradition. Those countries are heir to the traditions of Christianity and of 
the Enlightenment that have shaped the Western conception of human exist-
ence rather than participating in such great religious and cultural traditions 
as Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism or the various strands of Confucianism. It fol-
lows that the dissent that was present at the birth of the declaration cannot be 
interpreted as supporting the claim that the declaration was a Western cultural 
imposition on other traditions. 
There is a further and more abstract way of refuting this charge. This is to 
accuse those who make it of committing the "genetic fallacy': Informal logic 
describes this as the fallacy of charging that a claim is false or invalid if it 
arises from suspect sources. For example, it might be charged that scientific 
research that shows that drinking red wine can be good for you by reducing 
the risk of heart disease would be suspect if it were shown that the research 
was funded by the wine industry. We might indeed be a little suspicious of such 
research if it were funded in this way, but it would certainly not follow from 
the fact that the wine industry funded the research that the results were false. 
If the research is conducted with sound methodology, it may well yield cred-
ible results no matter the source of the research funding. There is no relation 
of logical implication between the proposition that the research was funded 
by the wine industry and the proposition that the result of the research is 
false. Similarly, if it were argued that the UDHR is false - in the sense that it 
does not express rights that are universally applicable - on the grounds that 
it was an imperialist imposition, such an argument would be committing the 
genetic fallacy. Even if it were true that the capitalist nations forced the docu-
ment through an unwilling General Assembly of the UN, nothing would follow 
about the validity or otherwise of the rights that are articulated in it. Whether 
those rights were consistent with the national interests of some nations and 
not others or whether they were vigorously promoted by some nations and 
opposed by others is irrelevant to their validity. The historical facts about the 
diplomatic manoeuvrings surrounding their adoption are not logically relevant 
to the question of whether those rights are universal in their application. 
Given these arguments, a great many international relations theorists and 
philosophers accept that human rights are legitimate in so far as there are 
international laws and other legal instruments that affirm those rights. The 
UDHR and the other conventions mentioned earlier are instruments of this 
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kind, albeit differing as to their legal status. However, the UN often lacks the 
policing power to enforce even those covenants that have a high legal status. 
There is now an international court that tries cases involving crimes against 
humanity such as genocide, but this court and other ad hoc tribunals that have 
been set up to try cases of this kind are highly dependent for their effectiveness 
on the policing powers and legal cooperation of various states. Nevertheless, 
these laws, covenants and declarations have been promulgated and have set up 
an international normative framework that all peoples are expected to abide 
by. Even if there is no effective policing power to enforce these norms, there 
is a sense of expectation and a sense of honour in relation to them such that 
a nation that flagrantly violates them can have at least the pressure of shame 
brought to bear on it. Moreover, if sanctions are applied, aid denied or trading 
privileges suspended in relation to a state that violates human rights, the jus-
tification for such responses need not depend on abstract philosophical argu-
ments but can allude to the body of rights declarations to which the whole 
world has formally acceded. The existence of this quasi-legal international 
order of acknowledgement of rights is sufficient to establish the legitimacy of 
global rights norms without the further need for theoretical justifications. 
We might call this position "pragmatic positivism':s It is positivist in that it 
grounds the legitimacy of rights in the quasi-legal declarations and covenants 
of the UN, and it is pragmatic because it recognizes that the purpose of such 
declarations is to secure global stability. As I noted in the Introduction, it was 
in response to the horrors of the Second World War and from a determination 
to avoid such devastating wars ever again that the UN formulated the UDHR. 
This pragmatic legitimation of human rights does not preclude the possibility 
that philosophical accounts of human rights that draw on local cultural or theo-
logical traditions might not be developed in one part of the world or another. 
People in the West may wish to refer back to the traditions of liberal thought 
or of Christianity to enunciate theories of human rights, while thinkers in other 
parts of the world may want to allude to concepts developed in their own tradi-
tions. My claim, however, is that the concept of human rights has been given 
a universal legitimation that enables fruitful discourse on human rights and 
global justice in all parts of the world just on the basis of the pragmatic consid-
erations adduced by the framers of the UN declarations. 
A further basis for the legitimation of basic human rights is the fact that 
people have struggled for them throughout history. Jay Drydyk (1997) has 
developed what he calls a "transformationist" conception of human rights in 
which human rights are constarttly being developed and expanded through a 
bottom-up struggle for justice rather than any top-down declaration of such 
rights.6 People around the world have always struggled for rights and continue 
to do so. People feel indignation at the harms they suffer that is more than an 
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expression of mere disappointment or frustration, and that motivates them to 
engage in political struggle. Rather than say that the concept of rights is not 
applicable in societies that have cultural traditions that are inhospitable to that 
concept, we should acknowledge that individuals and groups in such societies 
often struggle for what we would call their rights. Many voices will be raised 
within those societies to influence political discussions and create democratic 
processes in order to claim human rights. To cite a contemporary example, a 
Chinese court condemned Hu Jia, aged thirty-four, to three and a half years in 
jail in April 2008, for "inciting subversion of state power" following his criti-
cisms of Chinese repression in Tibet and of other Chinese policies (Amnesty 
International 2008). It is the struggle and sacrifice of such activists that consti-
tute the reality of rights claims much more than any permissions or liberties 
granted by governments or declarations made by global bodies. Although it is 
correct in one sense to say that there exists no right to express political dissent 
in China, it is nevertheless possible to argue that Hu Jia was justified in his 
actions and in the claim he was making to be allowed to express such dissent. 
But the reality of his right to dissent is founded on his courageous struggle 
rather than on any agreement to accord such rights to Chinese citizens that 
the Chinese government might make in the future, or on any philosophical 
justification that Hu Jia or his supporters might offer. 
Drydyk also does not agree that the rights enunciated in the UDHR are 
meaningless in traditional societies because they are largely individualistic in 
tone. He argues that all societies, including highly traditional or authoritarian 
societies, have concepts that are akin to those of rights. The most obvious of 
these is the concept of duty. It is the obligations that members of such soci-
eties have towards one another that forge the coherence of those societies. 
Moreover, most normative systems and moral codes - such as the ten com-
mandments that are central to the Judaeo-Christian tradition - are articulated 
in the form of duties, commands or prohibitions. I have argued that there is a 
symmetry between duties and rights in the sense that if one person has a duty 
to another, then that second person has a right to whatever the first person has 
a duty to do. Accordingly, the concept of a right can emerge in any situation 
where the concept of a duty or obligation is already current. Those societies to 
which the concept of human rights is alleged to be meaningless do not lack the 
concept of duty. It follows that the concept of a right is incipiently or inchoately 
present already in such societies. Drydyk quotes Kwasi Wiredu, who has made 
a study of the Akan people of West Africa: "On the face of it, the normative 
layer in the Akan concept of person brings only obligations to the individual. 
In fact, however, these obligations are matched by a whole series of rights that 
accrue to the individual simply because he lives in a society in which everyone 
has those obligations" (Wiredu 1990: 247; quoted in Drydyk 1997: 164). The 
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basis of the notion of rights here is that of duty. Even though it is duties and 
obligations that are mostly spoken of, people will feel that they are entitled to 
receive from others what it is those others' duty to provide. 
Drydyk provides a rationale for this symmetrical system of rights and duties: 
the vulnerability and needs of individuals and groups. We are all vulnerable to 
various kinds of harm. We can be physically injured in accidents. We can have 
insufficient resources to provide for our nourishment and shelter. We may lack 
parental or family support. We may be subjugated and exploited by more power-
ful individuals or groups. Because these conditions are harmful to us, it is natural 
to feel that we should be protected from them. Accordingly, among the Akan 
people that Drydyk is alluding to, people feel themselves under an obligation 
to provide others with assistance in, and protection from, such harms. Further, 
given the symmetry between duties and rights, people will feel that they have a 
right to such protection. Accordingly, Drydyk believes that "calling for a human 
right to something is calling for social protection against standard threats that 
exemplify a particular type of danger for humans" (1997: 163).7 Other theorists, 
such as Bryan Turner (2006), have also called attention to the link between rights 
and human vulnerability (see also Nickel 2004). Turner's argument is that we 
have evolved institutions through our history in order to protect us from the 
dangers to which we are vulnerable. These institutions are based on a prior soci-
ability, which forms a society or community and which gives expression to values 
such as caring and sympathy. This inchoate level of social solidarity provides the 
motivation for establishing more formal institutions, including that of human 
rights, which give juridical expression to it. But these suggestions take us from 
the task of legitimating rights to the task of justifying them. 
A philosophical justification for human rights 
Although it goes a long way towards establishing the reality or validity of human 
rights in pragmatic and positivist terms, legitimation is not enough. Even if 
the concept of human rights and the list of which of them are basic has been 
positively legitimated, we still need to see if they can be justified. We need 
to understand and justify the existence of the so-called "fundamental human 
rights" that are the yardstick against which laws and the actions of govern-
ments and other agencies are morally evaluated. The UDHR has a preamble 
that affirms that "the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace 
in the world" (United Nations 1948). What justifies this claim that everyone in 
the human family has rights? We can highlight the problem by formulating two 
contrasting questions: 
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• is a permission to do something or an entitlement to a good a right because 
the law establishes it as a right; or 
• does (or should) the law establish that permission or entitlement as a right 
because people have a right to it? 
Positivists would answer the first question in the affirmative, while most philo-
sophical theorists of rights would pursue the second question. And this pur-
suit entails the need to justify the concept of a right in intrinsically normative 
terms. 
To highlight this need, let us recall an example that occurred in Australia 
not long ago. There was a shooting of a number of innocent tourists at a histor-
ical site in Tasmania called Port Arthur. A deranged gunman had opened fire 
without any apparent reason. Soon after, the Australian government changed 
the law that permitted most people to own and carry guns so that having a 
gun became highly restricted and subject to licence conditions. Many sport-
ing shooters around Australia were outraged and bumper stickers appeared 
on cars saying, "People have a right to own and use guns'; or words to that 
effect. The sporting shooters were making a rights claim. What was the basis 
for such a claim? Various arguments were offered about the harmlessness of 
sports shooting, the need to protect life and property against criminals and the 
freedom to do whatever would not harm others. In the USA such debates also 
refer to a historical tradition of standing up against despotic rule, but this argu-
ment is less telling in Australia. However, I suspect that these arguments are 
but covers for what really matters: that shooting things for sport is something 
that many people are very keen on doing. They strongly want to do this and to 
be able to own and carry guns in order to do it. They were outraged when the 
law was changed so as to make it extremely difficult to continue their hobby 
and very upset that a well-established lifestyle and recreational choice would 
no longer be available to them. It seems, then, that their claim was based on a 
strong desire to do the thing being claimed and a very strong disappointment 
at no longer being able to do it easily. If I am right in this suspicion, then it was 
the strength of their desire and disappointment that led them to make their 
claim in terms of a right. In this context, "I have a right to carry guns" means 
little more than "I very strongly want to carry guns': 
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), who, like most utilitarians, was very suspi-
cious of the concept of rights, analysed it in just this way. People are apt to 
talk about rights, he said, when they want something very intensely or are 
extremely upset about something being taken away from them (1987). It was 
clear to him that very strongly wanting something is not a justification for 
claiming to have a right to it.s The reason for this is simple. When you claim the 
right to something you are claiming that someone else or some other agency 
66 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
has a duty to provide it to you or to protect you in your possession of it. But 
does very strongly wanting something give someone else a duty to provide it, 
to permit you to have it or to protect you in having it? Is the Australian govern-
ment under an obligation to permit widespread gun ownership just because a 
number of people, no matter how many, strongly want it? A government has 
to consider social consequences such as public safety, the risk of guns falling 
into the hands of criminals and perhaps even the welfare of the animals that 
would be hunted. It is under no obligation to accede to a request just because 
what is requested is desired or insisted on very strongly. Strong desire or disap-
pointment, therefore, provides no justification for rights claims. Because Mill 
thought that we should confine our ethical thinking to what people want and 
would make them happy - to what he called "utility" - he concluded that rights 
were spurious. 
However, the problem with confining our ethical thinking to what we want 
- and this is a problem with the concept of "utility" more generally - is that it 
takes people's preferences at face value and urges us to satisfy as many of them 
as possible without distinguishing those preferences that are for things neces-
sary to a dignified human life from those that are for superfluous things that we 
merely desire. Without this distinction the ethical demand to maximize utility 
is too indiscriminate. It can lead only to injustices where the preferences of the 
many are given priority over the vital needs of the few (Wiggins 2005). We need 
to be able to distinguish things we merely want from things we have a right to. 
And we need to be able to justify any claims that we have such rights. 
Cosmopolitans would argue that such justifications need to be offered in 
terms that would be acceptable to all the peoples of the world irrespective of 
their cultural traditions and systems of belief. If basic human rights are said to 
be universal, their justification must be universally acceptable. Accordingly, in 
justifying human rights 1 may not appeal to divine commands, a transcendent 
human nature or any abstract notions that arise from specific cultures, political 
traditions or religions and that could therefore not be accepted universally. For 
example, 1 may not appeal to the theories of the ancient Greeks, who taught 
that we were invested with an immortal and rational soul that marked us off 
from the animals. Christianity went on to teach that God created us with a 
human essence or nature and, indeed, with a destiny or purpose, which was to 
achieve union with him. Once again, it was through our souls that this destiny 
could be fulfilled. We have already noted how Christianity acquired from the 
ancient Greeks a conception of "natural law'; which was the embodiment, in 
nature, of the rational will of God or of the cosmos itself. This law dictated what 
we should do by declaring that every kind of thing should (or causally would, 
in the case of animals without free will) fulfil its own inherent and distinctive 
purpose. Even so recent a thinker as the Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain 
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(1882-1973), who had some involvement in the drafting of the UDHR, said 
that: 
possessed of a nature, being constituted in a given, determinate fashion, 
man obviously possesses ends which correspond to his natural constitu-
tion and which are the same for all - as all pianos, for instance, whatever 
their particular type and in whatever spot they may be, have as their end 
the production of certain attuned sounds. 
(1986: 140-41, quoted in Mahoney 2007: 128) 
The idea here is that either God or biological evolution has given us distinct 
purposes and goals that it is morally incumbent on us to pursue. However, the 
advance of modern science, with its rejection of teleological explanations, has 
led to the abandonment of such views. Accordingly, the concept of a universal 
human nature has also come to be regarded with suspicion. We need a less 
metaphysical and more widely accepted basis for human rights. 
Gillian Brock (2005) has suggested that the most distinctive, fundamental 
and universal feature that we have as human beings is that we are agents. This 
is not a metaphysical feature but one that anyone anywhere could understand 
in common-sense terms. We do things voluntarily on the basis of deliberation 
and choice. Accordingly, we have a basic need for anything that is necessary 
for human agency. In so far as agency involves bodily activity consequent on 
deliberation or choice, it requires physical and mental health, a degree of secur-
ity, a sufficient level of understanding of what one is choosing between and a 
certain amount of freedom to act. Moreover, one will need some social rela-
tionships to support one in one's action. These are conditions that we do not 
merely desire, but also need. Accordingly, it can be argued that we are justified 
in claiming them as rights. 
I would develop this argument one step further by pointing to a feature of 
human existence that is even more basic than agency. The least metaphys-
ical basis for postulating human rights is that all human beings (or at least all 
mature human beings with no serious abnormal disabilities) display "subjec-
tivity': Subjectivity is that feature of human existence - manifest in our ability 
to think, to reflect and to make choices - that is the basis for not only agency, 
but also for the rational critique of the social conditions in which agency is 
exercised. I have already alluded to Frankfurt's analysis of human freedom as 
the ability to reflect on and change our preferences and desires. We can desire 
to change our desires. Subjectivity contains this capacity for reflection. This is 
not to be confused with the notion of "autonomy'; which many theorists use to 
ground a theory of human rights.9 Autonomy might be defined as the ability 
that many people have to create their own life plans and live by them without 
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unjustified hindrance from others. However, this seems to me to be a Western 
liberal ideal more directly consistent with individualism than with the com-
munitarianism inherent in many traditional forms of life. I shall discuss this 
further in Chapter 5. My use of the notion of subjectivity points to something 
at once more basic, less socially constructed and more universal. For human 
beings many actions are voluntary rather than instinctual or caused reactions 
to stimuli. Although we do many things as a result of instinct, reflex or routine, 
we also deliberate about what we might do or reflect afterwards about how we 
might have done things differently (Ricoeur 1966). Even in the most traditional 
societies, everyone is a subject who can reflect on his or her own preferences 
and make decisions as to how to act and what to do within the framework 
constituted by the community and its traditions. Subjectivity is a necessary 
condition for any form of human experience at all. It comes to expression in 
thought and action. Even thoughts and actions that display a high degree of 
conformity to community norms will be voluntary rather than caused and will 
be "owned" by the subject who thinks or performs them on the basis of their 
ability to reflect on them. From these unexceptional considerations we can 
deepen Brock's point that to live as a human being requires that we be able to 
enjoy those conditions that would allow us to act voluntarily and to reflect on 
our existence. Our subjectivity renders any social conditions that prevent us 
from reflecting on our circumstances and seeking to improve them on the basis 
of such reflection unjustifiable. It is in this capacity for reflection and change 
that our dignity as human beings consists. lO 
Because the view that human beings can act from choice and can own their 
actions and their choices through reflection is not a view that depends on 
metaphysical doctrines about human nature or about God and the universe, it 
is readily and universally understandable. It is an observation available to any-
one who can reflect on their existence and on the fact that we make choices 
and require certain conditions to be enabled to do so. But how does it follow 
that we have a right to these conditions? Why are we entitled to them rather 
than just urgently desirous of them? 
The conditions necessary for choice, voluntary action and reflection are not 
just desired in order to live our lives as human beings, but are needed. The 
importance of the notion of "need" is that, once we establish what we need 
in order to live as a human being, we can conclude that we have a right to 
have these needs fulfilled. We have this right because only in this way can 
the fundamental features of human existence be established and protected.ll 
Accordingly we have to develop a theory of basic human needs and then argue 
that basic human rights stem from them. What is it about us that could help 
define some of our needs as fundamental or basic?12 What needs do human 
beings have universally by virtue just of being human beings? It would seem 
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that to define which of our needs are basic we need to have some conception 
of human nature after all. 
Let us explore this matter by using an analogy. I had occasion to visit China 
in 1978 and was taken to a zoo in a regional city. It was a very old-fashioned 
zoo in which animals were kept in small cages. One such animal was a male 
tiger, which was being kept in a cage that measured about five metres by four 
metres. The cage had a concrete floor, bars on three sides, a tin roof and a little 
hut-like enclosure against the back wall. There was an opening in the back wall 
big enough for the animal to pass through and which was also used to intro-
duce food into the cage. The tiger, when I saw it, was lying half asleep against 
the bars. I found the spectacle deeply depressing. It seemed to me that there 
was something profoundly wrong with the conditions in which this tiger was 
living. It could be argued that these conditions were morally wrong (see Taylor 
1986), but this is not an argument that I will pursue here. It is enough to note 
my impression that there was something unpleasant or inappropriate in the 
way in which the animal was being kept. 
It is not difficult to understand why I might have had this impression. Like 
most people in the West (but perhaps not in China), I have seen my fair share 
of nature documentaries narrated by David Attenborough or other naturalists 
that portray how tigers and other animals live in the wild. It is clear from such 
popular programmes, and even more importantly from scientific field stud-
ies engaged in by ethologists, that tigers in the wild move about freely in their 
forest environments, hunt other animals, congregate in packs, fight with other 
males either in play or for access to females, mate and lie basking on the moist 
ground in the afternoon sun. These kinds of activities are engaged in by male 
tigers in the wild. It is natural to them to behave in that way. You might say that 
it is in their nature to behave in that way. Ethologists will tell us that this is not 
quite accurate: their behaviour is somewhat shaped by their environment. But 
if the environment is the one to which natural selection has fitted them, then 
that is how tigers behave in such environments. It makes sense to capture this 
idea by saying that it is in the nature of tigers to act this way or that they act 
this way because of their nature. However, the Chinese caged tiger certainly 
did not behave in these ways. Because it was in a severely restricted environ-
ment, its patterns of behaviour were also severely restricted and it appeared 
to an observer to be listless and lacking in stimulation. Of course, it might be 
said that this is behaviour that fits it to its restricted environment and that this 
reaction to that environment is also natural to the tiger. It is out of its nature 
that it reacts to these restrictions and to this lack of stimulation by being list-
less. But my key point is that, because it is a wild animal, the conditions that are 
optimal for it and in which it can behave in the ways that are fully consistent 
with its nature are those of the wild forest in which there are spaces in which 
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it can roam, animals on which it can prey and other tigers with whom it can 
associate and mate. 
Given this analysis of what we might call "tiger nature'; it will not be difficult 
to see what is wrong with locking up a tiger in a concrete and iron cage. The 
caged tiger will not be enabled to fulfil its nature as a tiger by running about 
freely, hunting in packs, mating and so forth. Its circumstances prevent it from 
engaging in the kind of activity that is optimal for it, given its nature. Its cir-
cumstances frustrate the fulfilment of its tiger nature. And we feel that this is 
wrong in an important sense. 
Notice that this analysis does not depend on it being the case that the tiger 
is suffering in any obvious way. The caged tiger is not in pain. It is not starv-
ing. Indeed, it might be thought that it has an easy life. It is fed regularly. It is 
sheltered. We can assume that it receives all the veterinary attention neces-
sary to stay healthy. It might even be able to participate in the zoo's controlled 
mating programme so that the zoo can have tiger cubs to show its visitors. We 
can assume that it does not pine for life in the wild in anything like the self-
conscious ways that we might if we were in similar circumstances. This tiger 
might have been born in the zoo and have no experience of life in the wild. On 
the other hand, if it had been captured in the forest, we can assume that it does 
not have the kind of conscious memory that would now lead it to be depressed 
because of its being aware that it has lost its freedom. Even if tigers have some 
kind of mental life, I would assume that they cannot have a desire for life in 
the wild. This would be true because, on even the most generous assumptions 
about animal consciousness, a tiger cannot desire something that it has not 
experienced or that it cannot now remember experiencing. The object of an 
animal's desire needs to be more immediately present to it than that. What this 
tiger can desire is only what is available to it in its caged condition. It cannot 
have the same range of desires that a wild tiger has. In this way we can con-
clude that the caged tiger is not suffering the frustration of any of its occurrent 
desires. And yet the animal seemed to be listless and even, if I may be some-
what anthropomorphic, depressed. My claim would be that this is because the 
life that is possible for it in its cage is a highly reduced life for a tiger. It is a life 
that does not contain the possibilities that the life of tigers in the wild contains: 
the life that is in accord with the nature of tigers. 
Notice too that this analYSis of what is wrong with caging tigers in the way 
that Chinese zoo keepers did in 1978 does not depend on any metaphys-
ical views about the nature of tigers. There is no argument that suggests, for 
example, that God has given tigers a certain nature and that it is therefore our 
responsibility to ensure that tigers can live in accordance with that nature. Nor 
is there a theory that says that tigers have a certain kind of soul: a soul, let us 
say, that makes them fit for, or predisposes them towards, roaming, hunting, 
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fighting over mates and mating. These kinds of theory would depend on the-
oretical postulations of a "nature" that arises from some metaphysical entity or 
other. These would be speculations that do not depend on observation of the 
animals but on theological or philosophical constructions that are imposed 
on the phenomena from a purely theoretical or a priori perspective. In con-
trast, my idea of a tiger nature, or of a natural set of ways for tigers to behave, 
is based on empirical observations. Ethologists have studied the animals in 
the wild environments to which the evolutionary processes have fitted them 
- as opposed to studying them in captivity where their behaviour would be 
untypical for their species - and have discovered what their natural patterns 
of behaviour are. 
In so far as my story contains an argument to the effect that it is wrong or 
inappropriate to keep tigers in cages because of their nature as tigers, it might 
be said to fall foul of the "fact-value" or "is-ought" distinction. This distinc-
tion was famously drawn by David Hume, who used it to argue that we cannot 
validly draw any inferences from factual statements expressed with a verb that 
operates grammatically like "is" to value statements expressed with a verb that 
operates grammatically like "ought': How this argument works can be illus-
trated with reference to my example. I have said that it is in the nature of tigers 
to roam, hunt, mate and so on. A great deal of factual data from the science of 
ethology bears this out. A further factual premise in the argument is that small 
concrete cages do not allow tigers to roam, hunt, mate and so on. And then 
I have concluded that it is wrong to keep tigers in small concrete cages. We 
can express this conclusion by saying that one ought not to keep tigers in such 
cages. But this is a value conclusion drawn from factual premises and is thus, 
according to Hume, an invalid inference. 
However, I maintain that the inference is valid. I argue that to say that it is 
in the nature of A (where A is a living thing) to do X is already and immedi-
ately to say that A should be enabled to do X. To argue this case it is necessary 
to explore the word "nature" somewhat more fully. The concept of A's nature 
involves the concept of what kinds of things A wants to do or is disposed to 
do (call them "X') in whatever environment is natural to it. (The word "want" 
here need not refer to any occurrent desire of which A is conscious; it can 
refer to a disposition or an unconscious inclination.) Accordingly, it implies 
that A's not being able or permitted to do X is a frustration of its wants or 
dispositions. On the further premise that the frustration of A's natural wants 
and dispositions is an evil, it can be concluded that such frustrations should 
not occur and should not be brought about by a morally responsible agent. 
The key to the argument, therefore, is that the concept of nature, as it is used 
in the example, is both factual and normative. It expresses both facts about a 
species of animal, and indicates optimal conditions for the way of life of that 
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species of animal. That such conditions are optimal for animals of that kind is 
not only a fact, but also a value that, prima jacie, makes it incumbent on any 
being that is in a position to take the relevant responsibility to ensure that 
those conditions obtain to the maximum degree possible given other moral 
imperatives and values that might also be applicable to the matter at hand. If 
"nature" were a value-neutral term, then we could say that it is just as much 
in the nature of a tiger to lie listlessly in a small cage - given the link between 
behaviour and environment - as it is for the tiger to be running freely in the 
wild. But we do not say this. We acknowledge that the caged behaviour, while 
in some sense caused by the interaction between the animal's nature and its 
environment, is not as "good" for the animal as would be its behaviour in the 
wild. The latter is "good" because it is consistent with the nature of tigers in 
the way that the former is not. We can conclude from this story, then, that 
tigers, as a species, have a "nature" in a non-metaphysical sense, and that this 
nature can ground norms for how tigers should be treated and what they 
should be enabled to do. 
Notice that, although this argument bears some similarity to "natural law'; 
it is, in fact, somewhat different. What the natural law tradition argues is that, 
given the nature of a thing, it has an obligation to pursue that nature. To illus-
trate this we need to refer to human beings since the notion of duty does not 
apply readily to animals. For example, it is argued that, given that human beings 
have a natural aversion to death, they are obliged to preserve life and have a 
duty to maintain their own lives and forbear from taking the lives of others. 
If you add to this way of thinking the notion that God created human nature, 
then those moral duties become absolute because they express the will of God. 
On this theory, human nature gives rise to duties to do what nature indicates 
we have a tendency or inclination to do. This is the kind of inference from "is" 
to "ought" that Hume impugned. However, my argument is not that nature 
gives rise to duties in the being that has that nature. It is that the nature of a 
being gives rise to duties in others to treat that being in accordance with its 
nature. In my argument from "is" to "ought" I move from the nature of a being 
to what it should be enabled to do, rather than to what it has a duty to do. I 
have developed the tiger analogy at some length because it shows us how to 
draw the appropriate moral inferences from the claim that human beings also 
have a universal- albeit non-metaphysical- nature. 
Human nature 
This claim has been defended by Martha Nussbaum. Inspired by Aristotle, 
Nussbaum draws on literature, legends and stories from a number of cultural 
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traditions to identify the aspects of human living and concerns of human beings 
that seem to be present in all cultures (1992; see also Nussbaum 1998). These 
become the aspects of life that will make that life count as a human life. They 
are the basic aspects of human existence.13 Nussbaum is not trying to describe 
human beings in the way that biologists might when they classify species. 
Rather, she explores the self-expression of human beings in various cultures 
in order to highlight the problems of human existence that all of them come 
to deal with in one way or another. In this way she builds up a conception of 
human living, with all its challenges and aspirations, that seems to be applicable 
to all human beings. The features of human living that are most salient include: 
our sense of mortality; our embodiment, with its attendant needs for food, 
shelter, sexual expression and mobility; our capacity for feeling pleasure and 
pain; our ability to perceive the world and to think and imagine; the fact that 
we are born as helpless infants; our ability, up to a point, to plan our own lives 
and conceive of our goals; our inclination to form bonds with others and to live 
peaceably with them; our interrelation with other animals and with nature; our 
ability to laugh and to play; and our being the subjects of our own experiences. 
This list is not exhaustive and different people will stress some over others. 
Moreover, cultures will pursue these concerns and issues in various ways. The 
differences between cultures and historical epochs are differences in how these 
aspects of life are formed and structured in specific times and places. But the 
claim is that, whatever these differences might be, they are the differential for-
mations given to these fundamental aspects of human life. A life that lacks these 
features in some form will hardly be a human life. It would be a life that lacks 
human dignity. 
The conclusion that Nussbaum draws from this sketch of the universal con-
cerns of human existence echoes the conclusion that I drew from my sketch of 
the natural life of tigers in the wild: they should be enabled to live in that way. 
If this list, or something like it, is a description of those aspects of a life that 
give that life the quality of humanity or of human dignity, then it immediately 
follows that it would be wrong to deny to any human being the opportunity to 
live out those concerns. Indeed, Nussbaum draws a stronger conclusion. She 
argues that not only should human beings be left free to pursue those aspects 
of life, but they should also be enabled to. This means that others should not 
only forbear from interfering in their pursuit of these aspects of life, but they 
should also provide the means in cases where such means are lacking. This 
point will have considerable implications for public policy on both a national 
and an international level. I shall explore these later. For the moment, we 
should note that this enlargement of the scope of what should be done on the 
basis of a description of what constitutes a dignified human life, and from what 
human beings should be permitted to do, to what they should be enabled to do 
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eads Nussbaum to speak of "capabilities': Her argument is that whatever social 
nstitutions and cultural contexts human beings find themselves in, they should 
lave the capability to pursue the concerns that typify human living. 
Nussbaum has developed a number of versions of a list of ten such capabili-
:ies. In 1999 she articulated the list in this way: 
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length, not 
dying prematurely or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth 
living. 
2. Bodily health and integrity. Being able to have good health, including 
reproductive health; being adequately nourished; being able to have 
adequate shelter. 
3. Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; being 
able to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault, mari-
tal rape, and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satis-
faction and for choice in matters of reproduction. 
4. Senses, imagination, thought. Being able to use the senses; being able 
to imagine, to think, and to reason - and to do these things in a "truly 
human" way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, 
including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathemati-
cal and scientific training; being able to use imagination and thought 
in connection with experiencing and producing expressive works and 
events of one's own choice (religious, literary, musical, etc.); being 
able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of 
expression with respect to both political and artistic speech and free-
dom of religious exercise; being able to have pleasurable experiences 
and to avoid nonbeneficial pain. 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and persons out-
side ourselves; being able to love those who love and care for us; being 
able to grieve at their absence; in general, being able to love, to grieve, 
to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger; not having one's 
emotional development blighted by fear or anxiety. (Supporting this 
capability means supporting forms of human association that can be 
shown to be crucial in their development.) 
6. Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to 
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life. (This 
entails protection for the liberty of conscience.) 
7. Affiliation. (a) Being able to live for and in relation to others, to recognize 
and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms 
of social interaction; being able to imagine the situation of another and 
to have compassion for that situation; having the capability for both 
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justice and friendship. (Protecting this capability means, once" again, 
protecting institutions that constitute such forms of affiliation, and also 
protecting the freedoms of assembly and political speech.) (b) Having 
the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be 
treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. (This 
entails provisions of non-discrimination.) 
8. Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to 
animals, plants, and the world of nature. 
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
10. Control over one's environment. (a) Political: being able to participate 
effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having the rights 
of political participation, free speech, and freedom of association. (b) 
Material: being able to hold property (both land and movable goods); 
having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; 
having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, 
being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and 
entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with 
other workers. (1999: 41)14 
Nussbaum insists that her list of capabilities is not contingent on what specific 
people actually want. She claims that her list is objective in the sense that it does 
not depend on what people actually seek or desire. The list identifies capabili-
ties the exercise of which constitutes human dignity. Nussbaum insists that all 
of these capabilities are necessary and none should be sacrificed for the sake of 
enhancing any of the others. Nor does she specify how these capabilities should 
be exercised. Item 2, for example speaks of nourishment. Everyone should be 
able to secure for themselves adequate nourishment and be helped in doing so 
if they cannot manage it for themselves. But it is still open to any individual to 
choose what they will eat or even to refuse nourishment. They may have reli-
gious reasons for being on a fast, or they may be suicidal. There is no suggestion 
that anyone should be forced to take nourishment or should be required to eat 
a particular kind of food. It is required only that they should be free to do so 
and made capable of doing so. 
Further, local cultural traditions should not inhibit these capabilities even 
when those subject to those traditions seem to be compliant. Any non-exercise 
of those capabilities should be freely chosen by that agent rather than enforced 
by the guardians of the tradition. There should be public and unforced rea-
soning in any given culture about how the capabilities should be exercised in 
that culture. Nussbaum avoids specifying any particular form of life that peo-
ple might choose for themselves. Some people may develop an individualistic 
form of life, while others will conform to the norms of their communities. It is 
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important, however, that all people have the opportunity to influence the com-
munal forms that their societies take. 
One capability that is largely absent from Nussbaum's description of a good 
human life is religion. Despite basing her description on an analysis of the cul-
tural productions and literatures of many peoples, Nussbaum seems to have 
downplayed an obvious fact: most people in most parts of the world are reli-
gious. IS We in the West may have developed a more secular mode of social 
existence and separated church from state, but the vast majority of humankind 
sees religious faith as integral to every aspect of their lives. As an Aristotelian 
thnker, Nussbaum is well placed to understand this since Aristotle's descrip-
tion of the four aspects of human functioning whose fulfilment constitutes 
our happiness - the so-called four parts of the soul - includes the activity 
of contemplation. Contemplation is thinking about the eternal things that we 
cannot change through our own practical reason or agency. These include the 
gods, the laws of nature and the truths of mathematics. Although this is a 
heterogeneous list, I would suggest that this is the level of our existence in 
which our spiritual concerns find their place, along with our non-instrumen-
tal curiosity about the nature of reality. What Aristotle is suggesting is that 
contemplation and speculation about eternal things is as important a part of 
human life as exercising our practical intelligence in the pursuit of our worldly 
goals. Whether our spiritual or contemplative quest is met through belief in a 
system of religious doctrines and commitment to a god, or whether it is met 
through a sense of awe and reverence at the wonder of life and the world, we 
all pursue an overarching conception of reality through which we can give an 
all-embracing meaning to our lives. Whether that reality is immanent in the 
world or transcendent to it is immaterial to the reality of the urge that we all 
have to attach ourselves to it. We do not live by bread alone. Even an atheist 
has commitments that transcend the givens of everyday life. My claim would 
be that religious or spiritual commitments, conceived very broadly, should be 
added to the list of features that give dignity to human life. Nussbaum makes 
no mention of this in her 1992 list of capabilities (1992: 222) and mentions it in 
Item 4 of the list above only in so far as it relates to our ability to use our minds 
and to freely express ourselves. Accordingly, I think we should add an elev-
enth capability: the ability to conceive of an overarching conception of value 
that would give significance to human life, and the freedom to engage in any 
rituals or practices that express a commitment to that conception and that do 
not harm others. There may be many who think that religious commitments 
are inherently irrational, but this would be a particular cultural perspective 
and it denies the apparent importance that religion plays in the lives of most 
of the world's peoples. However, to say that there might be more capabilities 
that human beings should exercise in order to live a dignified human life is not 
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to undermine the argument for basic human rights that can be derived from 
Nussbaum's list. 
There is another doubt that might be raised about the list. If it offers a 
description of what human beings do and the concerns they have so as to 
posit a human nature, then it might be asked why unpleasant and unfortunate 
aspects of human life are left out. Aggression and competitiveness seem to be 
universal features of human life. The recent defeat of communist countries in 
the cold war might signal the fact that human beings are inherently self-seeking 
and greedy and cannot adjust to a form of life in which mutual concern and 
sharing are espoused as communal values (however imperfectly they are real-
ized in history), or it might show that human beings want to exercise control 
over their own lives rather than live in a totally planned and non-participatory 
political structure. Either way, it suggests that self-seeking and competitiveness 
are inescapable features of human existence. In the same way the frequency of 
war might be thought to suggest the inevitability of aggression. Perhaps any 
comprehensive list of features of human life should include aggression, com-
petitiveness and self-assertion. However, what I would suggest is that, if such 
features were to be on the list, they should appear not as capabilities the exer-
cise of which should be protected or enabled by social institutions, but as capa-
bilities the exercise of which others should be protected from. These features 
of human existence point to the need for social structures that protect people 
from the predations of others. As Drydyk (1997) and Turner (2006) point out, 
the concept of human rights that such structures are designed to protect will 
be central to designing and implementing humane social institutions. 
Nussbaum's argument is not only epistemologically universal in the sense 
that it draws on human self-understandings from around the world, but it is 
also normatively universal in the sense that its practical conclusions should be 
applied to all without distinction. It is not a set of capabilities that only men 
should be enabled to exercise. It is not a list of capabilities that only light-skinned 
people should be enabled to exercise. It is not a list of capabilities that only 
Brahmins should be enabled to exercise. It is not a list of capabilities that only 
Protestants should be enabled to exercise. It is not a list of capabilities that 
only people who are not disabled should be enabled to exercise. It is not a list of 
capabilities that only people taller than ninety centimetres should be enabled to 
exercise. I include that last sentence because to say otherwise would be patently 
absurd. A person's height is not a relevant factor in deciding how that person 
should be treated in relation to the eleven capabilities (although it might be in 
relation to choosing a basketball team). Any non-application of the norm that 
everyone should be capable of exercising those functions must be justified on 
relevant grounds and a cosmopolitan would argue that race, ethnicity, caste, 
religion, nationality, sexual preference and political affiliation are not relevant 
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grounds for making such discriminations. There is not a white nature and a 
black nature. There is not a European nature and an Asian nature. There is not 
a Catholic nature and a Buddhist nature. There is only one human nature. The 
features and concerns that characterize human life are common to all cultural 
and social formations of that nature. Accordingly the normative requirement 
00 social arrangements and human interactions that people be able to exercise 
their human capabilities applies equally to all. 
It is this last point that forges the link between Nussbaum's thesis and the 
discourse of rights. The argument has the following structure: 
[1] Describe human nature in terms of what would give dignity and worth to 
a human life by fulfilling that nature. 
[2] Note that this description is normative in the way that my description of 
the tiger's nature was normative. 
[3] Conclude from 1 and 2 that all people should be enabled to exercise the 
human capabilities given in that description. 
[4] Assert that people need the resources to exercise those capabilities rather 
than just wanting them (and need them even when they do not express a 
want for them). 
[5] Conclude from 3 and 4 that social institutions and individuals should not 
prevent the exercise of the listed human capabilities and should provide 
whatever assistance or resources that are needed for such exercise. This 
step derives obligations from needs without specifying who carries those 
obligations. It is open to different cultures and societies to meet them in 
differing ways. 
[6] Note that obligations and rights are symmetrical. 
[7] Conclude from 5 and 6 that all human beings have a right to the freedom 
and the necessary resources to exercise the capabilities central to human 
dignity. In so far as there is an obligation - not yet allocated to anyone 
in particular - to meet the needs of people so that they can exercise the 
capabilities described above and so live a human life of minimal dignity, 
so all people have a right to have those needs met. 
Nussbaum herself does not highlight the concept of rights and does not move 
to steps 6 and 7. However, it will be clear that such steps can be taken. To exer-
cise the capabilities on her list and any other capabilities necessary for human 
dignity requires the provision of resources, freedoms (Sen 1999; see also Alkire 
2005) and other social goods. Accordingly, such resources, freedoms and other 
social goods will be things for which people have a fundamental or basic need. 
The meeting of basic human needs is a necessary condition for attaining a life 
of human dignity. But the argument does not move directly from asserting that 
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human beings have basic needs - as opposed to urgent wants - to concludirg 
that they have a right to have those needs met. It moves from the fact that all 
people have basic needs to asserting that other people or agencies have respOI_ 
sibilities for meeting those needs. By focusing on human needs and human 
vulnerability, the argument appeals to our sympathy and fellow feeling - contiI-
gent and fragile as these might be - in order to ground our obligations towar<.s 
those who are in need. Global human solidarity and the feelings of humani1y 
described by Hume make it obligatory for those who can do so to meet the vittI 
needs of others. If it is correct that we have responsibilities and obligations to 
others because those others have needs that only we can meet, and if it is trLe 
that our obligations and their rights are symmetrical, then it follows that thme 
others have a right to have us meet their basic needs. It is not the case that "'e 
have those obligations because they have those rights. Rather, they have thme 
rights because we have those obligations. In this way, the reality of human righ1:s 
is founded on the more fundamental concepts of obligation and duty towarcis 
others in the way that it is in many cultures around the world, such as the Akan 
people of West Africa mentioned above. 
Conclusion 
This argument gives us a universal basis for acknowledging as a basic human 
obligation our duty to enable people to exercise the capabilities necessary fClr 
a life of human dignity, and for claiming as a human right the freedoms and 
resources needed to exercise those capabilities. There is a universal set of neecis 
that all human beings have for the resources and freedoms that will enable thern 
to exercise those capabilities that are essential for a dignified human life. Bllt 
how did I move from saying that all people have such needs to saying that all 
people are entitled to have those needs met? I appealed to a non-metaphysicil1 
but normative conception of human nature. I argued that all people should be 
able to exercise their human capabilities because they are the way in which the y 
express their natures as human beings. Given our common humanity, this giVE ~s 
us all an obligation to assist others to exercise those capabilities. This point also 
involves the principles of impartiality and of equality. In so far as all people have 
such a nature as is expressed in the exercise of those capabilities, all peopl e 
equally should be permitted to live a dignified human life by exercising them. All 
people are equal in having a right to having those needs met. It is our obligatio n 
to meet those needs impartially that grounds the human rights of others. Thes e 
arguments justify the according of human rights to all human beings globally. 
But the political reality of basic human rights and of the obligations that g 0 
with them resides in the positive, quasi-legal pronouncements of those right:s 
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on the part of the UN and its agencies and on the struggles for such rights that 
individuals and communities have engaged in through history. It is these that 
legitimate them, while it is philosophical arguments that justify them. It is such 
activist and positivist legitimations that have established the global respect for 
basic human rights as universally normative. Moreover, in so far as the UDHR 
is universal in its reach, it acknowledges the moral equality of all peoples and 
individuals. And so does my argument justifying the reality of basic human 
rights. It appeals to needs that all people have. In this way, too, my argument 
shows respect for the peoples of the world as united by reason, sociability 
and a common humanity. It identifies those capabilities, including reason and 
sociability, that constitute the common humanity - or common human nature 
- which is a premise of my argument. It is because of this common humanity 
that we accept the responsibility towards others that grounds their right to our 
assistance and protection. Lastly, in so far as this notion of a common human 
nature is drawn from empirical and common-sense observations about the 
human condition, it evinces a belief in a globally acceptable, non-metaphysical 
concept of human dignity. 
The form of most arguments for human rights derives them directly from 
universal features of the human condition, whether these features are meta-
physical, theoretical, a priori or empirical. In these arguments the obligation 
that others have to respect and protect human rights derives from the reality 
of those rights. My argument takes the opposite course. It derives the reality 
of human rights from the prior existence of the obligations that people have 
towards those who are in need. I have argued for the reality of those needs, 
and I have alluded to the sympathy and compassion that arise from our com-
mon humanity as a motivator for responding to those needs, but I have not 
said enough to establish the reality of those obligations. This will be the task 
of Chapter 3. 
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Global justice 
The metaphysics of the relation with the Other is achieved in service and 
hospitality. In the measure that the face of someone else truly brings us 
into relation with the third, the metaphysical relation from me to the 
Other takes the form of a we, and flows into a state, institutions and law, 
which form the source of universality. (Levinas 1969: 300) 
In this chapter we shall explore the following features of cosmopolitanism from 
the list I proposed in the Introduction: 
(8) benevolence to all others irrespective of race, caste, nationality, religion, 
ethnicity or location; 
(9) willingness to come to the aid of those suffering from natural or man-made 
disasters, including extreme poverty; 
(10) commitment to justice in the distribution of natural resources and wealth 
on a global scale; 
(11) global solidarity with struggles for human rights and social justice; and 
(12) commitment to the liberalization of immigration and refugee policies. 
I shall argue that a person with a cosmopolitan outlook would respond to the 
vital needs of others, whether they are near or far and irrespective of their 
nationality, race, caste, religious commitments, gender or ethnicity. The cosmo-
politan outlook refuses to allow the distance, difference or anonymity of those 
who suffer oppression, poverty or catastrophe to obscure the responsibility we 
all have to respond to their needs. 
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Humanitarian aid 
Our complacency on this matter was shaken by an article published by Peter 
Singer in 1972.1 In that article Singer refers to a famine that was occurring in 
East Bengal (now Bangladesh) and causing many thousands of deaths through 
starvation. Singer argued that people in affluent countries have a moral obli-
gation to provide assistance to the victims of such natural disasters. To argue 
that we have such an obligation, Singer relied on the principle that "If it is in 
our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacri-
ficing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it" 
(1972: 231). He also proposed a qualified and milder version of this principle, 
namely: "If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, 
without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to 
do it" (ibid.). He illustrates how these principles apply by imagining a scenario 
in which you see a child drowning in a shallow pond. It is envisaged that the 
pond is so shallow that saving the child involves no danger to yourself, but you 
would ruin your expensive clothes by wading in and saving it. The only cost to 
you is the ruin of your clothes. In this case you can indeed prevent something 
bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral 
importance. The moral importance of your clothes is negligible compared to 
that of the life of the child. Therefore you ought to save it. Using the words of 
the milder form of the principle, we could add that you could prevent something 
very bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything that is morally 
significant to you. On the assumption that you are a typical person in an affluent 
society, your clothes and the cost of cleaning them have no moral significance. 
The point that Singer draws from this analogy is that contributing money to the 
aid effort for victims of a famine such as was occurring in East Bengal is some-
thing that you ought to do. It would save lives and would involve no sacrifice of 
anything morally significant to you or of anything that is morally comparable 
to the lives you can save. 
One purpose of this argument is to show that giving money for disaster 
relief is an obligation rather than an act of charity. Just as you are obliged to 
save the drowning child, so you are obliged to give to famine relief. This point 
is significant because, as I noted in the previous chapter, an act of charity is 
thought of as a "supererogatory" act. It is something that it is good to do but 
that we cannot be blamed for not doing. Such an act is optional from a moral 
point of view. If you see a busker in the street you are under no obligation to 
give her any money, but it is a good and admirable thing if you do. In most cir-
cumstances this would be an act of generosity that is ethically praiseworthy but 
not morally required. Many people think that giving money to assist victims of 
natural disasters is similarly generous and admirable but supererogatory. The 
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burden of Singer's argument is to show that, if his principle is accepted, such 
a generous act is not just virtuous and admirable but actually obligatory. We 
have a duty to assist those who are suffering from dire needs such as starvation 
caused by famine if we can do so without sacrificing anything of comparable 
moral significance. Following my argument in the previous chapter that rights 
derive from obligations, we could draw the further conclusion that the victims 
of famine have a right to our assistance. 
Singer goes on to defend his position from a number of possible objections 
or excuses that people might offer. To people who say that "charity begins at 
home" and that the needs of people who are close to us should take priority 
over those who are distant, Singer replies that there is no moral reason why 
the needs of a child in mortal danger from drowning in a pond that you are 
standing next to are any different from the needs of a child in mortal danger 
from starvation half a world away. It takes only a modest sum of money to save 
the child who is far away just as it costs only a ruined set of clothes to save the 
nearby child, and their needs are morally equivalent. Singer is here express-
ing a central tenet of the cosmopolitan worldview. The moral status of a child 
in need close to me is no different from the moral status of a child far away 
and my obligation to help in either case is therefore no different either. Nor 
does it matter that the distant child is Bengali while the nearby child is of my 
own nationality. If I can help without sacrificing anything that is morally more 
important, I am under an obligation to do so. Even if we did want to insist that 
charity begins at home, we need to acknowledge that, in a globalized world, 
"home" is the whole world. The media bring the sufferings of the world into 
our living rooms on a daily basis and the facilities provided by global commu-
nications and delivery systems make it possible to help even those who live at 
a great distance from us. 
Some people suggest that I have less of an obligation to help if others who 
can help are not doing so. Since those others are not doing their duty to help 
the victims of the famine, why should I? Singer shows how preposterous that 
objection is by altering his example in such a way that there are now other 
people capable of saving the child standing around the pond but not helping. 
Would that exonerate a would-be rescuer from the responsibility of saving the 
child? What would we say to someone who used that argument not to save the 
child in the pond? Although there is often a very widespread and impressive 
willingness on the part of many people to help when disasters strike people 
around the world - the tsunami that devastated many parts of southern Asia in 
December 2004 is a good example - it is also true that a great many people do 
nothing to help. Is this fact an excuse not to help? Singer argues that it is not. 
He goes on to quantify the point. Suppose that starvation resulting from the 
famine could be avoided if everyone in affluent countries gave $5. This would 
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mean that, given Singer's argument, everyone in affluent countries has an obli-
gation to give $5. Others have made similar suggestions. Tom Campbell (2007: 
67) has proposed what he calls a Global Humanitarian Levy. This levy would be 
imposed and administered by a global body and would be calculated as a func-
tion of what is needed to alleviate poverty and what affluent nations and their 
citizens can afford without major disruption to the lifestyles and economies 
of those nations. Economists are confident that such a figure could be calcu-
lated and would be small enough to be affordable for each individual. Paying 
such a levy would then not be overly demanding. The problem, of course, is 
that no such institutional arrangements are in place and, given the reluctance 
shown by most people in affluent countries to pay their taxes, it is likely that 
the costs of securing compliance would seriously jeopardize the usefulness of 
the amounts collected. Moreover, if recent criticisms of the World Bank and 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are anything to go by, the political 
problems that would arise from deciding how to distribute the aid would be 
enormous. Accordingly it is unlikely that everyone would pay the $5 Singer 
imagines it would take to relieve world poverty if everyone pays it. Does it fol-
low that those who are willing to give have no obligation or have an obligation 
to give only $5? No, says Singer, they should give an amount that actually saves 
lives, and if the non-generosity of others means that it requires the willing to 
give $50 instead of $5, then they have an obligation to give that much. That 
would still be an amount that, for most, does not involve a cost of comparable 
moral importance. 
Singer's argument asks us to weigh up two things of moral value. In the ini-
tial scenario these two things are the life of a young child and a set of clothes. 
In this instance most people would share Singer's intuition that the life of the 
child is of greater moral value than the clothes. Accordingly, when we com-
pare the moral importance of the two values at issue we opt for the life of the 
child. What this comparative structure of the argument asks us to do is to 
give a moral evaluation of the things or opportunities that we might sacrifice 
in order to save the lives of others. It assumes that the lives of others are of 
very high moral value. On the principle of the sanctity of life, we could agree 
that this is so, and on cosmopolitan principles we can agree that the location, 
ethnicity or nationality of the would-be famine victim does not detract from 
that value. The suffering of people who are displaced by famine or who have 
lost loved ones because of starvation is also of great moral significance and as 
this is inserted into the comparative structure of the argument it can be agreed 
that it will require the sacrifice of something of very great moral significance 
to offset the moral demands that this disvalue generates. Just as the mere ruin-
ing of my clothes is too insignificant to offset the negative value of the death 
of the child, so the mere loss of $5, $50 or even $500 for an affluent person is 
86 
GLOBAL JUSTICE 
insignificant in comparison with the lives that can be saved or the suffering 
that can be averted for the victims of famine. Singer makes several references 
to the consumer societies in which many of us live in affluent countries and he 
seems to share the widespread view that much of what we spend our money 
on is frivolous and unnecessary. Another set of clothes above and beyond what 
we already have is of no significance. Even the loss of a car or an opportunity 
to go on a holiday to a luxurious resort are losses whose moral significance is 
minimal compared to the moral value of the lives we could save or the suffer-
ing we could avert by giving the relevant amounts of money to famine relief or 
other rescue efforts. 
It seems then that on the stricter form of Singer's principle, and even on what 
he thinks of as the milder form, we have obligations to give of our resources 
that are very demanding. The number of people in dire need around the world 
is very high and their suffering is very acute. Moreover, the things that I need 
to spend my money on, compared to all the things I actually spend it on, are 
but few. Most of my spending is on clothes I do not need, cars whose quality 
and costs exceed my needs, trips and holidays I do not need to take, concerts, 
films, computer equipment, mobile phones, various gadgets and compact discs 
that are useful but not necessary, and so on. Accordingly, Singer argues that, on 
the stronger form of his principle: 
we ought to give until we reach the level of marginal utility - that is, the 
level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself 
or my dependants as I would relieve by my gift. This would mean, of 
course, that one would reduce oneself to very near the material circum-
stances of a Bengali refugee. (1972: 241) 
This follows from the stronger principle because it calls for a simple comparison 
between the needful condition of the recipient of assistance and the resourced 
condition of the donor, and suggests that if there is no moral justification for 
such a difference then one should give until the difference disappears. The 
milder form of the principle asks us only to prevent something very bad from 
happening and calls on us to sacrifice only what is of no moral significance. 
On this version of the principle, if my giving would involve my sacrificing any-
thing of moral significance, then I am not obliged to do it. This allows for the 
material circumstances of the recipient of my assistance to continue to be less 
than my own. On this version of the principle there could remain a difference 
in the distribution of benefits and resources between rich and poor since to 
impoverish myself or my family might indeed be a case of sacrificing something 
morally significant. Nevertheless, it does follow that, if most consumer spend-
ing is of no moral significance, I would not be able to claim my desire for a new 
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MP3 player as an excuse for not giving to the famine relief effort. Accordingly, 
even on the milder form of the principle, "we would have to give away enough 
to ensure that the consumer society, dependent as it is on people spending on 
trivia rather than giving to famine relief, would slow down and perhaps disap-
pear entirely" (ibid.). 
Demandingness 
Singer's article has generated a great deal of critical philosophical discussion.2 
Many commentators have responded to it by acknowledging its cogency but 
by suggesting that its conclusion is too demanding. It seems to ask too much 
of us. It tells us we are obliged to give until we are no better off than a poor 
Bengali. While the milder form of the principle on which the argument is based, 
which asks us to give up only trivial consumption in order to help those in need, 
seems less demanding, this is not the conclusion that Singer embraces. He sees 
no reason to adopt the milder principle. By endorsing only the stronger prin-
ciple, even while admitting that it leads to a moral demand that we give of our 
resources until we hold no benefits or advantages that the poorest recipients 
of our beneficence do not enjoy, Singer insists on the most demanding conclu-
sion from the argument. Singer's immediate answer to his critics is to say that 
if the conclusion follows from the premises, then it must be accepted no mat-
ter how demanding it is. He challenges us to be suspicious of any response to 
his argument that seeks to lessen its demandingness. Such responses might 
be motivated by self-seeking considerations. No one likes to be told that they 
should give of their wealth until the access to resources and benefits enjoyed 
by the recipient is no less than that of the donor. No one wants to be told that 
they have an obligation to impoverish themselves. 
Nevertheless, we might question how the argument reaches its demanding 
conclusion. One assumption that Singer is making is that most of our spending 
is on trivial consumer goods. But surely we also spend our money on goods that 
are of moral significance, even if they are goods that would appear to be luxuri-
0us from the point of view of a starving Bengali. When we consider our lives 
and all of the values that inhere in them, it turns out that they contain much 
more complexity than Singer allows. While we could agree that a great deal of 
our money is spent on consumer items whose moral value is questionable, we 
need to see this in the context of the only forms of life that are available to those 
of us who live in affluent societies. Much of what we spend money on will be 
felt by us as necessary. Clothes are not necessary only for covering and pro-
tecting our bodies. If they were, a simple livery with a replacement set to allow 
for laundering would be enough. But we need to dress in ways appropriate to 
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many occasions. While the temptations to excessive display and subservience 
to fashion are real, there is no denying the need to present well in a variety of 
settings and thus to spend money on clothes beyond the levels that would be 
typical in East Bengal. Cars have also become necessary in cities in which hous-
ing developments are spread widely and public transport infrastructure has 
not kept pace. While better policy decisions might have been made in the past 
and will need to be made in the future to reduce carbon emissions, the present 
situation for many is that they cannot avoid spending money on cars and other 
forms of private transport. Further, given the responsibilities that parents have 
for giving their children the economic opportunities that exist in the society 
in which they live, spending on education cannot be limited by comparisons 
with the spending on education that are typical in the third world. Thanks to 
the opportunities that our relative affluence has given us, our cultural lives are 
richer than for many peoples in poorer societies past or present. We pay for 
and enjoy popular arts in the cinema and music, along with high arts through 
concerts, galleries and literature. The lives of many people are deeply enriched 
by consumption of cultural products or participation in artistic activities. The 
pursuit of knowledge, understanding and spiritual meaning also involves finan-
cial and opportunity costs. We participate in, and contribute financially to, 
sporting and leisure activities as well. Even eating, which is necessary for life 
itself, has taken on deeper social and cultural significance. Not only is there 
the enjoyment and cost of social meals in a variety of contexts, from working 
lunches to congenial dinner parties, but the art of cooking gives expression to 
values of both connoisseurship and love.3 
How are the values inherent in such activities and the monetary costs that 
they involve to be given a moral weighting so that they can be entered into 
Singer's comparative schema? Even granted the triviality of much of what we 
spend money on aside from meeting our basic needs, are we obliged to give 
up all or any of the culturally and personally valuable activities and forms of 
consumption until such time as the victims of natural disasters can be saved 
from their misfortunes? There are people who do so, but perhaps they should 
be regarded as saints or moral heroes rather than as people who have fulfilled 
obligations that we all have. It will not help to say that Singer's argument is not 
too demanding because it asks us only to give what we have a capacity to give 
or what we can afford. Judgements about what we can afford and what we have 
a capacity to give are judgements that involve giving monetary value to the 
many incommensurable values that have a rightful place in our lives, and then 
comparing these to the lives that can be saved by the gift. But if the values are 
incommensurable, this cannot be done. Our capacity to give is not measurable 
in monetary terms. Unless we are so wealthy that a financial surplus can be 
clearly identified, we cannot be asked to give only what we can afford because 
89 
COSMOPOLITANISM 
we have no way of deciding in a morally satisfactory way what it is we can or 
cannot afford. 
This is a specific case of the more general difficulty that attends many forms 
of utilitarian thinking. It is difficult to the point of impossibility to measure the 
utility or benefit of many courses of action and thus to compare the utility or 
benefit arising from one course of action with that arising from another. It may 
be that this systemic difficulty lessens the applicability, and thus the demand-
ingness, of Singer's approach. 
Cosmopolitanism must also face a form of this difficulty. If cosmopolitan-
ism encourages global impartiality, it needs to compare the moral stringency 
of our duties to strangers with duties to those who are close to us and to whom 
we have what are called "particular obligations': In order to save the life of a 
distant child, should I give away the money that I need in order to provide an 
excellent education for my children? A cosmopolitan thinker would agree that 
distance is not relevant to the issue. Whether the child whom I can save is in 
the pond right in front of me or whether it is thousands of miles away is indeed 
irrelevant. The principle of impartiality dictates that only differences that are 
morally relevant should make a difference to our actions. And distance is not 
a morally relevant consideration because it has no impact on the moral stand-
ing of either child. However, the notion of "distance" can also be given a meta-
phorical meaning. A child who is in danger might be "close" to me in a sense 
other than a geographical one. It might be a child of which I am the father. On 
a very strict application of the principle of impartiality it might be suggested 
that even this should make no difference, but most ethicists accept that one can 
give greater moral value to one's own child than one gives to a stranger's child.4 
To an impartial observer the two children may be of equal moral standing, but 
to the father of one of them the judgement might be, and indeed ought to be, 
different. If the issue then becomes one of spending resources on saving the life 
of a distant child as opposed to spending it on the education, for example, of 
my own, how should the comparisons of moral value be made? Can I compare 
the value of the life of a distant child with the education of my own, given that 
the life of my own child, barring accidents or fatal illness, is assured? Given my 
particular obligations to my own child, the spending on my own child that is 
involved in this case should not be considered trivial as compared to the life 
of the refugee child. 
To defend cosmopolitanism against the charge that it unreasonably insists 
on the morally equal status of one's own children with distant children, it 
might be argued that one's moral relationship with one's own children and 
family members is not of the same kind as one's moral relationship with dis-
tant peoples and their children. I spoke in the previous chapter of a global 
framework of justice in which all people have an equal status and in which 
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the principle of impartiality should apply to them equally. Justice focuses on 
what we owe to others. The concept entails that others have rights or deserts 
in the light of which they should receive what they are entitled to. In the con-
text of criminal law, convicted felons should receive the punishments that they 
deserve and that fit the crimes they committed. Moreover, they should receive 
no punishment if they are not guilty. In the field of distributive justice - a field 
that is of greater relevance to us here - people should receive what they are 
entitled to or deserve. If someone contributes a significant amount of good to 
the community through their work, they should be paid for it. In paid employ-
ment, people should be paid amounts that are commensurate with the amount 
of effort they put in or the level of skill that is required. Social and institutional 
arrangements should ensure that the distribution of wealth is proportional to 
what people deserve, and they should be reformed if the rich are getting richer 
while the poor are getting poorer. This reference to what people are entitled to 
or deserve also shows the link between the concept of justice and that of rights. 
A situation or social arrangement can be considered just if it secures the rights 
of all those involved in it. If a person's rights are violated by an arrangement, 
that arrangement can be said to be unjust.s 
But the framework of justice is not the only moral framework that we live 
in. We also live in a framework of caring in which we are tied to others through 
bonds of love, affection or concern. In this moral framework the status of 
another person is defined by their relationship to me, whether it is as my wife, 
my child, my cousin or my friend. In this framework we do not do things for 
others because we feel that it is our obligation to do so, but because we care 
enough about the other to be motivated to do so. If I visit my friend in hospi-
tal because it was my impartial obligation to do so, I would be insensitive to 
the quality of the relationship between us. If my friend came to believe that 
I had visited him out of a sense of duty, he would not take as much comfort 
from my visit as he would if he felt I had done so out of my caring about him 
(Stocker 1976). On the basis of such considerations, many philosophers distin-
guish the particular obligations that are based on caring relationships and other 
appropriate loyalties from our obligations to the distant needy that are based 
on justice, and argue that the kinds of moral value involved in either case are 
incommensurable. 
For example, Appiah (2006: ch. 10) espouses what he calls a "partial cosmo-
politanism': which acknowledges particular loyalties as well as accepting global 
responsibilities. According to Appiah (2005: 228ff.), a cosmopolitan under-
standing of justice as giving to each what they are entitled to should not con-
fuse us into thinking that cosmopolitanism has to do only with the distribution 
of goods. Certainly, the framework of justice enjoins us to treat all others equit-
ably. When it comes to the distribution of goods we should give to each person 
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what they deserve or need as judged impartially. But the distribution of goods 
is a task that does not exhaust our moral obligations to others. We also have 
to give others what is their due as our friends, or compatriots, or members of 
other forms of identity groupings. This may involve activities that acknowledge 
or forge forms of solidarity with, loyalty to and affection for people with whom 
we have a variety of identity-forming relationships. This kind of activity should 
not be assimilated to the distribution of goods that is central to the framework 
of justice. The impartialist and cosmopolitan norms of distribution that apply 
to the latter do not apply to the former. Indeed, Appiah suggests that the task 
of distributing goods, especially social goods, falls on the state and other social 
institutions, while individuals often do good to each other under a different 
rubric. This rubric is what has been called "the ethic of caring':6 
The ethic of caring 
The ethic of caring embraces all those actions that we perform for the benefit 
of others out of feelings such as love, affection, concern, sympathy, loyalty or 
compassion. It is not motivated so much by a sense of duty as by feelings of 
solidarity and sympathy. These motivations are strongest in relation to people 
whom I love, and extend to all people with whom I have some kind of personal 
relationship. Indeed, on Appiah's account, they extend to everyone with whom 
I have "identity-forming" relationships such as compatriots, co-religionists, 
people who share my ethnicity, and anyone else with whom or with whose 
community I identify. In so far as I draw my identity from such groupings I shall 
care about their members. The key to this ethic is that I am motivated to help 
others not out of a sense of duty, but out of concern for them. 
The problem with this ethic is that it does not seem to be universal. It appar-
ently confines itself to those with whom I have the relevant kind of relationship. 
Members of my family will be the most obvious such persons, but, even if it 
extends more widely, my concern will extend only to those with whom I iden-
tify in some way.7 Caring does not seem to have the global scope espoused by 
cosmopolitanism. Appiah solves this problem by suggesting that concern for 
others motivated by caring, and grounded in identity-forming relationships, is 
a different kind of moral motivation from the obligations that arise within the 
framework of justice. It is of a kind that is not required to be universal. Appiah's 
argument is that it is not prima facie a violation of the norms of justice to give 
priority to the demands that arise from the identity-forming associations we 
have with people we care about. But this is not because these demands have 
a greater weight than our obligations towards strangers or distant others, but 
because they do not exist in the same domain. It is not that we are permitted 
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by morality to give the needs of those near to us greater priority than those of 
strangers; it is that the obligations arising from these two categories of needs 
are of a different kind. The demands that arise from our identity-forming asso-
ciations are the demands of caring and are demands that we owe to others as 
individuals, while our obligations towards strangers or distant others belong 
to the framework of justice and belong to us as human beings and as political 
agents in a globalized world. Appiah comments: "Equality wasn't what moral-
ity demanded of us as individuals; it denotes a regulative ideal for political, not 
personal, conduct. We go wrong when we conflate personal and political ideals, 
and, in particular, when we assume that, because there are connections between 
the two, they are the same" (2005: 230). It would seem that Singer has assumed 
that they are the same. The value of those we care about and the value of those 
to whom I have obligations in justice are of different kinds and are therefore 
incommensurable. Rescuing a distant stranger is but one of the moral values 
I am rightly motivated to pursue along with values that are incommensurable 
with it, such as caring about those who share communitarian relationships 
with me. Of course the difficulty that this leaves me with is that of balancing 
and adjudicating between the various incommensurable moral demands that 
are placed on me. I shall return to this difficulty presently. 
But first I want to argue that the ethic of caring can itself have a univer-
sal scope and needs not be confined to those with whom one has particular 
identity-forming relationships. We have seen that Nussbaum argued that car-
ing about everyone universally is a form of moral maturity or virtue.8 On her 
view, it would be an unjustified limitation of my caring if I confined it to those 
with whom I had identity-forming relationships. If the domain of caring is 
defined by my feelings, might it not also embrace the whole world? While the 
range of my love and affection may be confined to family, friends and close 
associates, the range of my sympathy and compassion may well extend - and 
arguably should extend - to the starving of the third world.9 The ethic of caring 
advocates a willingness to assist others in need simply because they are human 
beings who have the same needs and vulnerabilities as I have. To live life with 
a minimum of human dignity is something that I would wish for all other 
human beings in so far as I care about them as human beings. The motivation 
for this willingness comes from aspects of my own humanity. My feelings of 
sympathy and compassion, my caring about the fate of others, and my concern 
for their well-being are inherent in my nature as a human being. Drawing on 
the writings of Adam Smith (1723-90) in arguing that human beings have an 
innate moral sense, James Q. Wilson has argued that "sympathy, defined as 
the capacity for and inclination to imagine the feelings of others, is a source 
- to Smith, the source - of human moral sentiments" (1993: 32). For her part, 
Kristen Renwick Monroe has used empirical studies to argue that the heart of 
93 
COSMOPOLITANISM 
altruism is the ability to adopt the perspective of a common humanity rather 
than confining one's concerns to family, tribe or nation. For her, altruism "con-
sists of a common perception, held by all altruists, that they are strongly linked 
to others through a shared humanity. This self-perception constitutes such a 
central core to altruists' identity that it leaves them with no choice in their 
behaviour towards others" (1996: 216). In my own writing (van Hooft 1995, 
2006) I have highlighted caring about others as a fundamental motivational 
stratum as important to all of us as the self-project on which our identity and 
feelings of self-worth are based. Accordingly, we can see that it is the ethic of 
caring that Tom Campbell refers to when he says: "The principle of benevolence 
or 'humanity' (as in 'humanitarian') is based on the propriety of the elemental 
response of aiding another human being arising from seeing, imagining, or 
knowing of the suffering of that being irrespective of who is suffering or why 
that suffering came about" (2007: 65). The paradigm example of the principle 
of humanity or the ethic of caring in action is the helpful treatment given to 
the stranger who knocks on one's door looking for assistance. The villagers of 
Le Chambon in France who helped Jewish refugees fleeing from Nazi persecu-
tion during the Second World War are a striking example of this virtue.lO They 
responded to the immediate and direct need of the people who knocked on 
their doors by hiding and feeding the refugees, often at great danger to them-
selves. In explaining their actions after the war, they did not make reference to 
moral principles or obligations but simply to the vital needs of those who had 
appealed to them for help. As Monroe remarks: 
Our study of altruism, if it teaches us anything, reminds us of the impor-
tance of seeing the human face, the person needing help, of moving 
beyond the anonymity of just another nameless victim, one more faceless 
Jew shipped off to a concentration camp, another child killed in Bosnia 
or dying from famine in some distant land. (1996: 236) 
In the contemporary world, however, the dire and vital needs of others are not 
so directly present to those of us in affluent nations who are in a position to 
help. This remoteness, along with many other circumstances, makes it easy for 
us to ignore the plight of others or to pretend that we are not in any way called 
on to help.u 
These considerations allow us to answer a question that Singer never actu-
ally asked in his article: why are we obliged to save the child - who is, after all, 
a stranger to me - in the pond and, by analogy, the starving children in East 
Bengal? Singer just assumes that we would all share the intuition that we are 
obliged to save the child in the pond. On the ethic of caring, the way to under-
stand such an obligation is to see it as a feeling generated within the motivational 
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field of an individual in response to the perceived need of another. What a vir-
tuoUS person responds to in the world and moves her to act responsibly is not 
the alleged fact that someone else has a right or that the agent herself has an 
obligation. Rather, the virtuous person responds to the fact that the other is in 
need. Whereas the framework of justice asks us to take a rationally structured 
and abstract view of others so as to see each individual in the world as equal in 
moral value and thus equally entitled to having their vital needs met, the ethic 
of caring urges us to care about them. My claim is that the scope of such caring 
can be global. It can transcend our particular loyalties and community-based 
attachments to embrace the whole of humanity in compassion. 
Having distinguished the framework of justice from the ethic of caring, I 
now need to discuss how we should adjudicate between them. It remains the 
case that both those who are "close" to me in the sense of having a bond of car-
ing with me and those who are "distant" from me in the sense of being merely 
nodes in a system of justice of which I am a part have a right to my attention 
and to my resources (even if "right" is not the most appropriate term in the 
context of caring). Should I keep the two domains distinct? Is the cosmopolitan 
principle of humanity as it applies to everyone globally to be understood as an 
expression of the ethic of caring or as an obligation in the moral framework 
of justice? My argument that the needy have rights because the affluent have 
obligations to the needy would seem to point in the direction of the second 
option. The human rights of others should not depend on such contingent and 
uncertain bases as sympathy and concern. In a suffering world we are all sub-
ject to "compassion fatigue'; but our responsibilities do not dissipate as a result. 
Cosmopolitanism downplays the importance of identity-forming relationships 
in the formation of global economic and political policies, especially the rela-
tionships that constitute nationalism. To treat everyone as having equal moral 
status is precisely to insert them into the framework of justice rather than 
into the framework of caring, where special relationships can trump impar-
tiality. Does the ethic of caring and its endorsement of partiality undermine 
the framework of justice with its stress on universality and impartiality? Are 
the ideals of cosmopolitanism undermined by Appiah's acceptance of partial 
cosmopolitanism? 
In order to answer these questions we need to notice that Appiah does not 
only distinguish the domain of justice from the domain of loyalty and caring in 
terms of the kinds of motivation that are involved in either. The kind of motiv-
ation that is involved in the framework of justice is the feeling of impartial 
duty to all, where all are understood to have an equal moral status. It sees the 
other as a generalized bearer of rights. In contrast, the kind of motivation that 
is involved in the ethic of caring is a feeling of concern and sympathy learnt 
in the context of relationships with family and with members of one's wider 
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identity-forming groups and extended to all of humanity. It sees the other as a 
particular person with whom one has a relationship of compassion. It is likely 
that a mature and virtuous human being would feel both of these kinds of 
motivationP But Appiah's central point is that the framework of justice does 
not define one's moral motivations. It defines the responsibilities of political 
and social institutions that distribute social goods. The framework of justice is 
relevant to individuals and defines their obligations in so far as those individu-
als participate in social and political arrangements that distribute social goods 
to others. While individuals might care about those others in so far as they are 
fellow human beings or in so far as they are family members, their duties are to 
distribute those social goods impartially and equitably in accordance with prin-
ciples that are inherent in those social and political institutions. Caring is a vir-
tuous motivation, but justice is a social duty. These motivations and obligations 
can coexist in anyone individual and they can come into conflict, but when the 
issue is that of distributing social goods, the principles of justice must guide the 
motivations of caring. Both justice and caring are universal in scope. But they 
have differing specific domains. Justice dictates what people are entitled to in 
the context of political arrangements that distribute social goods, while caring 
leads us to see why that matters. Caring should lead us to act justly. 
The morality of rescue 
To see the importance of the justice perspective, let us explore the example that 
generated Singer's argument - a famine in what is now Bangladesh - and the 
analogy that he used to illustrate his principle - saving the child in the pond. 
Both are cases of rescue that appeal directly to our caring. The morality of rescue 
is marked by a number of distinctive features. The first of these is that there is 
some sort of disaster unfolding at a specific time that is relatively unusual and 
extremely dangerous to its potential victims. The most obvious examples are 
natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, wildfires and volcanic eruptions. 
I have already mentioned the tsunami of 2004.13 
A second feature of rescues is that the situation can be expected to return 
to normal after the event and following successful rebuilding efforts. While the 
scale of the 2004 tsunami was such that rebuilding is still going on at the time 
of writing, in less dramatic examples it can be expected that aid and rescue 
workers should be able to leave the area in due course so as to allow people to 
rebuild their lives and continue to live in tolerable conditions for the foresee-
able future. In short, rescue workers go into a disaster area, do what is needed 
and then leave. The effort is relatively short term and ideally has no lasting 
effects on the lifestyles and infrastructures of the affected areas. Things should 
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return to normal and the presumption is that the normal state of affairs is 
not such as to require further assistance. Rescue efforts need have no lasting 
impact on institutional, economic or political arrangements in the recipient 
countries. From the point of view of donor countries, organizations or indi-
viduals, the demand is that there be a one-off donation of necessary resources 
to provide immediate relief and resources for rebuilding. Once the disaster is 
over and rebuilding complete, there is no further expectation of donor support. 
From the donors' perspective this means that the aid provided can be seen to 
be finite and proportional to the severity of the disaster. It also means that a 
degree of satisfaction at a job well done can be achieved, which will reinforce a 
willingness to assist in the event of future disasters. From the recipient's point 
of view, there need be no systemic dependence built into any relationships with 
donor countries or organizations. The situation that Singer is commenting on 
is one where there is an immediate need for rescue and an effective infrastruc-
ture for delivering assistance. In these circumstances, monetary contributions 
from individuals, organizations or governments in affluent countries have a 
reasonable chance of reaching their goal and doing some good. Moreover, there 
are no needs beyond the need for immediate rescue. 
But much of the suffering, death and poverty in the world to which we in 
affluent countries are asked to respond is not of this nature and it is therefore 
questionable how relevant Singer's argument is to them. The problem is that 
most of the situations in the world that currently call for our assistance are not 
short-term, immediate and dramatic disasters, but endemic and long-lasting 
conditions of poverty, ill health, vulnerability, malnutrition, poor sanitation, 
lack of education, denial of access to economic resources and political instabil-
ity. Much of the third world suffers from dire poverty, frequent famines, natu-
ral disasters, devastation caused by epidemics such as HIV / AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases, low life expectancy and literacy levels, graft, corruption and 
political oppression, and an almost endless list of misery and disadvantage. 
There are more men, women and children dying from poverty-related causes 
in third world countries every year (an estimated 18 million, or 50,000 a day) 
than were killed in the 2004 tsunami, but, because they do not die as a result 
of a single dramatic event, their deaths are barely noticed. "Poverty-related 
causes" include inadequate nutrition, unsafe drinking water and sewage sys-
tems, and lack of cheap rehydration packs for diarrhoea victims and of vac-
cines, antibiotics and other medicines (Pogge 2007b: 13). Poverty is not just a 
source of suffering in itself through hunger and starvation. It also leads to not 
being able to access health and education. In this way it contributes to mor-
tality rates, morbidity and lack of opportunity. It also contributes to political 
instability. Countries that are too poor to pay their public servants and police 
adequately are prone to corruption when government employees are tempted 
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to take bribes. Poor countries that have natural resources are prone to political 
coups as military officers or tribal leaders see the opportunity to seize power 
and enrich themselves by selling off those resources to developed nations. It 
follows that affluent people in rich countries are faced with a greater and more 
consistent set of appeals to their caring and benevolence than arise just from 
the occasional disaster. 
Our understanding of these issues and of how they are interrelated has been 
greatly advanced by the work of the Nobel Prize-winning economist, Amartya 
Sen. Commenting on famines, Sen points out that people can starve from fam-
ine even when food is in plentiful supply nearby; the problem is that they have 
no access to it. Indeed, in the very famine that Singer refers to, there was plen-
tiful food available at the time when people began to suffer from starvation. 
There had been flooding and, as a result, food prices had gone up in expecta-
tion of shortages. As a consequence, workers who were displaced by the floods 
and left out of work were unable to buy the food they needed for themselves 
and their families. Many died, but it was only later that food actually became 
scarce. What this shows is that famine is caused not only by lack of food but 
by lack of access to food. The problem might be that the victims of famine 
are unable to purchase food or that they are prevented by social and politi-
cal institutions from having access to it. In many societies women and chil-
dren are more vulnerable to hunger because there are social norms that give 
men privileged access to available food. In some societies, government policies, 
sometimes dictated by international financial institutions such as the World 
Bank or the IMF, affect food prices so as to prevent poorer people from buying 
food that is available. Famine relief, therefore, involves more than the short-
term distribution of food aid. It can also require long-term improvements in 
the production and distribution of food, changes to government policy that 
affect people's entitlement to food and challenges to cultural expectations such 
as male and female roles, all of which have an impact on the growth and con-
sumption of food products. Even the short-term distribution of food aid has 
to be handled sensitively since it can undermine the livelihood of local food 
producers by undercutting their prices (Sen 1999: 164ff.). 
Sen's broader thesis is that the. goal of economic development in the third 
world should not be just growth in gross national product (GNP). Nor should it 
be measured by such growth. Mere growth in GNP measures the gross wealth 
of a nation but says nothing about how that wealth is distributed or the extent 
to which it enhances the lives and economic 0pportunities of its citizens.14 
The GNP of Nigeria is very high because of its oil revenues, but most of that 
money is being siphoned off by the military kleptocrats who run the country. 
The ordinary citizens of Nigeria are as poor as they ever were. Sen argues that 
the goal of development should be the enhancement of freedom of the people 
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in that economy. Being deprived of food, health, economic opportunities or 
security are just as much forms of unfreedom as literal servitude or slavery. 
By "freedom" Sen understands five interrelated social conditions: (a) politi-
cal freedom; (b) economic facilities; (c) social opportunities; (d) transparency 
guarantees; and (e) protective security (ibid.: lO, 38). The first of these refers to 
the civil rights through which people can prevent exploitation, oppression and 
the social or economic conditions that amount to enslavement through their 
political action. The second condition refers to the establishment of institu-
tions that permit participation in trade, production and employment, while the 
third refers to the ready availability of services that allow individuals to develop 
and maintain the skills and competencies necessary to participate in economic 
activity: services such as education and health. The fourth condition refers to 
institutional arrangements that prevent graft and corruption so that the gains 
that people make and the income that they earn can be secured to them, and 
so that there can be public scrutiny to ensure compliance with regulations and 
laws that protect workers' rights and fair competition. The fifth condition refers 
to a welfare safety net that ensures that people who lose out in the system or 
are prevented by disability or bad luck from participating in it are, nevertheless, 
looked after. Although Sen does not mention it, this might also include policing 
as a protection from crimes against one's person or property. Economic activity 
and participation are throttled when the gains that one can achieve cannot be 
secured to one because property rights are not respected. Such policing would 
also protect the fourth condition. All of these five conditions of freedom inter-
act causally, and together constitute appropriate goals of economic develop-
ment. Without them, underdevelopment and vulnerability to natural disasters 
are inevitable. As evidence for this Sen claims that there have been no famines 
in democratic societies. 
The lesson to be drawn from Sen's argument is that providing aid to the 
world's poor is a much more complex project than Singer allows in his article. 
This in no way reduces the urgency and moral stringency of the obligation 
that we have to render assistance, but it does suggest that the simple giving of 
money may not be the best means to do so. Many theorists prefer an ethics of 
development over an ethics of aid (e.g. Crocker 2002). Emergency relief may 
be necessary but often has no long-term efficacy. Development efforts should 
be directed to a wide range of measures that enhance people's capabilities, as 
Nussbaum has described them, and their freedoms, as Sen has stipulated. This 
has important implications for the practical commitments of cosmopolitans 
in that it becomes much more difficult to see what one can do. Donating to 
international relief agencies and to NGOs that pursue development projects 
remains a viable and important option, but it is becoming increasingly appar-
ent that solutions to the problem of world poverty are very hard to find if 
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one is focused only on the obligation of individuals to give humanitarian aid.Is 
Benevolence and compassion are important but local and global economic and 
political institutions must be interrogated for the role they play in distributing 
the world's goods. Such institutions must be juSt. I6 
If we hold the view that Singer seems to prefer - that we are required to give 
of our resources until our holdings are no greater than that of the poorest in 
the world - no distribution of goods and opportunities would be just unless it 
leads to equal outcomes. While Singer draws this conclusion, he does not expli-
citly endorse this view of justice. It is one that many thinkers find problematic. 
A more plausible conception of what justice demands arises from Sen's and 
Nussbaum's ideas. For them, a distribution is just if the poorest in that distribu-
tion are nevertheless able, securely and over time, to exercise those capabilities 
that constitute basic human dignity. On this view there is a limit to what we are 
obliged to contribute to humanitarian and development aid: we need give no 
more than would be required for the recipients to reach this standard. 
Global justice 
Most philosophers think about distributive justice through the framework 
provided by Rawls in his epochal book, A Theory of Justice (1972). The basic 
principles that Rawls developed there were that any unequal distribution of 
social goods would be just provided that those who were worse off in the sys-
tem would still be better off as a result of the wealth of those who are better 
off, and provided that the opportunities to improve one's position within the 
system were available to anyone in the system. It would be unjust if the rich 
were getting richer at the expense of the poor and it would be unjust if anyone, 
rich or poor, were prevented from improving their position on the grounds of 
irrelevant factors such as colour, caste, creed, gender, ethnicity or place of birth. 
Rawls argues that these principles are just because they would be endorsed in 
an "original position" in which participants who were ignorant of what place 
they would occupy in a society structured by those principles design the insti-
tutions of that society.I7 Rawls focuses on the justice of the distribution of such 
social goods as economic opportunities, provision of services such as health, 
education and policing, and wealth outcomes, and it does so in the domestic 
context of a specific nation-state. Rawls sees a nation-state as an economic and 
political system in which co-nationals participate by contributing cooperatively 
to that system and by deriving benefits from it. It is because it is a relatively 
closed system of cooperation in this way that participants would only agree to 
the institutional structures of that society if the outcomes that they yielded for 
poor and rich alike were fair and just. 
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However, in the context of globalization it is no longer true that a nation-
state is a closed economic system. Economic activity that affects the living 
conditions of the poor and the rich has a global scope and the wealth of those 
In wealthy countries is won through economic and political activities that cre-
ate poverty in other countries. Accordingly, thinkers such as Thomas Pogge 
(1989) have applied Rawls's ideas to the global economic system and its insti-
tutions (see also Barry 1982; Beitz 1999a). If the principles of justice demand 
that the poor should benefit from the increasing wealth of the rich and should 
llave opportunities to acquire social goods equal to those of anyone else, why 
should these demands be met only within national economies? Why should 
they not apply to the whole world? Why should we not envisage a global "orig-
lnal position" in which participants agree on global institutions from behind 
a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing what country they will 
md up living in and what economic position they will hold in a globalized 
vVorld? Should we not count as just only those global institutions that would 
Je endorsed in such a scenario and that applied Rawls's criteria for justice on 
a global scale? 
Pogge has gone on to argue that we need to approach the problem of glo-
Jal poverty in a radically different way from that exemplified by Singer. Singer 
vVas arguing for a "positive obligation": an obligation incumbent on all affluent 
Jeople to do something positive to help others who are in need. Although he 
fescribes it as a duty to prevent harm to those who are vulnerable as a result 
)f famine, it is a positive obligation in that it requires us to do something to 
alleviate their suffering. But Pogge speaks of a "negative obligation': This is a 
futy to not harm others through one's own conduct. We could understand the 
fistinction if we ordered our actions on a scale of ascending moral stringency. 
~east morally stringent are supererogatory acts that are not strictly required 
)f us even if they are morally admirable. More morally stringent are positive 
futies that require us to do such things as provide assistance where it is needed 
Nhen we have the opportunity to do so and where there is no resultant loss of 
my thing of greater moral significance. Negative duties are duties that are even 
TIore morally stringent. They require us to forbear from doing anything that 
Nould harm others. Whereas positive duties urge us to protect others from 
rarious harms or to alleviate the sufferings that arise from a variety of causes, 
legative duties forbid us from actually causing harm to others ourselves. The 
:lassic prohibitions such as "Thou shalt not murder" or "Thou shalt not steal" 
lre examples of negative duties in this sense. To fail to fulfil such a negative 
futy is to commit a serious moral wrong. Even people who neglect the needs 
)f others with hardly a second thought would be appalled at the suggestion that 
:hey might kill those others or steal from them. But Pogge's dramatic thesis is 
:hat that is precisely what a great many people in affluent countries are doing. 
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For Pogge the crucial fact is not just that many people in the world are very 
poor. It is that they are very poor because of what we in affluent countries do 
to preserve and enhance our luxurious way of life. Accordingly, it is our way of 
life that is causing the poverty and misery of others. Through this way of life 
we are failing to fulfil our negative duty of not harming those others. This argu-
ment depends on much complex empirical evidence from economics, political 
analysis and studies of how economic globalization affects economic develop-
ment in poorer countries of the world. Along with many other commentators, 
Nobel Prize-winning economist and one-time chief economist at the World 
Bank Joseph Stiglitz has borne out these claims in a number of books (2002, 
2006; see also Falk 1999). 
Pogge (1998) argues that poverty in the developing world is due to global 
political and economic institutions that are designed to benefit those in the 
first world. These institutions are perpetuating a legacy of colonial exploita-
tion whose effects are still being felt, especially in Africa (see also Pogge 2005; 
Follesdal & Pogge 2005). Our clothes are relatively cheap for us because they 
are made by underpaid workers in developing countries.ls Our coffee comes 
to us from countries where farmers have had to move from growing food for 
themselves and their local markets to growing cash crops for export, thereby 
making themselves vulnerable to fluctuations in global commodity prices. Most 
recently, the pressures of having to replace petroleum-based products in order 
to meet our needs for transport and heating have led to the development of 
biofuels. This in turn has led to the growing of oil-producing crops to such an 
extent that food crops are being replaced and global prices for food are increas-
ing by as much as 70 per cent. The greatest impact of these price rises falls on 
the world's poor. Rich nations dominate global financial institutions in such a 
way that trade arrangements, lending policies, intellectual property rules, farm 
subsidies in rich countries, labour conditions in poor countries and a myriad 
of other economic arrangements systematically favour those rich nations and 
impoverish the poorer ones. Politicians and business leaders in affluent coun-
tries are happy to do business with tyrants and putschists and to lend money 
to them in order to secure access to resources. These tyrants and putschists in 
their turn use the money to buy arms to oppress their own people and to build 
palaces to display their ill-gotten wealth. 
Secondly, Pogge argues that the poor peoples are exploited because their nat-
ural resources are expropriated without compensation or purchased at exploit-
ative prices. Pogge here appeals to a principle first enunciated by the English 
philosopher John Locke (1632-1704). Writing at a time when natural resources 
were perceived to be readily available and open to exploitation by anyone with 
the means to do so, Locke argued that we were entitled only to take as much 
as we could use and that we should leave "enough, and as good" for others to 
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use (1960, quoted in Pogge 1998: 508). On this principle, if a person finds an 
apple tree in the forest that is not obviously owned by anyone, she may take 
as much as she can use (including what she could put away for later without 
any of it rotting) but must leave enough so that others can also benefit. And 
she must not chop down the tree. If it turns out that the tree was owned by 
someone else, she must pay fair compensation for what she has taken. And if 
everyone in the community agrees, she may take all the apples and fence off the 
tree in order, for example, to set up a shop and sell apples to others. The com-
munity may consider this a pragmatic and acceptable arrangement. In a similar 
way, if oil is found in a third world country, it may not be taken by those who 
find it without due recompense paid to the traditional owners of the land and 
without the agreement of the whole community in the country where the oil is 
found. This requires that the ruling elite of that country genuinely represents 
the people and that they spread the wealth generated by the sale equitably and 
fairly. But poverty and the temptations to corruption that it presents make this 
unlikely in the developing world. 
Thirdly, Pogge reminds us that the histories of the countries that are poorest 
in today's world are marked by exploitation and colonialism. If the inequalities 
that exist in the global economic system resulted from differential effort and 
success after beginning from an equal starting-point, and if the race for wealth 
began from a position in which no one had an unfair advantage, then the differ-
ential outcome might be morally acceptable. But the wealthy Western nations 
acquired their overwhelming economic superiority by expropriating people as 
slaves and extracting resources to feed the furnaces of Europe through hun-
dreds of years of colonial expansion. This was theft pure and simple. It was 
made to look acceptable by racism and morally untenable attitudes of cultural 
superiority. The moral quality of today's inequitable distribution of the world's 
wealth cannot be extricated from the moral quality of the colonial oppression 
on which it is historically based. Accordingly, Pogge concludes that "we, the 
more affluent, have a negative responsibility and duty to stop collaborating in 
the coercive maintenance of this inequality" (1998: 510). 
While Singer had already argued that alleviating the suffering of the world's 
poor was a matter not just of charity but of obligation, Pogge heightens the 
stringency of this obligation by arguing that it is a violation of our negative 
duty to not harm others. Accordingly, it is a violation of the human rights of 
those who are victims of global poverty (2007b). Their poverty is an evil not 
just because of the suffering and reduction of capabilities that it causes, but also 
because it is an injustice. Pogge's argument is not that the poor have a right to 
our assistance because their suffering is an evil that we should do something 
about because we are able to; rather, he argues that, because there is a causal 
link between the affluent lifestyles of most people in rich countries and the 
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poverty that is endemic in the third world, we are causing this evil and thereby 
failing in our stringent negative duty to not cause harm to others. We share the 
same moral status as thieves, cheats and murderers. Of course, we might argue 
against this conclusion by saying that, unlike thieves, cheats and murderers, we 
are not aware of the bad effects of our rich lifestyles or that, even if we are, we 
do not intend these bad consequences. But Pogge will not accept this excuse 
and argues that our very ignorance is culpable. We participate in, and benefit 
from, global financial and economic institutions - institutions that systematic-
ally deny the basic human rights of poor peoples - and for that reason we are 
guilty of injustice. 
The conception of justice that Pogge is appealing to here is twofold. First, he 
regards it as unjust of people to obtain goods by lying, stealing or murdering. 
To do so is to violate important negative obligations. Thus far his argument has 
been that many of us fail in honouring this negative duty, albeit indirectly and 
possibly unknowingly. But Pogge also gives thought to distributive justice when 
he considers what kind of unequal distribution of goods and resources would 
be just. He formulates a principle very like the one 'I have attributed to Sen and 
Nussbaum: "When social institutions work so that each person affected by 
them has secure access - understood always as reasonably rather than abso-
lutely secure access - to minimally adequate shares of all basic goods then they 
are, according to my proposed core criterion of basic justice, fully just" (2002a: 
38). It also matters to Pogge how such a distribution is assured. If a warlord 
were to bribe or threaten workers from an aid agency so that they were forced 
to distribute goods to the tribes loyal to that warlord - even if this resulted in 
those tribes having reasonably secure access to what they needed for a signifi-
cant length of time - such an arrangement would not be just. The institutions 
that provide access to basic goods must also operate justly. Distribution must 
be fair in the sense that all who are entitled to the goods are able to obtain 
them and also in the sense that recipients should have an uncoerced oppor-
tunity to influence how the distribution takes place. This points to principles 
of democratic participation that I shall discuss later. Moreover, if it turns out 
that members of a certain race, caste or gender disproportionately suffer a lack 
of a good, then the arrangement is unjust to that degree. It is institutions and 
the way that they operate that ought to be just. As Pogge puts it, "We should 
conceive human rights primarily as claims on coercive social institutions and 
secondarily as claims against those who uphold such institutions" (ibid.: 45). 
This focus on institutions takes some of the moral pressure arising from 
global poverty off individuals and any non-coercive organizations that they 
might be members of, including business organizations, and places it on gov-
ernments of nation-states. It is governments that are the central agents that 
create the global economic framework that exploits the poor and perpetuates 
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their poverty. Accordingly, it is governments that have the primary responsi-
bility to alleviate world poverty and to create a global economic system that 
is just and equitable. The injustices and rights violations that the poor suffer 
are the responsibility of governments, and the justified complaints and rights 
claims that the poor might issue against affluent nations should be addressed 
to the governments and international economic institutions that they have set 
up. The poor have rights to whatever they need to live lives of human dig-
nity as described in Chapter 2 because governments and similar agencies have 
a responsibility to see that those needs are met. The cosmopolitan position 
would be that it is not only the governments of the poor nations themselves 
that are responsible fbr securing the human rights of their citizens and res-
idents, but all the governments of the world, especially those of the more 
affluent nations. This does imply that, despite the cosmopolitan suspicion of 
national sovereignty that I shall discuss in Chapter 4, such sovereignty contin-
ues to be important. 
Pogge's argument dovetails with that of Appiah. Appiah had distinguished the 
framework of justice from the ethic of caring by making governments and gov-
ernmental institutions responsible for justice while individuals and any NGOs 
that they might set up give expression to the ethic of caring. As motivations, 
caring and indignation at injustice might overlap, but securing justice remains 
the responsibility of coercive state institutions. In arguing that global inequal-
ity is an example of injustice, therefore, Appiah is attributing the responsibility 
to do something about it to governments. This does not imply that individuals 
should not themselves take action. Virtuous individuals will be motivated by 
caring and by indignation at injustice to donate money to NGOs that serve the 
global poor and they will take whatever political means are available to influ-
ence their governments to act more justly in our globalized world. 
As a consequence of this argument, the demandingness of Singer's approach 
and of any arguments that depend only on the ethic of caring would seem to be 
reduced. It is not up to individuals to eradicate global poverty. While individu-
als still have a role to play and while they are still called on to respond to the 
needs of the poor by the ethic of caring, the eradication of injustice as such is 
a government responsibility. The ethic of caring is invoked when the suffering 
to be alleviated is not the result of injustice - as when a tsunami has struck 
- although even here the suffering is borne disproportionately by the poor and 
may be the result of pre-existing injustices. In such circumstances people act 
well and fulfil their positive obligations when they provide resources through 
aid agencies or other organizations to alleviate the suffering. But the redress 
and avoidance of injustice is the responsibility of those who cause that injustice: 
governments, the financial institutions they establish and the business corpo-
rations whose interests they serve and whose activities they should regulate. 
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However, this does not let individuals off the hook. In democratic societies, 
government policies reflect the will of the people and so every individual has a 
responsibility to engage in the political processes of their countries in order to 
ensure that government policies are such as to secure justice for all around the 
world. Individuals should be motivated to such engagement both by compas-
sion and by the recognition that they are participants in the unjust institutions 
that cause poverty. According to Pogge: 
A human right to basic necessities, as postulated, for instance, in Article 
25 of the UDHR, becomes more plausible when construed along these 
lines. On my institutional understanding, it involves no duty on every-
one to help supply such necessities to those who would otherwise be 
without them. It rather involves a duty on citizens to ensure that any 
coercive social order they collectively impose upon each of themselves is 
one under which, insofar as reasonably possible, each has secure access 
to these necessities. (2002a: 67) 
The political patriotism I described in Chapter 2 suggests that, through the 
political processes whereby we participate in the policy formation of our gov-
ernments, we also participate in the guilt that arises from the violations of nega-
tive responsibilities that our governments commit. We fail to fulfil our negative 
duties towards the poor to not harm them, but we do so collectively through 
the governments that we elect. Our governments owe it to the global poor to 
correct the injustices that flow from global institutions and we owe it to the glo-
bal poor to engage in such political activities as are needed to bring this about. 
People who think of politics in individualist or libertarian terms may claim that 
their enjoyment of affluence has caused no harm, but the deprived have a claim 
against anyone who participates in a coercive system that harms them. It follows 
that we should not participate in such a system without trying to change it. 
This argument also suggests that a cosmopolitan commitment to justice 
involves global solidarity with struggles for human rights and social justice on 
the part of oppressed and exploited peoples. Such struggles must be political 
struggles aimed at altering government policy so as to produce the changes 
needed to secure to everyone in the world the freedom to engage in such eco-
nomic activities as would enable them to live lives of simple human dignity. 
Immigration 
Both the principle of justice and the principle of humanity would entail that 
countries that are able to should receive and succour refugees from political 
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and religious persecution or from theatres of war. This principle has been 
enshrined through the establishment of a United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees (UNHCR).19 The forced movement of people around the world as 
a result of war, natural catastrophes or persecution is an overwhelming prob-
lem requiring huge resources to house people in temporary camps, see to their 
basic needs and, where possible, return them to their homes. Global warming 
threatens to increase the number of displaced persons around the world even 
more. Countries that have the required resources have a responsibility under 
the principle of humanity to accept such people within their borders and have 
a responsibility under the principles of justice to do so if the displacement is 
caused by conditions that the richer countries have, knowingly or unknowingly, 
helped to bring about (Boswell 2005). However, it is immigration motivated 
by economic needs that presents the most acute problems for cosmopolitan 
thinkers. The huge number of Latin Americans moving to the USA and the 
huge number of Africans moving to Europe are but the tip of an iceberg of huge 
changes that are occurring in the world's demography. Governments need to 
develop policies concerning the legal status of aliens, refugees and guest workers 
and concerning access to citizenship for legal residents. How would a cosmo-
politan approach such issues? 
Global justice concerns itself with the distribution of social goods and eco-
nomic opportunities around the world. It must also concern itself with any 
hindrances to the capabilities that people might have through no fault of their 
own to participate in the system of cooperation and distribution that marks 
the sphere of justice. The classic example of such a hindrance would be a phys-
ical disability with which one is born. A just society will ensure that such a 
disability, and any other disadvantage that a person or group might suffer as 
a result of bad luck, is compensated for in such a way that those persons or 
groups have a fair chance at participating in, contributing to and benefiting 
from the society in which they live. But one such hindrance will be the place 
where one is born. That one person is born in a poor country while another 
is born in an affluent one is a matter of luck. Should not the norms of global 
justice be invoked in order to suggest that there should be global institutions 
that would compensate the poorly born for their misfortune and give them an 
equitable opportunity to access the social goods that are available in the wider 
world? Should poor people not be allowed to move to rich countries in order 
to find their fortunes?20 
Applying Rawls's and Pogge's conceptions of justice to this matter has some 
striking implications. Not only would it lead us to question the justice of 
such global institutions as the World Bank, the IMF and the governments of 
rich nations, which, as was argued above, systemically disadvantage the glo-
bal poor, but it would also lead us to question the justice of national borders. 
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National borders serve to prevent a free movement of people from one country 
to another. While the UDHR gave people the right to emigrate, there is no 
corresponding obligation on countries to allow free immigration. However, if 
this prevents poorer people from pursuing economic opportunities in richer 
countries, this would seem to offend against Rawls's principles. People would 
not choose from behind Rawls's "veil of ignorance" to establish or maintain 
largely closed borders in an original position because they would consider the 
possibility that they themselves would be being locked into an inescapable situ-
ation of poverty in an underdeveloped country. Such a restriction would there-
fore be unfair. 
The idea that people could move freely around the globe, settling in whatever 
countries they choose in order to pursue economic opportunities, or, indeed, to 
enjoy whatever amenities are available there, constitutes a radical questioning of 
the idea of a nation-state. It has been argued that, in so far as a nation-state is a 
political community based on some kind of nation-based, identity-forming soli-
darity - whether that solidarity is based on a shared heritage, ethnicity or lan-
guage, or whether it is a more recent ideological construct - that nation-state 
has the right to decide who will be members and who will not (Walzer 1981). A 
national community may feel that its distinctive cultural and traditional identity 
would come under threat if there were a significant number of immigrants from 
a different cultural background in its midst. Whether this feeling takes the ugly 
form of the Cronulla race riots I mentioned in Chapter 1, or of more measured 
policies for integrating foreign communities into a multicultural society, there is 
a widespread assumption among national leaders that any state has the right to 
protect its cultural integrity and the national identity of its people. The debates 
on this issue are not likely to be resolved any time soonY 
However, cosmopolitans could make a radical proposaL Rather than con-
front the issue as one that is detached from the broader issue of global justice 
such that a nation's immigration and refugee policy is decided in the light of 
one set of considerations while its trade and economic policies are decided in 
the light of another - even when the first set is humanitarian while the second 
set is motivated by the national interest - it would be better if the problems 
were seen holistically. If a country adopts trade and economic policies that 
systemically impoverish other countries and if it is tardy in contributing, for 
example, to the UN's Millennium Development Goals,22 then it should not 
be surprised if it is beset with economic refugees. The best way to slow the 
movement of people driven to emigrate by economic necessity is to reduce the 
economic necessity. If a nation-state wants to preserve its ethnic or cultural 
homogeneity - I leave aside whether this perceived homogeneity might be an 
ideological construct - by excluding outsiders, then let it contribute to the full 
extent of its obligations to the alleviation of world poverty. By reducing the 
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need for people to flee starvation and indigence, they will have contributed to 
a reduction in the flow of immigrants and to a more stable and just world. 
Conclusion 
Cosmopolitanism endorses a global principle of benevolence based on the 
shared humanity of all peoples: a benevolence to all others irrespective of race, 
caste, nationality, religion, ethnicity or location. We have seen that such benevo-
lence can be motivated by caring or by a passion for justice. While caring is an 
important virtue, it has the disadvantage of encouraging partiality and of often 
being limited to only those with whom one has a relevant kind of relationship. 
While it is a mark of virtue to acknowledge that this feeling extends to the whole 
of humanity, to do so involves having to contend with countervailing inclina-
tions of selfishness and group identification. It is difficult to extend caring to 
the whole of humanity. Justice, on the other hand, gains its moral validity and 
motivational strength from a rationally constructed conceptual framework in 
which everyone is conceived to be of equal moral value and in which one's self or 
one's identity-forming group is not to be given priority. But the most significant 
difference between these moral frameworks is that the ethic of caring belongs 
to the individual as the responsible moral agent, while honouring the frame-
work of justice is the responsibility of coercive state institutions. Accordingly, 
the cosmopolitan willingness to come to the aid of those suffering from natural 
or man-made disasters such as extreme poverty can be expressed both by con-
tributions to international aid efforts and by participation in political struggles 
for global justice. The cosmopolitan individual's commitment to justice in the 
distribution of natural resources and wealth on a global scale must seek expres-
sion in political action. Only in this way, and motivated by a feeling of shared 
humanity, can a cosmopolitan evince effective global solidarity with struggles 
for human rights and social justice. 
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Chapter 4 
Lasting peace 
We must resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves of dis-
cussion. The only excuse for going to war is that we may live in peace 
unharmed; and when the victory is won, we should spare those who have 
not been blood-thirsty and barbarous in their warfare. 
(Cicero, De Officiis I.x, in May et at. 2006: 5-7) 
In this chapter, I propose to discuss the following features of cosmopolitanism 
outlined at the end of the Introduction: 
(13) acknowledging the sovereignty of nation-states while insisting on limi-
tations to that sovereignty in order to secure human rights and global 
justice; 
(14) quest for lasting world peace; 
(15) respect for the right to self-determination of peoples; 
(16) preparedness to prosecute crimes against humanity internationally. 
These features alter the focus of our considerations. Whereas the previous three 
:hapters discussed the personal ethical stances that a cosmopolitan adopts 
towards others as individuals, this and the next chapter will discuss cosmopol-
[tan ideals and attitudes towards states, international relations and global insti-
tutions. These ideals and attitudes require individuals - especially those who 
~xercise political, economic and social power - to adopt and pursue responsible 
positions towards the relations between states and other transnational actors on 
~he world stage. How should states behave towards each other? Are they permit-
:ed to seek their advantage by force of arms or by dis honouring international 
19reements? In order to set the stage for considering these issues, we should first 
mderstand what nation-states are and what their "sovereignty" consists in. 
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Sovereignty 
The origin of the modern idea of the nation-state was the Treaty of Westphalia 
of 1648. The Thirty Years War had been fought from 1618 in northern Europe 
between a number of kingdoms and principalities. The ostensible cause was reli-
gion, with Protestant rulers seeking to impose their specific forms of Christianity 
and Catholic rulers trying to do the same. It could, however, be argued that the 
religious motivations of these struggles were a continuation of previous and 
more deep-seated struggles over territory. Since time immemorial the territorial 
boundaries of European principalities - and this was true for most lands around 
the world - were defined by the ability of the relevant ruler to seize and defend 
such territory. If he had an army stronger than that of his neighbouring rulers, 
he could seize more of their lands and extend his territory. If he was weaker, 
his lands would contract because of incursions from his neighbours. Clearly, 
the more lands he controlled the more wealth and population would be at his 
disposal so as to enable him to create larger armies and pay for more mercenary 
soldiers. Natural boundaries such as deep rivers, mountain ranges or seas would 
help to defend one's land and thereby became natural borders, but where no 
such impediment to armed incursions was available the only way to define and 
defend one's territory was by force of arms. The only means of defence available 
to smaller kingdoms was the formation of alliances with stronger powers. As 
a consequence, the boundaries of principalities, dukedoms and the like were 
constantly shifting. The Thirty Years War only added religious hatred to this 
already unstable form of territorial definition. 
Moreover, Catholic Christianity had bequeathed to Europe a divided system 
of political authority. Following the biblical injunction to give to Caesar what 
is Caesar's and to God what is God's, European peoples owed a temporal or 
political allegiance to their king, prince or emperor, but also owed a religious 
allegiance to their priest, bishop or pope. Issues of land tenure, taxation and 
military readiness were the province of the king or the prince, while issues of 
morals, religious observance and tithes were the responsibility of the Church. 
While this division seems simple enough in principle, it laid the foundations 
for many conflicts of authority. Many princes sought to overturn the authority 
of the Catholic Church and to set themselves up as the arbiters of the religious 
observance of their subjects. 
Accordingly, the Treaty of Westphalia needed to establish new bases for 
territorial boundaries and new definitions of the rights and responsibilities of 
temporal rulers in relation to other powers. It was agreed to define firm bound-
aries for states and to give a defined range of authority to the relevant ruler 
over the lands so bounded. This gave rise to the all-important concept of the 
"sovereignty of states'; giving to each state or kingdom the fundamental right 
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of political self-determination. No prince or bishop had the right to impose 
his religious convictions on the prince or people of another state or to invade 
another state for any but a clearly defined set of reasons. Any non-military 
form of interference in the internal affairs of other states was also forbidden. 
From a legal point of view, all states were to be of equal standing to each other 
even if their actual military strength might differ. But if the power of temporal 
rulers to interfere in the affairs of other states was radically reduced, their pow-
ers over their own territories were greatly enhanced. People were now clearly 
defined as subjects of their princes with no overlapping or extraneous alle-
giance to any other power, be it an emperor or a bishop. 
Even though the Treaty of Westphalia established the system of nation-
states that we recognize today, it did nothing to overcome the rivalry and com-
petitiveness between states that had been the norm before its institution. It 
certainly did not introduce a new era of moral relations between states. It was 
the product of the exhaustion brought on by thirty years of destructive war in 
which the population of northwest Europe was thought to have been reduced 
by over a third. It was the product of a pragmatic wish to bring the destruction 
to an end. It sought to do this by ensuring a balance of power between states 
that could, either by force of arms or by alliances with better-armed states, 
stave off the predations of more powerful neighbours. It did not usher in a new 
era of harmony based on moral or religious consensus, but a new form of peace 
that was more like a truce between armed camps. The animosities did not die 
away but were merely contained by the division of Europe into nation-states 
with standing armies that kept their neighbours at bay. 
In the Westphalian system a state was not just a legal entity but also a 
power-based entity, so that a "real" state was one that could defend or expand 
its borders and be part of the balance of power that maintained stability in the 
international order. A would-be state that did not have such power (such as 
colonies or countries from which trade concessions could be forced without 
the traders being subject to local law) was regarded as fair game. The system of 
states was therefore unequal, with only the powerful effectively having full state 
rights. This is the situation described by theorists of international relations as 
"realism': Such theorists argue that the situation between states today is not 
essentially different from that developed in the seventeenth century. 
As an account of the nature of international relations, political realism 
often appeals to the thought of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who had sug-
gested that the natural condition of human beings was one of conflict and 
rivalry. In order to argue that we need strong and absolute political authority 
within nation-states in order to keep the peace among individuals, Hobbes 
suggested that in the "state of nature" - a condition in which there is no civil 
or political authority - men and women would struggle to the death for what 
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they need and what they want without any regard for public order or the well-
being of others. People would be aggressive even if only to protect themselves 
against the deadly aggression of others. The only way to keep property in a 
context marked by scarcity would be to acquire it by work or theft and then 
defend it against the predations of others by using whatever force one had 
at one's disposal. In such a world, human life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish and short" (Hobbes 1651: §xiii); While in such a world individuals 
possess a natural right to preserve their lives and to take possession of what-
ever they need in order to do so, there is no morality restraining how people 
behave towards one another. People simply act out of self-interest without any 
moral constraints on their wills. Accordingly, such a world is one where, as 
Hobbes put it, there is a "war of all against all': Hobbes went on to argue that 
in order to establish an orderly society, individuals would have to give up their 
natural right and invest it in an all-powerful ruler, or "Leviathan'; who would 
secure the peace by force. While this argument was developed with reference 
to the internal politics of nation-states, its logic can be applied to the inter-
national sphere by suggesting that, just as a powerful sovereign rather than a 
moral consensus was needed to maintain the rule of law in specific countries, 
so, if there were to be lasting peace and an end to the constant state of war 
between nation-states, a single sovereign would have to rule the world. In this 
way states and principalities would all disappear and there would be a sin-
gle world government. In the absence of such a global authority states would 
exist in something like an amoral "state of nature" and the only basis for stable 
relations between them would be the mutual threat of force. In such a world, 
might is right. 
While the world order introduced by the League of Nations and by the UN 
does not constitute a world government, it did introduce a moral, and there-
fore non-realist, consideration: that all states were to be considered equal- to 
have "sovereign equality" (Chandler 2003). They are all equally states, no mat-
ter how weak they are, in so far as they are recognized as such by other states. 
The UN in its charter is committed to respecting and defending the sovereignty 
of states, and it is through its institutions that the existence and legitimacy of 
states can be formally recognized. If there has been a violent regime change, 
or if there has been a successful secessionist struggle, it is other nation-states 
that accord recognition to the new state and it is the UN that extends the rights 
of membership in the world community of nations to the new government. 
This recognition is accorded provided that the state possesses a permanent 
population, a defined territory and an effective government over that terri-
tory and its population. The governments of states that are duly recognized 
have the authority to enter into political and commercial arrangements with 
other states, with multinational corporations and with any other bodies that 
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can assist it with its governmental responsibilities, such as the World Bank, the 
IMF or relevant NGOs. 
Immanuel Kant 
To see how the cosmopolitan ideal of peaceful, moral and uncoerced relations 
between states evolved, we need to explore the writings of one of its leading 
progenitors. Immanuel Kant published his famous pamphlet "Perpetual Peace: 
A Philosophical Sketch" in 1795 with a second enlarged edition in 1796 (see 
Kant 1991). The essay begins with a numbered set of moral or political prin-
ciples that Kant thinks would eventually be agreed on by peoples in their deal-
ings with each other, whether because the natural evolution of society would 
have brought them to this point or because all rational peoples would see them 
as prerequisites for a state of peace. 
(i) "No conclusion of peace shall be considered valid as such if it was made 
with a secret reservation of the material for a future war" (Kant 1991: 93). 
Here Kant distinguishes a state of peace from an armed truce. Any nation 
that builds up its armaments and armies, even if not engaged in actual 
conflict, cannot be considered to be at peace with its neighbours. This sets 
a high standard for what is to be regarded as a state of peace. It is not just 
an absence of armed conflict but a harmonious and trusting, unarmed 
coexistence between states. 
(ii) "No independently existing state, whether it be large or small, may be 
acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift" (ibid.: 
94). This thought expresses a fundamentally "republican" conception of 
what a state is. It is not a piece of property to be turned into an exchange-
able commodity by absolute monarchs, but a national community with 
roots in the life and loyalty of its people. This principle would also rule 
out colonialism, since this consists in the possession of a state as a piece 
of property by another. The main point seems to be, however, that if states 
were to be conceived of as possessions, they would be more likely to be 
fought over and forcibly acquired by princes. " 
(iii) "Standing armies (miles perpetuus) will gradually be abolished altogether 
(ibid.). This principle reaffirms that an armed state is not in a genuine state 
of peace with its neighbours. 
(iv) "No national debt shall be contracted in connection with the external 
affairs of the state" (ibid.: 95). The text seems to be saying here that a state 
should not borrow money to pay for its army or to buy armaments. There 
is a suggestion also that for one state to be in debt to another is contrary 
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to the ideal of peaceful relations between them. Indebtedness involves a 
form of power over the debtor that is inconsistent with a genuine state of 
peace. Whether this principle is applicable in the contemporary world of 
globalized commerce and international monetary institutions is a mat-
ter that I shall leave to economists to ponder. However, it certainly does 
raise the question as to whether economic competition and dependence 
between states is antithetical to a genuine state of peace between them. 
(v) "No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of 
another state" (ibid.: 96). This would seem to be the principle of sov-
ereignty and the policy of non-intervention that it implies. Even in the 
event of civil war or a war of secession, it would not be appropriate for a 
third-party state to intervene. A people must be allowed to decide its own 
destiny, according to Kant. 
(vi) "No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would 
make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace. Such 
acts would include the employment of assassins (percussores) or poison-
ers (venefici), breach of agreements, the instigation of treason (perduellio) 
within the enemy state, etc:' (ibid.). While the list of examples that Kant 
offers are acts of treachery, it can be supposed that Kant also intends to 
rule out any means of waging war that would flout international con-
ventions such as relate to the treatment of prisoners, exempting non-
combatants from attack, and outlawing rape and pillage. This reading is 
supported by the fact that Kant goes on to point out that his principle also 
rules out wars that would utterly destroy another state or its people. The 
importance of this principle is that unless it is adhered to - unless states 
deal with each other honourably even while at war - no subsequent peace 
will be lasting and stable because of the lingering mistrust and hatred that 
will have been engendered. 
The second section, "Which Contains the Definitive Articles of a Perpetual Peace 
Between States" (ibid.: 98), articulates the social, moral and political conditions 
that would be necessary and sufficient to establish peace between states. It 
begins with the claim that a state of peace must be formally constituted through 
some political and diplomatic instrument such as a treaty or international insti-
tution, since a mere peaceful coexistence without guarantees does not rule out 
the possibility of mutual aggression. It is not enough for states to be at peace 
because circumstances happen to be such that they are not in conflict. States 
that are not even aware of each other could be at peace with each other in this 
sense. A genuine peace is a peace agreed to and declared between states. 
Kant goes on to propose several conditions for peaceful relations between 
states. The first of these is an idea that has come down to us in the form of a 
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theory that democratic states do not wage war on each other.l He says that it 
is a necessary condition for peace to exist between them that states be consti-
tutional republics. Kant understands a republican state in terms that we would 
recognize as liberal-democratic: 
A republican constitution is founded upon three principles: firstly, the 
principle offreedom for all members of a society (as men); secondly, the 
principle of the dependence of everyone upon a single common legislation 
(as subjects); and thirdly, the principle of legal equality for everyone (as 
citizens). (Ibid.: 99) 
For Kant, a republican state is one that does not enslave its citizens, respects 
the rule of law, and does not accord hereditary or any other form of unequal 
privilege to any of its citizens. Kant himself does not prefer the term "democ-
racy" since he sees that as a form of tyranny by the majority. Yet a republican 
state is democratic in a recognizable sense since a key element of a republican 
state is the separation of powers between legislature and executive so that both 
can be held accountable by the people. The reason that republicanism would 
lead to peace is that in a republican state citizens would need to either make 
or endorse any decision to go to war. But such citizens would not be likely to 
approve going to war since they are well aware of the cost to them of doing so. 
It is absolute monarchs who readily go to war since they do not personally suf-
fer the hardships of fighting. 
The second condition for lasting peace that Kant identifies is that states 
should form themselves into a global federation. Kant envisages a global law-
ful order founded on principles that a rational person can conceive being 
endorsed by everyone who is affected. Such an international lawful order is 
one that, even if it is not formally instituted in international law, exists a pri-
ori as an idea that should be so realized. The claim is that if there were a fed-
eration of republics or of peoples living within republics, then there would be 
no cause for war. Matters of dispute between states would be settled on the 
basis of principles that everyone concerned could endorse. Such a federation 
would not be a world state since there would not be a central government. A 
Single world government is likely to become despotic and to centralize too 
much power within itself to be acceptable. Kant criticizes states for wanting to 
maintain a form of sovereignty premised on belligerent independence and self-
aggrandizement: what we would today call "nationalism': Unless states agree 
to place themselves under the sway of "Right" - that is, of international law 
- they will always act as individuals do in the Hobbesian state of nature: aggres-
Sively. Accordingly, states need to voluntarily form "a pacific federation" (ibid.: 
104), which is more than just a peace treaty forced on the weaker by the more 
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powerful: it is a voluntary eschewing of recourse to arms to resolve conflicts on 
the part of all participating states. So long as they are republics, states will be 
disposed to do this for reasons we saw in Kant's previous point. The principles 
of international law would simply flow from the rational self-interest of citizens 
in republican states. 
Unfortunately, even though Kant says that this free federation of states 
would serve as a guarantor for the rights of individual states, he does not make 
clear how this would work: whether an international police force would be 
needed, for example. Such a force would be an armed instrument of violence 
and it would have to be under the command of some super-state agency. But 
the principles of international law could not be based on war or the threat of 
violence. If they were, it would be a case of "might is right': Accordingly, they 
must be based on an unforced international agreement between states. This is 
an argument to show that no genuine international law could be engendered by 
the overarching power of a world government. Accordingly, the best that can 
be hoped for in an agreement between states is a world federation in which the 
use of arms between states is voluntarily surrendered. 
After a discussion of the duty of "hospitality': which is the duty of protecting 
and helping strangers that I discussed in Chapter 3, Kant returns to his central 
themes in a set of appendices that add considerable philosophical depth to the 
cosmopolitan principles for international relations that he has been advocat-
ing. He suggests that international agreements between states should be based 
on a universal morality grounded in reason. 
The first appendix begins by discussing the apparent conflict between moral-
ity and politics and the claim often made by realists in international relations 
that politics requires politicians and state leaders to be at least amoral if not 
positively immoral on the grounds that reasons of state override the demands 
of morality. Kant asks whether it is possible to be a "moral politician, i.e. some-
one who conceives of the principles of political expediency in such a way that 
they can co-exist with morality" (ibid.: 118). But Kant's attention is not focused 
on the crises of conscience that politicians and national leaders may suffer from 
time to time as they balance the interests of their countries against the rules of 
honourable international behaviour. Rather, it is still on the question of what 
conditions are necessary to secure lasting peace in the world. He suggests that 
it is only when peoples are united globally in holding to a single and universal 
morality that peace can be secured. He is suggesting not that all peoples should 
have the same marriage customs, dietary rules or other domestic precepts, but 
that there is a core set of moral principles that they must all share as rational 
human beings. 
To defend the role of morality in politics, Kant distinguishes between tak-
ing one's material interests as primary, and taking a priori principles that can 
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be endorsed as universalizable by pure reason as primary. When a politician 
or a people is acting under the influence of their patriotic passions, or their 
desire for their state's gain and glory, they are acting on reasons that have only 
local purchase rather than on reasons that anyone anywhere could endorse. 
Therefore they are not acting on universalizable reasons. They are pursuing 
their specific interests and, without the constraint of universalizable principles, 
will do anything that would advance their ends. In contrast, when a politician 
or a people is acting on the basis of policies that they could imagine any rational 
person anywhere endorsing, they cannot fail to take the dignity and rights of 
all others into account. Accordingly, this way of thinking leads to acting mor-
ally. In so far as acting morally here consists in adopting the view of anyone 
who might be affected by one's action no matter what country or culture that 
person belongs to, it cannot but lead to international peace and harmony. For 
politicians, therefore, acting morally - being constrained by considerations of 
the dignity and rights of all others - is necessary and sufficient for the attain-
ment of perpetual peace. Kant reinforces the point when he says that "the gen-
eral will" or the basic values and interests of all human beings, based on a 
universal, purely rational morality abstracted from people's particular interests, 
is the only thing that can unite people across borders. Accordingly, states must 
not pursue their ends as if they were more important than the general will, but 
must pursue them within the constraints of the moral law. In this way there 
would be no conflict between morality and politics. Accordingly, to secure last-
ing peace, "the rights of man must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice the 
ruling power may have to make" (ibid.: 125). 
Kant goes on to argue in his second appendix that no political decision or 
policy would be moral or valid unless it were able to be made public. If mak-
ing a policy public were somehow to make it impracticable or inapplicable, or 
if the effectiveness of a policy were to depend on its being kept secret, then it 
could not be a morally permissible policy. The reason for this is that if I cannot 
publicize my policy, then it cannot be endorsed by the general will and it will 
fail the test of rightness expressed in Kant's argument that only a policy that 
is known to respect the rights of all those affected can be morally justified. As 
an example we might consider the Nazis' "final solution to the Jewish prob-
lem': If the Nazis had announced their policy ahead of time, most Jews would 
have tried to escape and so the policy would have failed. Success depended 
on secrecy. And this is a prima facie indication that the policy was immoral. 
While its wrongness did not consist in its being secret but rather in its being an 
attack on the lives of the Jews, this wrongness was indicated by its having to be 
kept secret in order for it to be implemented effectively. As an example in inter-
national relations, Kant suggests that if a state were secretly to have a policy to 
renege on its agreements with other states, then international diplomacy would 
119 
COSMOPOLITANISM 
become impossible. The very suspicion that such a policy was in place would 
destroy any trust between the relevant states. Moreover, the state that was 
suspected of having such a policy would not be able to enter into agreements 
with other states. In this way the policy would also be self-defeating. Hence 
such a policy would be irrational, non-universalizable and therefore immoral. 
Moreover, public disclosure would also be a condition necessary for an effec-
tive federation of states, and as this is the only basis for perpetual peace, it will 
be necessary for such peace that states adhere to the requirements of publicity 
and enter into frank and open relations with each other. Secret treaties and hid-
den intentions can lead only to the breakdown of peace. In politics everything 
should be out in the open. Publicity is a necessary though not sufficient condi-
tion for a policy's being moral. 
This condition applies to domestic politics just as much as to international 
politics. It applies because if the condition for a policy's being moral is that it 
acknowledge and respect the rights of all those affected, then the best way of 
ensuring that such acknowledgement occurs is to have the policy-making pro-
cess take place in the open where all those who are affected can contribute to 
the debate and voice their opinions. There can be no correspondence between 
a political policy and the "general will" unless there has been an opportunity 
for all those affected by the policy to participate in debating it. The arbitrary 
will of an absolute ruler is effective because of the fear it inspires in his people, 
whereas the will of a democratic body is effective because of the agreement 
with the general will that public debate will have secured for it. Through these 
arguments, Kant forges a close link between cosmopolitanism, republicanism 
and democratic political processes.2 
Kant concludes his essay by expressing confidence that, if international poli-
tics gradually becomes more moral, lasting peace can be attained. The sections 
below will show that, in this essay, Kant has set the terms for philosophical 
debates about international relations and global institutions that are still rele-
vant today. 
World government 
State sovereignty is less complete today than it was in the recent past. Given 
the complexity of international arrangements and agreements, given the greater 
power that some states have to influence others, and given the capacity of mul-
tinational business corporations to pl;essure national governments, the actual 
power that many states have to order their internal affairs and to secure their 
safety and advantage in the international sphere is dramatically less than it 
used to be. The investment decisions of major corporations can have an even 
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greater impact on smaller nation-states than the hegemonic ambitions of more 
powerful neighbouring states (Held 1995: chs 5, 6). Moreover, in a world of 
sovereign states pursuing their own interests, international institutions need to 
coordinate responses to global problems. Many such organizations exist, ran-
ging from the UN, NGOs, financial institutions such as the IMF and courts of 
international law. Whether such bodies reduce the sovereignty and autonomy 
of nation-states is both an empirical and a conceptual question (Shue 1999; see 
also Parekh 2003).3 Are they agencies through which nation-states can exercise 
their governmental responsibilities on the world stage but which remain sub-
ject to the sovereign will of those states, or are they supranational entities that 
impose conditions and rules which constrain the sovereignty of the states that 
are subject to them? But there is also a normative question. Would the world 
be a more just and peaceful place if it comprised sovereign states or would the 
world be better off if state sovereignty were reduced or even extinguished? 
Given the commitment of cosmopolitan thinkers to human rights and glo-
bal justice and given their focus on individuals, they have a tendency towards 
downgrading the importance of the sovereignty of nation-states. As it is fre-
quently national governments that oppress their peoples, engage in exploita-
tion of their country's resources for the benefit of their officials and assume 
national debts that later governments are unable to repay, it is argued that 
national governments should be bypassed and human rights and global justice 
secured by transnational institutions or by global forms of democracy (Pogge 
2002a: 169; see also Beitz 1999a: 287; Held 1997; McGrew 1997). As it is fre-
quently states that go to war with each other for the sake of their national inter-
ests, it is thought by some cosmopolitans that peace could be secured only if 
there were a world government that would extinguish the sovereign rights of 
states and inaugurate a global rule of law effective enough to hold all nations 
in check. Many realist international relations theorists, drawing on Hobbes, 
see this issue as involving only two options. The first is a world in which force 
exercised or threatened by autonomous, sovereign states is the only basis for 
stability, while the second is the notion of an all-powerful world government 
capable of maintaining peace through its exclusive right to exercise force over 
non-sovereign states. I shall argue that cosmopolitans should advocate a third, 
Kantian option in which global and lasting peace is based on open and public 
international agreements entered into by states acting rationally. 
Advocacy of a global government with the power to enforce international law 
depends on a Hobbesian theory of political realism that claims that only an over-
arching force can quell the conflicts that arise from irreconcilable national inter-
ests. On this view, the world needs a "Leviathan" to keep the peace. However, as 
Kant had seen, this theory would also suggest that, in the absence of any power 
to curtail its reach or hold it to account, such a global government would become 
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an oppressive hegemonic power acting in the interests of whatever political 
or commercial interest groups could influence its policies. It would seem then 
that global governance centred on institutions with global jurisdiction would be 
politically dangerous. The basic liberal principle that the rights of individuals are 
best protected when governments are marked by a division of powers is realized 
in the current world order to a higher degree than it would be under a single 
world government. Accordingly, most cosmopolitans continue to accept the 
necessity of the state as a form of governance of peoples (Sassen 2003, 2006). 
A further reason for this position is the necessity of the nation-state as an 
administrative unit. Just as a local municipal council is responsible for the 
maintenance of a defined set of services in a city, and a state or provincial leg-
islature is responsible for a defined set of functions in a larger territory, so the 
nation-state is responsible for the administration of a still larger territory and 
for the maintenance of appropriate relations with other states. As you cross a 
national border, you enter into a different legal jurisdiction. Whereas on this 
side of the border the laws of state A apply to you, when you cross the border, 
the laws of state B apply to you. While it is conceivable for a world body to leg-
islate and administer a global set of laws that would cover the many issues that 
laws have to deal with, it is impracticable for it to do so. The nation-state dele-
gates the maintenance of city parks to municipal councils and the maintenance 
of schools and hospitals to provincial governments. Different countries might 
arrange these matters differently but it is unusual for a central government to 
take responsibility for all of the many matters that governments at lower levels 
have to deal with. Nevertheless, legal or constitutional responsibility resides 
with the nation-state since it is its constitution and legal system that spell out 
what level of government is responsible for what functions. This responsibility 
is not given to the nation-state by a higher or global level of government; it is 
a function of its own sovereignty. It is because the state has this sovereignty 
and the responsibilities that go with it that it can rule its own territory and 
make laws that apply to it and only to it. Moreover, it is because the state has 
this sovereignty and the responsibilities that go with it that it can enter into 
arrangements, treaties and contracts with other bodies in order to fulfil those 
responsibilities and pursue the interests of its citizens.4 
The fundamental reason for the necessity of the state is that some entity has 
to have jurisdiction over a specific population living in a specific territory. This 
jurisdiction has to be acknowledged by other bodies, be they other states or 
business corporations that wish to have dealings with anyone or any organiza-
tion based in that territory. It is states whose laws allow the flows of money, peo-
ple and goods that constitute globalization. Moreover, decisions that affect the 
wider world have to be made in the context of domestic political struggles and 
debates. Even if a foreign power or a multinational corporation is able to influ-
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ence the government of a poor and weak state, it is obliged to do so through the 
laws, regulations and officials that operate in that state. It may be able t6 influ-
ence the formation or application of those laws, but if it were to disregard them, 
its actions would be illegal and it would be regarded as an invader. 
Accordingly, if it became the desire of the majority of citizens of states 
throughout the world that there be a new form of global governance, it would 
have to be states that entered into the necessary arrangements and handed over 
the relevant powers to such a global body. In that event states would still not 
wither away. They would become another tier of government just as municipal 
councils or provincial governments are. These new states would give up some 
of the prerogatives of sovereignty but they would retain relevant forms of legal 
jurisdiction over their territories. This might have the advantage of giving their 
citizens less reason to attach themselves to their states with the kind of mind-
less fervour that marks nationalism, but the administrative necessity for having 
territorially defined legal jurisdictions would not disappear. Indeed, what we 
would then have is the kind of federation of states that Kant had advocated. 
Any federation of states, whether it is ruled by an armed authority or whether 
it is held together only by cooperative agreements, will involve some reduc-
tion in the number and scope of sovereign rights that a nation-state enjoys. A 
state with such a reduced form of sovereignty would also be less likely to see its 
national interests in ways that would encourage it to relate to other states and 
territories in competitive and aggressive ways. Such a state would be united 
ideologically not by an insular nationalism, but by a feeling of global citizenship 
that would be in accord with the cosmopolitan ideal. 
Given that the nation-state would continue with some form of reduced sov-
ereignty even in a globalized world, a more cosmopolitan form of patriotism 
would also survive. People need to feel some kind of belonging to their com-
munities. Just as people take pride in the town, city, province or local state in 
which they live, so they will attach themselves to the nation-state that holds 
constitutional and legal jurisdiction over the institutional arrangement of their 
lives. This produces a political and civic solidarity among citizens that they do 
not share with citizens of other nation-states. But this is to be distinguished 
from the nationalism that cosmopolitans decry. It would be what I described 
in Chapter 1 as "political patriotism': 
World peace 
As we have seen in our discussion of Kant, cosmopolitans are committed to 
lasting world peace. Given the death, destruction and mayhem war causes, it 
cannot but involve violations of human rights, acts of injustice and the kinds of 
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harm that cosmopolitans decry. The fact that war today might involve the Use 
of nuclear armaments, with the unimaginable devastation that would bring, 
merely intensifies the disapproval of war that all cosmopolitans feel. Of course, 
this stance is not unique to cosmopolitanism. Many theorists in many cultural 
and political traditions share it. 
Nevertheless, it should not be thought that the rejection of war is a univer-
sally endorsed stance. In times past there were very notable European phil-
osophers and writers who applauded war, and this view can be found in other 
traditions also. War has been seen as a way for a nation to show its mettle and 
for men to show what they are made of. It has been suggested that a nation 
or a people that avoids war would become soft and degenerate. It would enjoy 
the kind of luxurious life conditions that prevent it from developing the many 
virtues that allow a people to achieve greatness. Even Kant expressed this sen-
timent when he said: 
War itself, provided it is conducted with order and a sacred respect for the 
rights of civilians, has something sublime about it, and gives nations that 
carry it on in such a manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime the 
more numerous the dangers to which they are exposed, and which they are 
able to meet with fortitude. On the other nand, a prolonged peace favours 
the predominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a debasing self-
interest, cowardice, and effeminacy, and tends to degrade the character of 
the nation. (1928: bk 11, 112-13, quoted in Coady 2008: 46) 
The rhetoric inherent in these sentences draws on a competitive form of nation-
alism in which a people feels it to be important that it be seen as superior to, 
and more powerful than, another people. Talk of "the character of the nation" 
indicates a perspective that sees a nation as a unitary body with a single char-
acter. What this ignores, of course, is that, quite apart from the possibility that 
the nation might comprise different ethnic, racial or religious groups, it also 
comprises different socioeconomic classes. In war it is the high-ranking officers 
- most of whom will be from the richer and more dominant classes - who send 
lower-ranking officers and soldiers - most of whom will be from the working 
classes - to their deaths. It is all very well for the ruling classes to applaud the cul-
tural effects of war and celebrate the way it enhances the fortitude of the nation, 
but it is not they who normally bear the brunt of the destruction and suffering. 
This rhetoric also expresses a masculinist outlook in which manly virtues and 
masculine prowess are valued. War is seen as a test of both manhood and of 
nationhood. It will be clear that these attitudes are fundamentally immature, and 
that they have links with the militaristic nationalism that I discussed in Chapter 
1. No modern political thinker should be influenced by them. 
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Some have thought that war is an inevitable part of the human condi-
tion because it is a natural and unavoidable expression of an innate human 
aggressiveness.s Evidence for this view might be found in comments made by 
front-line soldiers. As an example, here are the words of an Australian soldier 
writing from the trenches of Gallipoli in the First World War: "Oh! The bloody 
gorgeousness of feeling your bayonet go into soft yielding flesh .. :' (quoted in 
Sparrow 2008: 14). It is also true, however, that many soldiers at the front line 
refuse to fire their weapons at the enemy and that extensive training is needed 
to turn recruits into killers. 
Thinkers who believe that natural aggressiveness plays a role in war point to 
ethological studies of animals in the wild that describe aggressive behaviour, 
especially among males. However, the context of such behaviours differs from 
that of war among human beings. Male wild animals will fight each other over 
access to females and most will do so individually rather than in organized 
groups. Animals also prey on each other and on other species, but they do 
so when they are hungry. Warfare among human beings is not of this kind. It 
is not driven by the instinct to mate or by hunger. Nor is it the result of such 
emotional states as anger or hatred. Even if it is sometimes the case that troops 
going into battle are driven to a frenzy of aggression in the heat of combat, it 
is not the case that the architects of war - the politicians who declare war, or 
the generals who plan it - are driven by anger or heightened states of emotion. 
For them, the war is a matter of cold calculation and strategic thinking. And 
for many soldiers who engage in war operations far from the face of the enemy 
- soldiers such as airmen who drop bombs from great heights or sailors who 
patrol the oceans - war is not an expression of aggressive emotions. If it is true 
that war is a phenomenon peculiar to the human species of animal, it does not 
seem to be true that it arises from any genetic or instinctual aspect of what it 
is to be human. War is a human institutionalized activity that is pragmatically 
designed to serve sophisticated human purposes, rather than an expression of 
natural instincts. 
If hatred is a cause of war, it is so not in the form of aggressive emotion, 
but in the form of cultural xenophobia or racism in which one people hates 
another because of its perceived otherness. This otherness may consist in dif-
ferences in religion, skin colour, political ideology or moral practices and, as 
such, should be overcome by the cosmopolitan acceptance of global cultural 
differences. Moreover, the more difficult historical question is whether hatred 
of the other is a cause of war or a symptom of it. It may be not that people go 
to war because they hate the enemy, but that they hate the enemy because they 
have gone to war with them. It may be that the cause of war has been greed 
for territory and the resources they contain, and that the hatred of the other is 
fomented and used by bellicose leaders in order to create a willingness in their 
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citizenry to attack the perceived enemy. Did the Spanish conquistadors attacl 
and slaughter the native peoples of Central and South America because the~ 
decried their pagan practices, or were they motivated by a lust for the gold 
land and wealth possessed by those peoples while using their Christian disap 
proval of human sacrifice as an excuse? While I cannot answer such comple) 
historical questions here, I do think they should give us pause before we accep 
that hatred can be, by itself, a cause of war. 
A cursory glance at history, which would seem to be a litany of wars frorr 
the very earliest recorded chronicles to the present day, might, nevertheless 
encourage the idea that war is inevitable. It would seem to be the case thaI 
human beings have not yet developed ways of resolving conflict that stop shorl 
of violence. In so far as many aspects of human interaction involve clashes oj 
wills - situations where one person or group is trying to force another person 
or group to do something that they do not want to do - it might seem inevit-
able that organized violence will ensue. It seems that our powers of persuasion 
are too rudimentary and that our rational capacities for understanding one 
another and for coming to agreement over matters of dispute are too limited 
for us to be able to say that violence used for political ends can be expurgated 
from the human condition. While we may hope for a day when human beings 
will have developed enough intelligence, tolerance and restraint to avoid going 
to war with each other, we may have to accept that, for the time being, war is 
as inevitable an aspect of international relations as crime is of civil society. 
War has been described as politics by other means. As Carl von Clausewitz 
puts it: "War is the resort by an organized group to a relatively large-scale act 
of violence for political purposes to compel an enemy to do the group's will" 
(1976: 75). What this suggests is that war is an instrument of global politics 
in which the constant threat of war makes weaker states compliant with the 
will of the more powerful. Accordingly, the morality of waging war is a sub-
division of the morality of global politics. It is when global political relation-
ships between states or peoples fail to respect human rights, global justice and 
the legitimate claims of state and non-state actors that recourse is had to war. 
Given this, it will be difficult to articulate a position on war that is uniquely 
cosmopolitan. Given that cosmopolitanism rejects militaristic forms of nation-
alism and stresses respect for human rights and for global justice, and given 
that most cosmopolitans acknowledge the fallibility of the human condition, 
which leads to the need, on occasion, to resolve disputes by force, most cosmo-
politans will regretfully accept that the use of arms may be necessary to defend 
human rights and establish global justice. 
For this reason not all cosmopolitans espouse pacifism. Pacifism is the view 
that war and political violence are always wrong.6 No matter what the provo-
cation, a pacifist will always seek some non-violent solution to the problem 
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and will accept the option of capitulation to the more powerful if all other 
peaceful means have failed. While the example of Mahatma Gandhi and others 
encourages the idea that pacifist and non-violent means can overcome violent 
oppression and injustice, history also shows many examples of individuals and 
peoples who have been overcome by invaders or political bullies despite their 
principled stances of resistance. It would seem, then, that the best way to resist 
armed aggression is with armed defence. In the quest for human rights and 
global justice, moral victories claimed over the bodies of willing martyrs are 
empty victories. The tyrants and oppressors may not enjoy moral praise, but 
they will enjoy the spoils of their aggression. 
The cosmopolitan stance towards political violence - involving a regretful 
acceptance of its being sometimes necessary - is well illustrated by the life 
of Dietrich Bonhoeff'er (1906-45). Bonhoeff'er was a German pastor whose 
preaching stressed the Sermon on the Mount in which Jesus urges his followers 
to turn the other cheek and to love their enemies. On the basis of this teach-
ing, Bonhoeff'er rejected war as a legitimate means of resolving international 
disputes. Nevertheless, he joined in the plot initiated by officers in the German 
army to assassinate Hitler in 1943. Along with these officers, Bonhoeff'er had 
come to believe that the only way to stop the war in Europe that Hitler was pur-
suing was to assassinate him. The assassination attempt failed and the officers 
and their fellow plotters were hunted down and executed by the Gestapo. It 
seems, then, that while he was opposed to war, Bonhoeff'er was not opposed to 
political violence. If violence were required to avoid a great evil, then it could 
be justified. 
What is rejected by cosmopolitans and pacifists alike is the idea that war 
is a normal and acceptable way of resolving international disagreements and 
that the nation-state is defined in terms of its ability and readiness to wage 
war. What is rejected is that permanent state of war-readiness among nation-
states that turns the world into a series of armed camps held in uneasy truce 
by fear of the more powerful. The cold war was only the most recent example 
of this form of international relations. Even today, nuclear armaments continue 
to raise the stakes between states. The traditional stance of a truce between 
armed camps continues with the unimaginable horror of nuclear Armageddon 
as a constant shadow hanging over human civilization. Although this shadow 
is said to be justified on the grounds that it deters nuclear armed states from 
going to war with each other, such states, along with other states, continue to 
resort to violence to defend their economic interests as well as to pursue their 
national glory or defend their allies. 
But the nature of war has changed since the end of the cold war. The quin-
tessential example of war used to be the staged battle on a defined battlefield 
in which soldiers in bright coloured uniforms stood at one end while soldiers 
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in bright but differently coloured uniforms stood at the other waiting for the 
command to engage. When that command was given, all hell broke loose but 
certain rules were followed. Officers were not targeted and ambushes were out-
lawed. At the failing of the light of day hostilities would be called off and victory 
given to one side or the other. Soldiers were clearly agents of the state - even if 
they were mercenaries - and were seen as expendable. Officers saw it as their 
duty to further the cause of their countries and maintain order in the lower 
ranks. This form of warfare is inextricably bound to the notion of the nation-
state or, in earlier times, to the right of kings to wage war on other kings. 
Reasons for initiating war have ranged from territorial expansion and national 
glory to the propagation of one's religion. It is this kind of war that Kant sought 
to overcome with his proposals in "Perpetual Peace" and for which, it appears, 
he nevertheless harboured a hidden nostalgia. Today, however, there are many 
instances of armed conflict in which it is not states as such that are the central 
protagonists. There are wars within states caused by ethnic or religious rival-
ries and hatreds, wars of secession, wars of liberation or revolution, and strug-
gles against imperialist hegemony. Guerrilla groups, terrorist cells, resistance 
fighters and defenders of ethnic purity take up arms against perceived oppres-
sors. State authorities, for their part, use their armies to quell internal dissent, 
whether it is peaceful or violent. 
One feature shared by many of these so-called "new wars" is that they are 
fought over the alleged rights that peoples have to self-determination. Even 
before the creation of the UN, American president Woodrow Wilson had spo-
ken of the right to self-determination of peoples, a statement that had encour-
aged movements against colonialism after the First World War. The central 
idea here is that a people should not be oppressed politically or exploited eco-
nomically by states or powers that do not share its culture, religion, ethnicity 
or conception of what would constitute a good life. The notion of a "people" 
as it appears in this discourse is inescapably vague but is meant to suggest a 
community held together by a common tradition, cultural heritage, ethnicity 
or religion. When Wilson first made his statement he had in mind peoples 
who were colonized by European powers, but historical events since that time 
have made clear that almost all sovereign states include peoples in the relevant 
sense. Most nation-states include within their borders definable groups who do 
not share the cultural outlooks of their rulers, whether because of differing tra-
ditions or ethnicities. They might be the indigenous people of that place or they 
might be peoples who have migrated there in recent or more distant times, but 
they will mark themselves off by speaking a different language, having different 
customs or worshipping different gods. Some will have integrated themselves 
into the economic or political systems of their masters, but others will not. 
Most, but not all, such peoples have close ties to the lands on which they live. 
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As we saw in Chapter 1, the word "nation" is often used to designate a people 
understood in these terms. In so far as people feel that their identity is bound 
up with their attachment to place, race or tradition, they will feel the need to 
affirm and maintain that identity. Unfortunately, if all such peoples - whether 
they be Kurds, Basques or the Cham Muslim people of Cambodia - were to 
be given sovereignty over their territories, the number of nation-states in the 
world would multiply to thousands, and global governance as well as national 
governance would be well-nigh impossible. Nevertheless, many such peoples 
have struggled successfully for their independence and many others continue 
to do so. And many of these struggles involve political violence. 
While it seems impossible to grant statehood to all of the world's peoples, 
it should not be impossible to grant them a degree of autonomy that would 
allow them to continue to live their preferred cultural lives in conditions free 
from political or economic domination? President Wilson's call for "self-
determination" was ambiguous as to whether it meant that all peoples should be 
allowed to govern themselves and form nation-states of their own, or whether, 
within the nation-states in which they live, they should be permitted such a 
degree of control over their social and political conditions as would allow them 
to maintain their cultures. It seems that, in the contemporary world, even this 
second more modest aim is being denied in many countries. The issues here 
are complex. No one wants to see indigenous or ethnic minorities shut off in 
their own countries from the economic and cultural opportunities afforded by 
the wider community, whether by their own choice or by the policies of their 
governments. This would be an apartheid system. But neither does one want 
to see the loss of language, culture or religious practice that assimilation into 
the wider community would bring, if such assimilation were not desired by 
the community in question.8 Whether groups or peoples have collective rights 
to their language, religion, tradition or culture, and whether national govern-
ments have an obligation to protect the identity-forming conditions of cultural 
groups are questions debated by philosophers who ask whether rights are the 
sorts of moral entity that can be held by a group or whether it is only indi-
viduals that have such rights (Appiah 2005).9 In such debates cosmopolitans 
will favour the concept of individual rights. If every individual has the right to 
those cultural conditions that would allow him or her to live a life consistent 
with their worldview and their cultural tradition, and if governments have an 
obligation to protect those individual rights, then the best policies for meeting 
that obligation will be policies that support and protect the cultural practices 
and identities of the peoples living in their territories. In this way, governments 
can have duties to protect and maintain the group identities of the peoples liv-
ing within their borders even if it is the individual rights of members of those 
peoples that constitute the rights that correspond to those duties. 
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Just war 
But let us now return to the topic of political violence. In order to bring some 
order into a warring world, philosophers have thought about what moral rules 
should apply to war and have developed what is now called "the just war doc-
trine': This phrase refers to a body of thought, developed in the West since the 
time of Augustine (354-430), that established criteria for engaging in war ethi-
cally. These criteria come under two headings. The first set related to when going 
to war is justified (in Latin this is called jus ad bellum, which could be translated 
as "right reasons for going to war"). The second set related to how war should 
be conducted (in Latin this is called jus in bello, which could be translated as 
"right ways of conducting war"). The criteria that were devised for justifying 
going to war included: 
• Just cause. The most obvious just cause is to repel an invasion or to sup-
port an ally who has been invaded. It used to be thought that one state 
could attack another in order to punish it for breaking treaties or invad-
ing other states. This view is less widely accepted today. There is debate 
also as to whether it is acceptable to attack a state in order to prevent it 
from developing or deploying nuclear weapons. Most agree that it is not 
permissible to go to war in order to secure access to natural resources 
such as oil. Further, whether one state is permitted to invade another in 
order to protect the human rights of the citizens of that state - so-called 
"humanitarian intervention" - is a question I shall discuss presently. 
• Right intention. War must not be waged merely to enhance the glory of 
the national leader, for example. 
• Last resort. All other means such as diplomacy and economic sanctions 
must have been exhausted. 
• Reasonable chance of success. It would be irresponsible to declare war on 
an overwhelmingly more powerful enemy. 
• Having the right authority to declare war. War must be declared by the 
legitimate leader of the relevant nation-state. If a warlord or the head of a 
group of gangsters or of a terrorist group "declares" war on a state or on 
another group, the conflict that follows is technically not a war, and will 
not be recognized as such in international law. Such conflicts should be 
dealt with through the, criminal law of the affected states. 
Among the principles relating to jus in bello are: 
• Proportionality. It would be wrong to respond to a minor border incursion 
with an all-out invasion or with a nuclear attack. 
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• Exempting non-combatants. Blanket bombing of cities causing civilian 
deaths would be ruled out. 
• Treating captured soldiers humanely. 
• Forbidding rape and plunder. 
• Creating conditions for a lasting peace after hostilities cease. 
• Forbidding the use of child soldiers. This is a more recent development 
endorsed by the UN. 
• Forbidding the use of certain weapons such as chemical weapons or flame-
throwers. Negotiations on the banning of nuclear weapons, land mines, 
cluster bombs, and ordnance using depleted uranium are continuing. 
While much has been written about how these rules apply to modern conflicts 
(e.g. Etzioni & Wenglinsky 1970; McKeogh 2002; Christopher 2004; Atack 2005; 
Fotion 2007; Young 2007a; Coady 2008), our question is whether there is a 
uniquely cosmopolitan perspective on them. I have already said that cosmo-
politanism is not alone in being concerned about war and in wanting to see it 
engaged in in an ethical manner and only as a last resort. But cosmopolitanism 
does introduce a new questioning of the role of the nation-state in thinking 
about contemporary armed conflicts. 
Michael Walzer's definitive study of the ethics of war focuses on wars that 
are fought between states and argues that the first and most obvious "just cause" 
for going to war is to defend the state against outside attacks. Indeed, he argues 
that in the case of a "supreme emergency'; as when the very existence of the 
state is under threat, it may be permissible for the threatened state to suspend 
its adherence to the norms of jus in bello and, for example, use torture to extract 
vital information from captured soldiers or bomb cities with the foreseen con-
sequence of many civilian deaths. A state may also pre-emptively attack another 
if it sees that other state as an immediate threat to it (Walzer 1992: ch. 16). 
Simon Caney (2005: ch. 7) has criticized Walzer's position on the cosmopolitan 
grounds that he assumes that the state is an entity that has a right to defend 
itself no matter what its legitimacy. On this argument, an aggressive state such 
as Nazi Germany would have had the right to defend itself against attack from 
forces seeking to end its rule even after it had begun to murder its own citizens 
and those of the lands it had conquered. Moreover, it would have been justified 
in using means forbidden by the rules of war in order to do so. Walzer's concept 
of supreme emergency, which justifies abrogating the rules of jus in bello, makes 
light of the human rights of combatants and civilians in favour of defending the 
integrity of the political community, but it does so without questioning whether 
the state or the political community encapsulate values that warrant setting 
aside such individual rights. Walzer uses the standard "statist" or nationalist 
arguments to the effect that states embody the common life of their people 
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along with their cultural traditions, and therefore constitute an intrinsic and 
supreme value. Accordingly, the modern international order of sovereign states 
must be preserved. But a cosmopolitan would ask what value a state has if it 
does not protect the human rights of the individuals that make it up or respect 
the human rights of foreigners or the sovereignty of other states. Can such a 
state have just cause in defending itself against other states, especially if those 
other states are in conflict with it because of its violations of human rights? 
The cosmopolitan perspective would put the stress on the rights of individuals 
and accord rights to states to engage in war only if those states have the kind of 
legitimacy that comes from respecting individual human rights. 
Principles of jus in bello already have the kind of focus on individuals that 
cosmopolitans would applaud. They seek to protect non-combatants and sol-
diers alike because they are human beings with rights. But the norms of jus ad 
bellum seem to admit only of a statist or nationalist reading. Cosmopolitans 
like Caney would seek to make the two sets of norms consistent by arguing 
that political communities have value only in so far as they protect the rights 
of individuals, and that they therefore have the right to go to war only to pro-
tect the rights of individuals. While it is illegitimate for a state to go to war in 
order to seize the territory or enslave the population of another, this is not pri-
marily because doing so would destroy that state or disturb the international 
order, but because doing so would violate the rights of the citizens of the state 
being attacked. In this way a defensive war would be justified not in terms of 
defending the sovereignty of the state, but of defending the human rights of 
that state's citizens. Not every state that defends itself from external attack 
could genuinely claim that rationale. It is not acceptable to say that one can kill 
innocent people in order to protect one's despotic rule or even one's traditional 
way of life. From the cosmopolitan perspective the principles of jus ad bel-
lum focus on defending the rights of citizens rather than on those of the state. 
Just causes will include the defence of a state only if that state respects human 
rights and enjoys the consent of the people. Similarly, third-party states may 
defend attacked states only if more justice will result. On the cosmopolitan 
conception, the right intention for fighting a war will be the defence of human 
rights. 
Moreover, while not all theorists in the past agreed that punishing a state for 
international criminal acts, such as invading another state, was a just cause for 
going to war, a cosmopolitan would argue that it is not justified for one state to 
punish another because only superstate bodies such as the UN should have that 
kind of authority. If one state took it upon itself to punish another, it would be 
claiming hegemonic rights over that state. Cosmopolitans would only acknow-
ledge as legitimate the authority of superstate organizations such as the UN or 
of any collective security organizations that are accountable to democratically 
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constituted bodies to authorize war in the defence of human rights. Again, if 
having the right authority to declare war used to rest in kings and more recently 
in presidents or prime ministers, cosmopolitan proper authority will be demo-
cratic authority. 1his idea fulfils the promise of Kant's suggestion that demo-
cratic states will be less inclined to go to war by suggesting that if they do, and if 
the democratic process has not been compromised by nationalist propaganda, 
it will only be to defend human rights either at home or abroad. 
However, in so far as wars are no longer fought just between states, the just 
war tradition needs to be expanded. 1he rules of war cannot readily be upheld 
by state authorities in the new kinds of contemporary war that involve the 
breakdown of civil order. 1he way in which terrorists target civilians is only 
the most obvious example of this. In such contexts it becomes important to 
acknowledge that it is individuals and groups of individuals who perpetrate 
acts of war, whether new wars or conventional wars. Individuals cannot abro-
gate their responsibility by claiming to act on behalf of a state or a national, 
ideological or religious cause. Wars should be fought under the aegis of what 
Kant called cosmopolitan law: laws that apply to individuals rather than col-
lectivities. As Mary Ka1dor puts it, "a cosmopolitan approach requires respect 
for cosmopolitan law. 1his is international law that applies to individuals and 
not to states. The two main components of cosmopolitan law are the Laws of 
War and Human Rights Law" (2002: 277). As an example of what she means, 
Ka1dor mentions the Nuremberg trials, which made individuals liable for the 
war crimes they committed even when they were obeying the authorities of 
their states. Just as statesmen have used "reasons of state" to justify acts of 
global injustice, so soldiers and generals frequently use "military necessity" to 
justify acts that violate the rules of war. However, no individual is immune from 
liability for crimes they commit on behalf of the state, whether during war or 
in times of peace. Cosmopolitanism insists that, just as individual rights should 
be protected, so individuals should be held accountable. 
Humanitarian intervention 
I have discussed the cosmopolitan norm of accepting limitations on the sover-
eignty of nation-states to secure human rights and global justice by asking the 
question of how, and to what extent, sovereign states are still a necessary com-
ponent of a globalized world. My conclusion has been that while sovereignty is 
not as absolute as it once was, it continues to have legal, commercial and dip-
lomatic reality. However, many of the debates around the issue of sovereignty 
in recent times have been about whether states have the right to intervene in 
the domestic, social and political affairs of another state. 
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States have been seeking to influence one another since time immemorial. 
At once the most obvious and most brutal means for exercising such influence 
is military force. A more powerful state can force a less powerful one to do its 
bidding by threatening to invade it or to steal its territory. Under such pressure 
a less powerful state may agree to unfair trade arrangements, cede some of its 
territory or change its policies so as to allow foreign takeovers of its resources. 
The cold war was not a war in the sense that armies invaded each other's ter-
ritories, but in the sense that two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, sought 
to influence less powerful states so as to create two opposed "blocs" of nations 
in the world with a third group of non-aligned nation-states standing off to one 
side. Any government that showed signs of currying favour with an opposing 
superpower found itself under diplomatic pressure, infiltrated by secret agents 
who would encourage and fund anti-government activities, denied trading 
opportunities or even invaded by the armed forces of the relevant superpower. 
Economic sanctions, trade embargoes and naval blockades were also used. The 
moral justifications for such actions were very weak since the fundamental 
issues were ideological. Although the conflict between capitalism and commu-
nism was often portrayed as a conflict between freedom and godless tyranny, it 
is arguable that it was commercial interests and the expansion of markets that 
played the most operative role in fomenting the conflict (Koshy 1999). 
Now that the cold war is officially over, the most morally justifiable reason 
for any foreign intervention is said to be the securing of human rights and glo-
bal justice. In the event that the government of a particular state oppresses its 
people, exploits them economically and denies them their human rights, do 
other states have the right to intervene? Does a body like the UN, even when it 
can secure the agreement of member states to do so, have the right to invade a 
nation-state in order to restore the rights of its citizens? The term used for such 
interventions is "humanitarian intervention" because it involves intervening in 
the internal affairs of a nation-state, whether with military force or other forms 
of pressure, in order to provide humanitarian aid or to secure human rights. 
If this intention were not present, the intervention would be rightly seen as an 
invasion and would be resisted as such. 
The UN was initially set up to maintain peace between nations and its char-
ter sets up a series of criteria by which the UN can authorize armed interven-
tion to preserve peace. But all of its rules and guidelines are premised ort the 
sovereignty of nation-states. It is states that go to war with each other and it 
is states that must be policed so as to preserve peace. War is seen as conflict 
between states and the UN sees itself as the umpire or arbiter between states. 
The members of the UN and of its Security Council are states. In this concep-
tion sovereignty is never called into question and the right of states to not 
be interfered with except if they threaten other states is sacrosanct. However, 
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the UDHR introduces a deep tension into the mission of the UN. It focuses 
on individual human beings. It declares the rights that each individual has 
irrespective of nationality, race, ethnicity, gender or religion. These rights are 
to be honoured and protected by the states in which the relevant individu-
als live and, in the event that they are not so protected, the UN declares that 
the international community has the duty to protect them. The UN Security 
Council can authorize foreign interventions to protect human rights and it 
does so most notably when it provides humanitarian aid in war-torn areas, 
provides soldiers to protect the delivery of such aid or installs peacekeeping 
forces in troubled areas. But the goal of protecting human rights puts the UN 
at loggerheads with its own commitment to state sovereignty. In the event that 
tyrants attack their own peoples through genocide or through levels of mis-
management that lead to starvation, there is a conflict between protecting the 
victims of such actions and respecting the sovereign rights of that state. 
Henry Shue (1999) has offered an argument for the legitimacy of foreign 
intervention based on the premise that talk of human rights is empty unless 
we are prepared to police their observance. His argument rests on a distinction 
between wrongs that, as he puts it, we have a right to commit (such as being 
rude or disloyal), and wrongs we have no right to commit (such as stealing or 
wantonly killing other human beings). If it seems a bit odd to speak of a wrong 
that we have a right to commit, we might consider that being rude or disloyal 
are failures of virtue but may not be an offence against strict moral norms. 
Even if being rude is SOcially offensive, no one has the right or the duty to stop 
us from being rude if we want to be. In contrast, we have no right to commit 
wrong acts such as stealing or murder because of the kind of harm they cause 
to their victims. People have a right to defend themselves against the kinds of 
wrongs that would harm them and to use the instruments of the state to do so. 
Accordingly, we are prepared to enforce those prohibitions with police action. 
It is because we institute such policing that we can genUinely say that people 
have a right to property or a right to life. To claim that people have such rights 
and yet not to institute policing to enforce their observance would make talk of 
such rights empty rhetoric. Accordingly, to say that we have no right to com-
mit such wrongs is to say that others have a duty to prevent us from commit-
ting them or to punish us if we do. Given that rights and duties go together, it 
would be vacuous to say that there was a right without there also being a duty 
to protect it and to punish those who violate it. 
The reason that Shue approaches this issue in the rather unusual form of 
asking whether there are wrongs that we have a right to commit is that the 
doctrine of state sovereignty might seem to imply that sovereign leaders have 
a right to commit any wrongs within their own borders that they like. Provided 
they are recognized as the legitimate authority, their right to rule is said to be 
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absolute and they are answerable to no one. The implication of this doctrine 
is that foreign intervention to protect the human rights of individuals within 
tyrannical states would never be justified. However, if we apply Shue's distinc-
tion to the international sphere, we could say that sovereigns have a right to 
commit some wrongs but not others. We might look the other way if corrupt 
leaders use illegitimate means to influence election outcomes, take bribes or 
engage in economic mismanagement, provided that the lives or fundamental 
rights of the population are not threatened. But they have no right to destroy 
their own populations through genocide, for example. The kind of harm that 
such wrong acts cause is such that we could not tolerate them. They would be 
wrongs that tyrannical leaders have no right to commit. Human rights consti-
tute a boundary beyond which such leaders may not go. Accordingly, the basic 
human rights of populations anywhere should be policed by the international 
community lest such rights become mere rhetoric. If a state will not police 
them, they will need to be policed by a super-state body. It follows from this 
argument that the international community has a duty to protect populations 
even in other countries. 
The argument then proceeds to talk of two kinds of duties that attach to 
rights: the duty to respect the right and the duty to police its observance. 
Because of the right to bodily integrity, we all have. the duty not to assault 
others. This is a negative duty. But in case an assault does occur, there is also 
a positive duty to prevent, deter or punish offenders. Shue (1999) calls such 
positive duties "default duties': Within most states, such duties are borne by 
the police and the system of criminal justice. When we speak of fundamen-
tal or basic human rights, we refer to rights that attract both these kinds oj 
duties. Fundamental human rights concern interests that are so important that 
positive or default duties must be specifiable. The lesson to be drawn from this 
point is that a gross violation of human rights, even on the part of the sover-
eign leaders of the victims, must be responded to with police action to rescue 
the victims and to bring the perpetrators to justice. This principle applies even 
when the perpetrators are leaders of sovereign nation-states. To fail to do sc 
would be to not take seriously the claim that the victims had the relevant right~ 
in the first place. 
Shue demonstrates the relevance of this argument to cosmopolitanism wher 
he says: 
The fundamental point is: if all the rest of us actually do nothing to define 
and assign default duties for the case in which a state does not protect 
its own people against genocide - even for the most common case in 
which the state is the orchestrator of the genocide - then we genuinely 
are assigning the vital interests and basic rights of non-compatriots zero 
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weight in our calculations about how to organize the planet, specifically 
how to understand sovereignty - most specially, what a sovereign may 
allow. (Ibid.: 4) 
Cosmopolitans should be in favour of armed humanitarian intervention so 
long as it is authorized by the UN, and also of a global system of criminal jus-
tice to bring perpetrators of crimes against humanity to justice. The police 
powers of the state in which the genocide occurs would seem to be powerless 
to stop it, and so to assign the default duty of preventing the crime to such 
state-based powers is not to be serious about protecting the human right in 
question. 
Nevertheless, other cosmopolitans see considerable danger in the alleged 
rights of states to engage in humanitarian interventions. They argue that, if 
states assumed that they had a right to intervene in the affairs of other states 
whenever those states abused their citizens, global anarchy would result. 
According to David Chandler, "In the Middle East, in Africa and the Balkans, 
the exercise of 'international justice' signifies a return to the Westphalian sys-
tem of open great-power domination over states which are too weak to prevent 
external claims against them" (2003: 37). Chandler is opposed to humanitarian 
intervention because he sees it as a reassertion of their hegemony on the part 
of the more powerful states. He sees this as a thwarting of legality and thus as 
the negation of the international justice that it is meant to protect. The problem 
arises when interventions are justified by humanitarian ideals rather than by 
law. International law establishes the formal equality of states and their equal 
rights to sovereignty. If such law were to be overruled by the pursuit of human-
itarian ideals, it would result in the hegemony of the more powerful states. 
Only weak states would be subject to such policing action and so their status 
of legal equality in the international system would be compromised. Even if it 
were for the best of humanitarian reasons, force would once again be the major 
influence on the relations between states. lO 
The solution to this problem is to enshrine the "duty to protect" as a prin-
ciple within international law. Whereas traditional justifications for war cen-
tred on self-defence on the part of states, a recent report issued by the UN 
acknowledges a right to respond militarily not only to clear and serious threats 
to a state but also to threats to its population. The report asserts that when-
ever the Security Council authorizes the use of force it should apply "five basic 
criteria of legitimacy" (United Nations 2004: para. 207). These criteria turn 
out to be similar to the principles of jus ad bello (Lango 2008). Such criteria 
include defending populations against violations of humanitarian law such as 
genocide or ethnic cleansing. At the 2005 UN World Summit, the General 
Assembly adopted a resolution in which it endorses armed humanitarian 
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intervention (United Nations 2005). Also relevant to the question of whether 
military force might be used for humanitarian interventions or to enforce and 
protect humanitarian aid efforts is the Report of the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty set up by the Canadian Government 
in 2000 in Ottawa. This report, entitled The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS 
2001), argues that humanitarian intervention is justified by criteria that resem-
ble those of the just war doctrine, including "right authority'; by which it refers 
to the UN Security Council. As for "just cause'; according to Singer's summary 
of this report: 
The commission cut down the criteria for justifiable military action to 
just two: 
(a) Large-scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent 
or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state 
neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or, 
(b) Large-scale "ethnic cleansing", actual or apprehended, whether carried 
out by killing, forced expulsion, act of terror or rape. 
(Singer 2002: 140-41) 
Singer endorses these principles on the grounds that states have a responsibility 
to protect their own citizens. Accordingly, when a state fails to do so, or actively 
violates the rights of its own citizens, the international community is entitled to 
take up this responsibility. But even then, the UN must still consider the conse-
quences and not authorize intervention if more harm would result (including 
anarchy resulting from the failure of the intervening power to establish law and 
order). The jus ad bello principle of reasonable chance of success would rule out 
any foolhardy military adventure or any premature withdrawal. 
Singer notes that the Canadian report has made a significant contribution to 
international thinking on humanitarian intervention. Moving from talk of "the 
right to intervene" to talk of "the responsibility to protect" gives a more con-
strained and humanitarian flavour to this thinking. The concept of a responsi-
bility to protect the rights of individuals in other states is more onerous and 
more focused. Only the UN should accept this responsibility, since if it were 
open to powerful states to do so unilaterally there would be considerable dan-
ger of imperialistic abuses of their power. Such states might be tempted to 
use humanitarian justifications for interventions whose real purpose was the 
enhancement of their hegemony. If humanitarian intervention were engaged 
in with the endorsement of the UN, the imperialistic abuses that Chandler 
and others have warned us of could, in principle, be avoided. Cosmopolitans 
could endorse the principle of the responsibility to protect the human rights 
of all, even though the UN is not itself a body that can escape the pressures of 
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its more powerful members. As a matter of logic, it does not count against the 
validity of a moral principle that it might be abused by unscrupulous agents. 
That the principle of humanitarian intervention might be abused by power-
ful nations does not count against the validity of the principle. It does, how-
ever, require of decision-makers that they apply the principle with honesty and 
integrity and that the processes through which such decisions are made be 
transparent and open to as much democratic scrutiny as is feasible. 
It might also help to reconceptualize the notion of "humanitarian interven-
tion" somewhat. By discussing the issue under the rubric of the just war doc-
trine, it is framed by the question of when war is justified and conceptualized 
as an international issue centred on conflicts between states. However, if we 
discuss the issue under the rubric of defending the rights of individuals from 
the predations of criminal tyrants, we can see it as an issue of policing. Policing 
consists in upholding the law so as to protect individuals from criminals. In 
civil society every individual has the right to be protected from theft, murder 
and other crimes. For this purpose police forces are instituted and given pow-
ers within the law to enforce the law, prevent crime and apprehend criminals. 
If we translated this model to the international sphere, we could conceptualize 
humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping missions as police actions rather 
than as acts of war. Forces that engage in such actions would then be seen 
as international police rather than as invading soldiers. The world will always 
contain recalcitrant people or criminals. Some of these might be the leaders of 
nations. They are criminals if they flout international law, including those laws 
that ensure compliance with international treaties and secure the human rights 
of their subjects. Such criminals, like criminals in the domestic sphere, need to 
be made answerable for their crimes. They should be subject to international 
law and police action should be taken to ensure their compliance with such 
law. If they do not comply, they should be apprehended and brought to justice 
through duly recognized international courts. 
The use of coercion by police would have to be strictly controlled within 
justifiable guidelines. Conceptually there is no difference between the domes-
tic justifications for police action and an international justification for police 
action. Admittedly, there are inescapable difficulties in the international sphere 
that do not exist in the domestic sphere. The policing powers of the UN and 
other global agencies are not so clearly defined and institutionalized as are 
domestic police forces and their use is subject to sometimes arbitrary restric-
tions resulting from the veto powers of the permanent members of the UN 
Security Council. Nevertheless, the ethical difficulties of conceiving of human i-
tarian intervention as morally justifiable are reduced if we conceive of such 
interventions as police actions that support and uphold international law rather 
than circumventing it, as Chandler fears. Of course, the results of police action 
139 
COSMOPOLITANISM 
must not produce a worse condition than that which it is designed to prevent, 
the action must be proportional and it must have justification from legitimate 
authority. As in the domestic sphere, police brutality can occur when these 
guidelines are ignored (Young 2007b). But in so far as it is designed to uphold 
international law, police power can be seen as legitimate much more readily 
than can military invasions in the name of human rights. While what actually 
happens in either case may be very similar, the conceptual and justificatory 
framework for understanding what is happening differs. Police primarily have 
the responsibility to protect the rights of individuals rather than pursuing the 
international objectives of nation-states by means of force. 
Conclusion 
Although it seems that conflict and criminality are ineradicable from the human 
condition, the incidence of war can be reduced to the extent that nationalism 
can be. It is the pursuit of the national interest on the part of nation-states and 
the pursuit of self-determination on the part of peoples who aspire to be nation-
states that are the main causes of war. Most developed nation-states devote 
considerable time to adopting strategic policies to meet the challenges posed by 
the pursuit of power and influence on the part of other nation-states. The emer-
gence of new powers in the international arena, such as China and India, leads 
other states to explore opportunities for economic advantage, threats to national 
security, risks to supplies of natural resources, changes to diplomatic relation-
ships and new military alliances. Seldom do these policy discussions raise the 
issues of global justice, democratic governance and human rights, except in so 
far as their denial might lead to global instability and hence to the undermining 
of national sovereignty. The mindset of the think tanks and policy experts who 
advise governments on such matters is inescapably strategic and centred on 
the national interest. While many say that it is unrealistic to expect otherwise, 
I would say that it is unrealistic to expect lasting world peace if the cosmopol-
itan concerns for global justice, democratic governance and human rights are 
not addressed as a first priority. The sovereignty of nation-states must be seen 
not as sacrosanct, but as a pragmatic, administrative arrangement. There will 
be less reason to go to war to protect national interests or honour if the focus 
of world leaders is on individual human rights and global economic justice. 11 
there were a need to protect such rights or the self-determinations of peoples, 
it should be done by way of UN authorized police actions rather than by wars 
waged between states. 
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Towards a global community 
Cosmopolitanism refers to a form of moral and political community char-
acterised by laws which are universal. The central proposition of cosmo-
politanism as a moral and political doctrine is that humans can and should 
form a universal (that is global) moral community. (Shapcott 2001: 7) 
The final set of features of cosmopolitanism that we need to explore is: 
(17) acknowledging the rule of international law; 
(18) commitment to open and participatory political processes globally; 
(19) religious and cultural tolerance and an acceptance of global pluralism; 
(20) dialogue and communication across cultural and national boundaries; 
(21) seeing the world as a single polity and community. 
The suggestion that the whole world might be seen as a global community could 
express an ideal or describe a reality. It may be an ideal that cosmopolitans 
advocate as a hoped-for utopia or it may be an apt description of the way the 
human world actually is. I shall suggest it could be both. A global community 
may already exist, but in a form that requires further enhancement in order to 
realize the hopes and aspirations of human beings everywhere. 
Community 
Before we can begin our discussion of whether the world constitutes a global 
community, we need to specify what we understand by a "community': A group 
of people who are together in some sense but only by chance does not consti-
tute a community. A group of people waiting for a train at a railway station are 
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together in the sense that they are in proximity to each other in a specific place, 
but they have little in common that would constitute them as a community. That 
they share the purpose of catching a train is not usually enough to bind them in 
this way. Nor does a prison yard occupied by mutually antagonistic criminals 
among whom peace is maintained by mutual fear, by bullies within the yard or 
by armed guards at its perimeters constitute a community. A large number of 
people gathered together at a football ground to support their favourite team, 
however, could be thought of as a community, even though it will be a very 
temporary one. They share a substantial goal and purpose, and enjoy some 
conviviality and solidarity because of that. Shared interests such as a desire 
for wealth and social goods may also ground a feeling of community, although 
they could also give rise to competitiveness and class struggle. We have noted 
in Chapter 3 how Rawls sees a national economy as a system of cooperation in 
which participants can demand fair institutions for the distribution of social 
goods. A community becomes even less ephemeral when it shares an outlook 
on life or a conception of how life should be lived. This might arise because of 
a shared social and political tradition, shared ethnicity, shared religion, shared 
nationality or shared class identification. 
What is distinctive of community is some feeling of solidarity. Members of 
a community share some aspect of identity and purpose, and recognize each 
other as sharing that identity and purpose. This leads them to be concerned for 
each other and to set up institutions or arrangements through which they can 
share aspects of their lives and fulfil obligations towards each other. It should 
also be noted that one can be a member of a number of communities in this 
sense and have a number of loyalties and affiliations based on group identity. 
A most dramatic example of this would be a village that has a national border 
running through it. The villagers would share a proximity to each other and 
would share a life based on the village, and yet some would be of a different 
nationality than the others and be subject to a different legal jurisdiction. These 
villagers would identify with several overlapping communities. In modern plu-
ralistic societies most people are members of overlapping communities in this 
way and have overlapping identities as a result.1 
I have discussed patriotism as a form of identification with, and loyalty to, 
one's political community in Chapter 1, and I argued there that cosmopoli-
tans try to overcome the tendencies to chauvinism that such feelings of loyalty 
give rise to by being somewhat ironic about their identification with their own 
group. In Chapter 3 I argued that our concern for the well-being of others 
and for justice in the distribution of social goods should not be confined by 
national borders or group memberships. As we have seen when we discussed 
the Nussbaum debate on patriotism, many commentators see the modern 
nation-state as the broadest community of which we are a part, whereas cos-
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mopolitans would see worldwide humanity as the community with which we 
should feel a degree of solidarity. Similarly, Rawls considers a nation-state to be 
the broadest context in which institutions can be asked to operate justly, while 
cosmopolitans demand that the whole world be a context in which institutions 
operate so as to secure justice for all. The pursuit of global justice and the feel-
ing of global solidarity are inextricable. It is our shared humanity that provides 
the motivation and ethical basis for such concerns. The question is, however, 
whether a shared humanity is a sufficiently "thick" form of solidarity to provide 
the basis for what we might call a global community. 
Identity has a horizon: difference. If a group of people share an identity and 
recognize each other as holders of that identity, they will also define themselves 
as different from people who do not share that identity. Being a Catholic is in 
part defined by not being a Protestant and being a Muslim is in part defined 
by not being a Jew or a Christian. Of course the positive features of what it is 
to belong to such communities will be more important and more prominent, 
but the feeling that one is different from members of other communities will 
also be strong. One could conclude from this point that the human world as a 
whole cannot be a community because there is no "other" to which members 
can contrast themselves and from which they can see themselves as different. 
It has been suggested that the world would only come together as one if it were 
attacked by extra-terrestrials. However, cosmopolitans would urge that people 
should overcome the tendency to define themselves by contrast to others and 
embrace difference as an intrinsic feature of a world community. 
I would suggest that a world community exists - despite all the different 
groupings, nations, ethnicities, religions and traditions that structure and dif-
ferentiate the global human family - when people acknowledge a global obliga-
tion to help each other when times are hard, accord each other cultural respect 
and political equality across ethnic differences and state borders, pursue global 
justice on the assumption that in a globalized economic system everyone has 
a right to a fair distribution of social goods, and see themselves as global citi-
zens engaged with each other through a variety of global political institutions. 
In a global community individuals and peoples accord everyone equal moral 
status, protect each other's rights and enter into dialogue with each other with 
mutual respect. This is a very idealistic conception and the conflict-ridden 
world of today does not encourage hope that this ideal is close to being real-
ized. However, I shall argue that it is an ideal that, despite all the enmity in the 
world, is already some way towards realization, and that it is one to which we 
should be committed. Moreover, I shall argue that cosmopolitanism is the out-
look that we need in order to contribute to its realization. 
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International relations 
In the discourse of international relations, the focus is on nation-states and 
their relations to each other, and the norm would be that they would treat 
each other with respect - albeit that, in a Westphalian world, this respect is 
won through the exercise of power. Accordingly, if cosmopolitans acknow-
ledge the sovereignty of states even as they see the need to place limitations 
on that sovereignty so as to protect human rights and secure global justice, 
they must also give consideration to the nature of the relations between states. 
They will consider it important that all states honour the treaties and under-
takings that they enter into with each other. Only in this way can the inter-
national legal order that protects the rights of individuals be protected. If the 
UN secures agreement to international covenants that recognize and enshrine 
human rights, then states that are signatories to those covenants are under 
an obligation to abide by them. Political realists would argue that the national 
interest can trump such obligations and that states have the right to repudiate 
them if their own interests are under sufficiently serious threat. Accordingly, 
cosmopolitans need to argue why treaty obligations and other international 
covenants are binding on states. 
Such an argument has been offered by Rawls in his book The Law of Peoples, 
a book that displays the influence of Kant's "Perpetual Peace". Rawls envisages 
a hypothetical situation not unlike the one he had created in his earlier book 
A Theory of Justice. Whereas in the earlier book he had imagined the kinds of 
social and political institutions that individuals would agree to at the level of a 
nation-state if they decided on them without knowing where they would come 
to stand in those arrangements, in the later book he envisages representatives 
of peoples meeting together to shape the international order without their 
knowing what positions their peoples would hold in that order. Under such 
conditions, Rawls suggests that, through their representatives, peoples would 
endorse the following principles: 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independ-
ence are to be respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right to self-defense but no right to instigate war for 
reasons other than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of 
war. 
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8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavora-
ble conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and 
social regime. (Rawls 1999: 37) 
Although we are familiar with these principles from texts on international law 
and from our description of cosmopolitanism, Rawls's argument is that a meet-
ing of reasonable representatives of peoples, deciding from behind a "veil of 
ignorance'; would agree to them because in doing so they would secure the 
kind of global order in which those peoples could pursue their ways of life and 
other legitimate goals. Accordingly, these principles become fair, reasonable 
and normative. 
In using the term "peoples" Rawls seeks to avoid the theoretical constructs 
associated with the term "nation-states': He wants to distinguish a people from 
a state because he thinks that the concept of a state is tied to a utilitarian and 
realist conception of international relations. According to the Westphalian con-
ception I described in Chapter 4, a state exists in so far as it aggressively defends 
its borders and hegemony either by its own strength or by alignments with other 
states. It seeks its own advantage - it is "rational" in that utilitarian sense - and 
is not bound by the criterion of reasonableness that binds peoples through the 
kind of global social contract that Rawls envisages. A people that is "reasonable" 
will be more likely to accommodate itself to others through compromise than a 
nation-state that is "rational" in the pursuit of its national interests. In this way 
basic human rights are secured not by a central global authority or by a stable 
balance of power between states, but by peoples agreeing to exist within, and 
be subject to, a cooperative scheme of mutual respect and non-intervention. 
However, if it is a social contract that is being envisaged, it is a second-
level social contract that differs from the first-level contract described in A 
Theory of Justice. Participants at that first level are individuals who decide on 
principles for fair political association and the distribution of social goods on 
behalf of themselves and their own kith and kin in the domestic context of a 
particular nation-state, while the participants at the second level are repre-
sentatives who act on behalf of peoples. Moreover, the scope of their delibera-
tion is how to interpret the above principles rather than whether to establish 
them. Rawls thinks that they already have such a priori plausibility that they 
do not need grounding, perhaps because the very definition of a "people" is 
that such principles are enacted by them. A people is a people in so far as it 
adheres to principles 1, 3 and 4, for example, and also holds other peoples to 
doing so. Another reason why Rawls thinks that the second level differs from 
the first is that, at the second level, the control of territories by peoples can-
not be questioned, despite the historical arbitrariness of borders. The reason 
for this is that unless a state-like body has control and ownership of territory, 
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that territory or resource will deteriorate. A legal jurisdiction is required to 
maintain property rights and develop the legal instruments and infrastructure 
needed for economic activity. 
The picture of international relations that Rawls is drawing could represent 
a global community because it leads to social or international stability for the 
right reasons. "Stability for the right reasons means stability brought about by 
citizens acting correctly according to the appropriate principles of their sense of 
justice, which they have acquired by growing up under and participating in just 
institutions" (ibid.: 13 n.2). Rawls is contrasting his conception of international 
cooperation with that of political realists who argue that the world of nation-
states is an anarchy in which brute force is required to maintain peace, whether 
that force is exercised by one or several powerful states or whether it is exercised 
by a super-state agency with a monopoly on power. The realist conception of 
international relations is like that of the prison yard above. Coercion to enforce 
cooperation or compliance does not create stability for the right reasons.2 
This point had already been made by the English jurist and philosopher 
H. L. A. Hart in 1961 in the last chapter of his book The Concept of Law. In an 
attempt to understand how international law can have the status and norma-
tivity of law, Hart compares it to domestic law or the law that applies within 
states. Legal theorists called "positivists" argue that municipal law is binding on 
citizens - that is, has the status and normativity of law - because it is backed 
by sanctions. Their model of how the law works is that of a powerful Leviathan 
or ruler who issues commands and has the power to punish disobedience 
severely. On this view, it is only because they fear punishment that citizens 
within nation-states feel themselves obliged to obey the law. If this is the basis 
of the normativity of domestic law, is international law binding on states for 
similar reasons? Do states respect international law only out of fear of sanc-
tions? Kant had suggested that there is no international agency to enforce inter-
national law in the way that a Leviathan enforces domestic law, and that there 
ought not to be. For his part, Hart points out that, even if the UN charter pro-
vides for sanctions, recent history has shown that this power is severely limited 
by the use of the veto on the part of the most powerful UN members except 
when it has suited those members to use the legitimacy accorded by the UN 
to pursue their own national interests under the UN banner. 
But rather than concluding that international law is a sham, Hart argues that 
the positivist's account of the normativity of domestic law is incorrect. He likens 
it to a scenario where a gunman has held you up and demanded your money. It 
makes sense in this context to say that you are obliged to hand over your money. 
But it is not the case that you "have an obligation" to hand over your money. 
Having an obligation is not the same as being obliged (Hart 1961: 80). Having 
an obligation is a moral condition whereas being obliged is the state of feeling 
146 
TOWARDS A GLOBAL COMMUNITY 
motivated by the likelihood of suffering the sanction or punishment threatened 
for disobedience. Even where there are sanctions, as in domestic law where the 
criminal code is backed by policing, one must not equate the external predic-
tive statement "1 shall suffer sanctions" with the internal normative statement 
"1 have an obligation to act thus': To be under an obligation is simply a different 
phenomenon from being afraid to transgress. It is a moral condition. According 
to Hart, domestic law places citizens under a legal obligation rather than forcing 
them to obey through fear. It may be that the fear of sanctions is needed at the 
domestic level to stop the criminally minded from committing crimes, since it 
is often easy to perform criminal acts and even to escape detection in a society 
where everyone is equally vulnerable, but for most people the sense of being 
under an obligation will be enough to ensure that they conform to the law and 
will provide sufficient motivation to overcome the temptations to criminality 
that might arise in the context of fallible policing. On the basis of this analogy, 
Hart concludes that, despite the absence of the Hobbesian solution to the prob-
lem of international order - the solution that posits a global Leviathan to enforce 
the peace - international law truly is law in the sense that it secures global order 
through there being a genuine obligation on the part of states to conform to it. 
The only question that remains is where this genuine obligation comes from. 
This question is answered by Rawls's account in that the second-level social 
contract that he describes shows how representatives of peoples can place 
themselves and their peoples under an obligation to adhere to international 
law; they do so because, as reasonable peoples, they acknowledge that it is fair 
to do so. It is a system of law that representatives of peoples would agree to 
if they did not know what standing their peoples would end up having in the 
world system. In this way stability is attained for the right reasons rather than 
through fear of punishment or of anarchy. Just as in the domestic case, if a 
society is a system of cooperation - as opposed to a command system - then 
it must have the cooperation of its people. People must see it as fair. When they 
do so they will be under an obligation to cooperate with that society. In the glo-
bal context, a people will be under an obligation to meet its obligations within 
the global community to the extent that it sees the principles under which that 
community operates to be fair. 
However, just as in the domestic case there are individuals with differing 
moral relationships to the state - citizens in good standing, criminals and indi-
viduals in need of welfare, for example - so in the international community 
there are peoples with differing moral relationships to the global community. 
There are liberal societies, hieni.rchical but decent societies, outlaw states that 
refuse to adhere to international law and in which internal governance is inef-
fective, "burdened" societies that stand in need of international assistance, and 
what Rawls calls "benevolent dictatorships': 
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Liberal societies are those that give full political rights to their people _ 
rights such as liberty of conscience, individual equality before the law, and 
rights to dissent, to democratic participation and to association - as well as 
providing whatever social goods such as education and health services their 
members need in order to pursue whatever they consider to be the human 
good in ways that do not harm others. In contrast, a decent, hierarchical 
people is non-liberal because it does not give full political rights to its mem-
bers but has political institutions that allow for consultation on matters of 
policy. Moreover, decent peoples respect such basic human rights as the right 
to life, security and subsistence, property, and formal equality before the law. 
Theocratic societies in which non-elected clergy rule, but do so in accordance 
with the conception of a good life shared by the whole community, would be 
examples of such decent peoples. Both liberal and decent societies are partici-
pants in good standing in the social contract between peoples that establishes 
the global community. 
An outlaw state, on the other hand, is a people that refuses to enter the 
global contract and that seeks to secure its advantages by force of arms or dis-
honest diplomacy. It also refuses to secure the human rights of its members. 
Like a criminal in the domestic context, such a society may be legitimately sub-
jected to police action or humanitarian intervention on the part of the global 
community. The global community is also entitled to intervene in the political 
arrangements of a failed state in so far as the absence of effective governance 
in such states can lead to their becoming outlaw states. Given the existence of 
such states, the idealized picture of a global community that the eight prin-
ciples enunciate needs to be modified so as to acknowledge the need for forms 
of political violence that go beyond mere self-defence. A burdened society is 
one that suffers such a degree of poverty, both in resources and in individual 
wealth, as to not be able to govern itself effectively. In relation to such soci-
eties, Rawls's eighth principle suggests that the global community and richer 
societies have an obligation to assist through the provision of aid to the point 
where such societies can govern themselves effectively and enter into the global 
community in accordance with the eight principles. Rawls does not offer much 
comment on benevolent dictatorships. 
The foreign-policy implications for liberal societies in relation to other liberal 
societies are, as Kant had argued, that they will live in peace. The foreign-policy 
implications for liberal societies in relation to decent societies are that decent 
peoples should be accepted into the world community and, perhaps, encour-
aged to become liberal by non-coercive means such as example and admoni-
tion. However, liberal peoples must not show them contempt lest they become 
aggrieved and create international tensions. The foreign-policy implications 
for liberal societies in relation to outlaw societies are that they will have to be 
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contained and pacified, and, if necessary, intervened in so as to secure the human 
rights of their citizens. Moreover, liberal and decent societies have the right to 
protect themselves from the aggression of such states, even pre-emptively. The 
foreign-policy implications for liberal societies in relation to burdened societies 
and failed states are that they will need to be assisted to the point where they 
have enough economic stability to permit either liberal or decent governments 
to emerge. Unlike in the domestic context, to which the notion of justice as fair-
ness as developed inA Theory of Justice applies, there is no obligation to ensure 
global justice in the global distribution of social goods or to create any mechan-
isms that would ensure that the increasing wealth of the world's rich contribute 
to improving the living conditions of the global poor. 
Rawls's thesis has been subjected to scrutiny and many cosmopolitans 
reject it. The first reason for such a rejection is that, despite Rawls's mention 
of "peoples'; his conception of international relations is still "statist" in form. 
Critics have pointed out that the notion of a "people" is vague and that, given 
the kinds of arrangements that are being agreed to, it is clear that states are 
the relevant parties to the agreement (Nussbaum 2006: chs 4, 5). The eight 
principles that would be agreed to by reasonable peoples bear a remarkable 
resemblance to the international laws that secure the prerogatives of states in a 
post-Westphalian world. But if Rawls is envisaging a utopia, why could he not 
envisage a world without state boundaries? Why would a "people" define itself 
as a nation-state distinct from others? What would be the meaning of bor-
ders for peoples rather than for states? Cultural, linguistic and religious differ-
ences may exist between peoples but there is no necessary link between these 
forms of solidarity and identity and the existence of nation-states. Accordingly, 
peoples could decide to create a borderless world in which the issue of inter-
vention and war becomes moot, leaving only a policing function to deal with 
crime. Such a world could be ordered by political and economic institutions 
that secure global justice in accordance with the principle set out in Rawls's 
earlier work (Pogge 2006). The only force that would prevent this ideal from 
becoming a reality would be nationalism or chauvinism, attitudes to which 
cosmopolitans are opposed. 
Cosmopolitans are also concerned about Rawls's limited conception of global 
justice. In arguing that rich societies only have an obligation to assist burdened 
peoples to the extent that they can come to govern themselves effectively, Rawls 
seems to be assuming that every people has the natural and human resources 
to lift itself out of poverty, and that it is only because of conditions internal to 
the social and political lives of those people that this might not happen. Such 
conditions might include bad governance or a lack of willingness to engage in 
economic activity or to participate in the global economy. But this ignores the 
influence on that burdened people of the international economic system, which 
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systematically exploits poorer countries so as to extract natural resources and 
labour power from them at the lowest possible price. As noted in Chapter 3, 
poor governance is often caused by bribery and corruption condoned by multi-
national corporations and the governments of richer countries. 
Moreover, many cosmopolitan commentators find it hard to understand why 
Rawls would not apply the criteria for justice that he developed in A Theory oj 
Justice to the international sphere (Pettit 2006). Why not imagine individuals 
from around the world coming together behind a veil of ignorance in order to 
establish the political and economic institutions that would govern the world 
as a whole? Why do these decisions have to be limited to national jurisdic-
tions? If parties to the original position were not to know where in the world 
they would end up and what nationality they would hold, they would certainly 
insist on global conditions that would prevent severe and systemic poverty 
from arising in any part of that world. But Rawls circumvents such theorizing 
by assuming that "peoples" already exist and bear a striking resemblance to 
nation-states acting rationally in their own interests. First, individuals contract 
to form a state, and then states, acting analogously to individuals, contract to 
form an international order. But this assumes that state delegations to the origi-
nal position are truly representative of their peoples, that the internal arrange-
ments of those states are just, that people in those states are not seeking redress 
against their ruling elites through international pressure and NGOs, and that 
such states are economic and political closed systems. None of these assump-
tions can be guaranteed. As Nussbaum puts it: "The assumption of the fixity 
and finality of states makes the second-stage contract assume a very thin and 
restricted form, precluding any serious consideration of economic redistribu-
tion, or even substantial aid, from richer to poorer nations" (2006: 235). 
A third source of concern for cosmopolitan thinkers is that Rawls is prepared 
to accept decent but non-liberal societies as members of the world community. 
Most cosmopolitans would argue that the denial of liberal political rights should 
not be made acceptable in the world community. But Rawls does not claim to 
be a cosmopolitan.3 His thinking is statist in form. Even as he creates an ideal 
theory of the global community, he is realistic enough to accept that there can 
be no such community if only liberal societies were acceptable in it. Moreover, 
he urges that the normative standard that should apply to such a community be 
that of "reasonableness': Rawls (1993) developed the norm of reasonableness in 
his discussions of domestic politics. Most nation-states today are multicultural 
and contain communities and individuals that have conceptions of the good life 
that differ from others within that same nation-state. Many of these views are 
based on metaphysical or religious views not shared by everyone in that larger 
political community. In such conditions of "value pluralism" a political com-
munity must avoid basing policy or law on the comprehensive moral doctrines 
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of anyone segment of society, even if that segment were the majority. Rather 
than insisting on one's own conception of the good, one must be "reasonable" 
and be tolerant of conceptions that one might disagree with. Public policy must 
be based on considerations that all reasonable people in that society can accept. 
Rawls calls this position "political liberalism': 
Applied at the international level, this standard of reasonableness implies 
that parties to the second-order social contract that Rawls envisages should 
not be driven by an ideal conception of social and political life, human rights 
or social justice that people in other parts of the world might not be able to 
accept. The fact is that a great many nations of the world do not accept the 
liberal ideals of political life and the individualist conception of humanity that 
goes with it. While there might be room for debate about the rightness or 
wrongness of this position, such debates are not likely to be resolved any time 
soon. In the meantime it is important for people to be reasonable. What this 
means in positive terms is that we should espouse a discursive political culture 
in which comprehensive doctrines - religious or moral doctrines relating to 
what constitutes a good human life - are set aside in favour of a pragmatic 
consensus about basic human rights, justice as fairness, and a minimal set of 
principles that should guide a political community in conditions of value plur-
alism. Even peoples who base their lives on a set of comprehensive doctrines 
can, if they are reasonable, suspend these commitments in relation to other 
peoples in order to adhere to an overlapping global consensus on basic and 
minimal political values. As Catriona McKinnon puts it: 
The thought at the heart of this approach is that features of the political 
context give reasonable persons justifying reasons to tolerate other rea-
sonable persons to whom they are opposed: insofar as we are required to 
find principles to govern our shared political problems, to that extent we 
are also required to practice toleration. (2006: 68; see also Walzer 1997) 
Just as a modern pluralistic and multicultural domestic society might have to 
tolerate practices that it disapproves of within its constituent communities, so 
the global community might have to tolerate peoples whose political arrange-
ments fall short of the liberal ideal. Just as a modern society needs to tolerate 
unusual but harmless sexual practices, for example, in order not to destroy the 
cohesion of the political community, so the global community needs to tolerate 
theocratic or patriarchal societies provided they do not harm their neighbours 
or destabilize world peace. 
However, a cosmopolitan like Nussbaum argues against Rawls's use of the 
analogy with domestic societies in which there are different traditions of which 
political discourse should be tolerant. As she puts it: 
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In the domestic case, Rawls's principle of toleration is a person-centred 
principle: it involves respecting persons and their conceptions of the good. 
In the transnational case, although Rawls depicts himself as applying the 
same principle, the principle is fundamentally different: it respects groups 
rather than persons, and shows deficient respect for persons, allowing 
their entitlements to be dictated by the dominant group in their vicinity, 
whether they like that group or not. (2006: 253) 
The point that Nussbaum is making is that there are societies, for example, il 
which the clergy dictate and administer the law on the basis of theological trad 
ition and where there is no opportunity for individuals who object to such law: 
to register their dissent without danger to themselves. While outside observ-
ers such as Rawls might want to acknowledge a right for that society to set th( 
norms of behaviour to be followed within it, to do so would ignore the plight 0 
any individuals within those societies who disagreed with those norms on rea· 
sonable grounds. The standard liberal position in such cases is that any dissiden1 
has the right to have their voice heard without danger to themselves and has thf 
right to leave the society if their position becomes untenable. There are man} 
autocratic and theocratic societies in which these conditions do not obtain. 
Nussbaum is especially concerned for women whose social and economic 
opportunities are systemically denied in many societies in which patriarchal 
conditions are sanctioned by tradition. Her point is that Rawls's tolerance is for 
the social and political conditions of a society as a whole, and for its traditions 
and norms, without giving due consideration to the plight of those individuals 
whose rights are denied by those conditions. 
Other commentators have also noticed that claims in defence of a given 
non-liberal political institution, whether it be theocratic, Confucian or based 
on any other ancient tradition, are often made by the leaders of the relevant 
community rather than by the members who live under their rule. But such 
leaders have an interest in retaining their own power. Accordingly, we cannot 
be confident that they can genuinely represent the interests of all their con-
stituents. As Kok-Chor Tan puts it, "We cannot with confidence accept that 
a set of 'values' in force in a society are truly assented to cultural values when 
there is no avenue for persons to voice their assent to or dissent from these 
values" (2000: 143). If there are no political institutions that allow for dissent, 
or if individuals who espouse different values are silenced and prevented from 
leaving the relevant community, we cannot be assured that there is a genuine 
consensus around the dominant values of that community. 
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Toleration 
These critics of Rawls insist that there should be no toleration of non-liberal 
societies. Such societies should not be accepted as members of good standing 
in the global community. Accordingly, the question we now need to address 
is whether, in order to create a world community, it is reasonable to insist on 
liberalism as the content of a global overlapping consensus on basic political 
values or whether we should rest content with a convergence on such min-
imal values as the protection of only basic human rights even in consulta-
tive but autocratic political regimes. While it is clear that cosmopolitans need 
not tolerate outlaw and failed states that clearly violate human rights, should 
they tolerate non-liberal but decent societies? Rawls would say that if cosmo-
politanism is a comprehensive political doctrine that insists that liberal and 
democratic political conditions should obtain in the whole world, then it is 
not reasonable because it is not tolerant of social and political conditions that 
fall short of the ideals of liberalism but which are nevertheless "decent': If lib-
eral peoples insisted that the full range of democratic political rights should 
be available everywhere, then they would have too many reasons to engage in 
humanitarian interventions and would destabilize the world order (Hinsch & 
Stepanians 2006). They would be rightly accused of cultural imperialism and 
of seeking to impose their own vision of the good life on the whole world. 
Although most cosmopolitans would deny that liberal states have the right 
to impose liberal political norms on non-liberal societies by force of arms 
except in such extreme cases as would involve the duty to protect the lives of 
people facing genocide or ethnic cleansing, they would insist that in a sketch 
of an ideal world community no allowance should be made for societies that 
deny their members democratic political rights. This would not imply that 
cosmopolitanism was a vehicle for global hegemony on the part of Western 
liberal states because, while espousing liberal ideals, cosmopolitans do not 
condone imposing them by force. There is a distinction to be drawn between 
making an evaluative judgement about another society and deciding to act on 
that judgement. Not imposing liberal political conditions may be a realistic 
compromise that has to be made for the sake of world peace, but cosmopoli-
tans do not have to accept as ideal a situation in which ordinary members of a 
society have no right to democratic participation in the decision-making that 
affects them. 
Tan has explored what toleration means in this context by seeing toleration 
as an institutional virtue. While individual cosmopolitans can adopt intolerant 
attitudes and disapprove of illiberal practices around the world, institutions 
should act in accordance with international law, and do so without forming 
any specific attitude. In this wayan individual who disapproves of political 
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arrangements in non-liberal societies can still be tolerant in the required sense 
by supporting international institutions that accept such societies for the sake 
of preserving international stability. As Tan puts it, "We might say that the 
virtue of toleration is expressed when individuals endorse and support insti-
tutional arrangements that protect reasonable ways of life or practices or atti-
tudes that they also find objectionable according to their particular idea of the 
good" (2006: 82). The preservation of a global community might require insti-
tutional tolerance even of practices that offend against one's convictions. In 
this way, Rawls might be understood to be attributing toleration to the inter-
national order and its institutions rather than to the outlook of individuals or 
their representatives in the original position. If the parties to the second-order 
original position are representatives of peoples, they should be taking an insti-
tutional view rather than a personal one. We might call this "political tolera-
tion': Political toleration is a pragmatic and reasonable acceptance of decent 
but non-liberal peoples into the world community. It is toleration exercised 
by peoples towards other peoples. The demands of political toleration fall 
on individuals only in their official capacities when acting on behalf of their 
peoples. In their private capacity, such officials, like individuals anywhere, can 
adopt disapproving attitudes and advocate change in accordance with liberal 
ideals. Within the context of a global institutional framework of toleration, 
private individuals could still criticize the practices of others and advocate 
change by persuasion, education and even non-violent pressure. 
It might be possible to map the distinction between political toleration and 
personal toleration onto the distinction between a framework of justice and 
the ethics of caring. Rawls and Pogge had suggested that justice was a norm 
for institutions while Appiah had seen it as a political norm for the distribu-
tion of social goods rather than a demand made on the personal relationships 
we have with others. In contrast, caring for others isa virtuous motivation for 
individuals. Accordingly, we might suggest that caring could motivate us to 
disapprove of illiberal practices in other societies and to work for their aboli-
tion by non-coercive means, while we also acknowledge the institutional or 
political need to avoid imposing the will of one people on to another even in 
the name of liberal values. In this way the political sphere of justice might call 
for political toleration while the personal sphere of caring urges us not to adopt 
tolerant attitudes to departures from the norms encapsulated in the UDHR. 
If Rawls's critics are right to suggest that his thinking is "statist" rather than 
cosmopolitan, it will come as no surprise that he sees tolerance as a normative 
requirement placed on institutional arrangements between peoples rather than 
as a personal stance. 
But I have argued that cosmopolitanism is a normative stance not only for 
governments and their policies but also for individuals and their attitudes. 
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Accordingly, I shall now argue that, at both levels, cosmopolitans should advo-
cate and pursue a full range of human rights for alL 
Is political toleration consistent with justice? Does it involve too great a 
compromise of cosmopolitan values? Is it merely a second-best modus viv-
endi for the sake of avoiding conflict? Like Nussbaum, Tan recognizes that "the 
problem of tolerating decent peoples is that it lets down dissenting individual 
members in these nonliberal societies" (2006: 85). Should the fate of dissenters 
be ignored for the sake of global peace? As an example, should liberal states 
turn a blind eye to political repression in other countries in order to secure 
favourable trading relationships with those countries? The cosmopolitan focus 
on the rights of individuals would imply that no such compromise is accept-
able. Cosmopolitans give as much weight to political and democratic rights as 
they do to subsistence and economic rights. When it is alleged that economic 
development can take place only if political freedoms are curtailed, it might be 
argued that we should be tolerant of political repression. However, it is at this 
point that we should remind ourselves of the connection that Amartya Sen 
makes between development and freedom. The point of economic develop-
ment is to enhance freedom. To trade freedom for subsistence is to embrace 
slavery. There are vanishingly few instances in which the benefits of economic 
development have flown to non-unionized workers in sweatshops, for exam-
ple, rather than to the ruling elites in the poor countries in which their factories 
are located (Drydyk 1997). Political rights are needed in order to ensure that 
economic rights are honoured. 
Tan has discussed these matters at greater length in a book that seeks to 
resolve a dispute between Rawls's conception of political liberalism and what 
Tan calls "comprehensive liberalism': For Tan, the central and comprehen-
sive doctrine that all liberals should embrace is that human beings should 
enjoy "autonomy'; understood as the capacity of all individuals to define for 
themselves what the good life is, and to pursue this conception in a manner 
that can ensure peaceful coexistence with others. Comprehensive liberal-
ism stresses the rights of individuals harmlessly to pursue such conceptions 
as they see fit. Political liberalism is a more strictly political conception and 
relegates individual conceptions of the good to the private realm. Politics 
should be based on such minimal shared values as would allow social life to 
be free of conflict or repression and should not be founded on a substantive 
conception of the good, such as autonomy, which only some people embrace. 
It acknowledges that there may be societies in which autonomy is not a cen-
tral value. It is only political autonomy that is important to it. It is only depar-
tures from political freedom that it will not tolerate while repressions in the 
private sphere can be tolerated. As Tan puts it, "The political liberal will be 
willing to tolerate nonliberal group ways of life as long as these do not reject 
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liberalism understood strictly as a political ideal" (2000: 6). As Tan goes on to 
explain: 
The crucial difference between comprehensive liberalism and political lib-
eralism is that comprehensive liberalism nonetheless remains fully com-
mitted to supporting individuals who wish to live fully autonomous lives, 
even if this involves questioning and criticizing the customs and traditions 
of their own societies. That is, comprehensive liberalism's commitment 
to individual liberty overrides its toleration for diverse ways of life when 
a way of life conflicts with individual liberal aspirations. 
(Ibid.: 81; see also Mendus 1989) 
Comprehensive liberalism asserts that non-liberal ways of life should not be 
tolerated because they deny to the individuals who participate in those ways 
of life the autonomy to choose their own values. Patriarchal ways of life should 
not be tolerated because they deny to women the right to act autonomously. 
Theocratic ways of life should not be tolerated because they punish apostasy 
with death. The denial of freedom of speech and of political dissent should not 
be tolerated even when there is said to be an ancient cultural tradition to which 
such freedoms are anathema. 
But there are some problems with this position. If liberals support group 
rights in the sense that they would want to protect groups from oppressive 
regimes that would deny them the practices that are precious in their cultures, 
should they also support those groups whose practices involve oppressing their 
own members? Should liberals tolerate ways of life that deny autonomy to their 
adherents even when, by virtue of those traditions, autonomy is not sought 
or valued in those ways of life? Or should autonomy be sought equally for all 
even if that means that traditional practices that are central to a group's identity 
would be threatened? Should cosmopolitans value autonomy to such an extent 
that they would reject Rawls's tolerance of non-liberal but decent societies? 
These questions raise issues that have been debated recently under the 
rubric of "communitarianism" (see Etzioni 1995). This concept suggests that 
any individual person has an identity that arises from the group or groups of 
which he or she is a member (Appiah 2005: ch. 3). In traditional societies, for 
example, a person may live in a farming village and think of themselves as pri-
marily a farmer owing allegiance to the village and its collective farming efforts. 
It would not occur to such a person to consider what career they might adopt 
and what place they might wanf to live in. They will see themselves as belong-
ing to the village and as destined to be a farmer. They will consider that their 
happiness and fulfilment will arise just from how well they fit into village life 
and how much they can contribute to the farming activities of the village. It 
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might also be the case that the woman or man that they marry will have been 
decided for them by their parents or the village elders. It will not occur to them 
that any other way of choosing a spouse could be meaningful or attractive. 
They will not have the Western notion of romantic love as a basis for marriage, 
although they might, as a matter of good luck, experience the joys of affection 
and bonding with their partner. The children will be nurtured within a larger 
group than the Western nuclear family, with aunts, uncles, cousins and other 
village members providing a nurturing function that not only sustains the life 
of the infants but ensures that their outlook is shaped in such a way that the 
values and expectations of the village are internalized and passed on to the next 
generation. The authority of the elders of the village will be accepted without 
dissent, and obedience to that authority, established in any of the many ways 
described above, will be complete. Religion, too, will be assimilated along with 
the shaping of one's worldview within village life. The religious authorities and 
traditions will be passed on and adopted without question. The idea that one 
might investigate the truth-claims of one's faith will be unimaginable and if one 
were ever to be confronted by such an idea it would be felt as an abomination 
and as heresy. Whatever the religious tradition deems anathema, whether it be 
the eating of certain foods or certain sexual preferences and practices, will be 
viewed with abhorrence and vehement action will be taken to eradicate it from 
the community. One's political choices, too, will reflect traditional structures 
of authority or village loyalties. In these and many other ways, a member of a 
traditional community will see their identity as bound up with the lore and cus-
toms of that community. They will find the meaning of their existence in that 
context and will regard any departure from that context, whether in thought 
or in actuality, as a threat to their very identity. 
Communi tar ian thinkers not only applaud this mode of human existence, 
but regret its passing from the way of life of Western societies. They see the 
Western notion of individualism as an "atomistic" conception of human exist-
ence. In this conception, a mature adult individual of normal capacities lives 
their own life. They choose their own career or mode of employment. They 
choose their own marriage partner or, indeed, have their own sexual prefer-
ences. They choose their own friends and other social relationships. While they 
cannot choose their parents or siblings, they can reject them by choosing to live 
elsewhere and by adopting a new set of friends or companions. They are even 
empowered or permitted to reject or accept any religious faith with which their 
spiritual ruminations might bring them into contact. Moreover, they choose 
their own political affiliation in the light of rational self-interest or a chosen 
ideology. In short, an "individualist" person is seen as "unencumbered" by any 
bonds, affiliations or loyalties that might arise from their upbringing or from 
their social context and as possessed of an almost limitless capacity for choice. 
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Many criticize this view because it seems to assume that a mature adult indi-
vidual of normal capacities becomes, at the moment of their maturity, a clean 
slate on which they can themselves write the story of their subsequent lives, 
as if that slate had not already had the products of their upbringing written on 
it. Such products will include not only the family relationships and friendships 
through which they have been brought up, but also the attitudes, political out-
looks and affiliations that arise from religious, ethnic, gendered and national 
loyalties. 
But the individualist position does not depend on denying what every social 
psychologist knows well: that we are not clean slates at any time of our lives. We 
are indeed inducted into social and cultural formations that structure the way 
we live and that both limit and create the possibilities that lie before us as we 
travel on life's road. Rather, the individualist position depends on the thought, 
which I developed in Chapter 2, that we have a capacity for critical reason. We 
have the capacity to stand back from all the attitudes and affiliations into which 
we are formed in order to subject them to rational scrutiny. I might indeed 
be born into a traditional village life, but I can stop and ask myself whether I 
want to continue to live this way or whether I want to move to the city where 
I have heard there are jobs and opportunities denied me in the village. I might 
indeed be brought up in a modern Western society in a deeply religious family 
and I might indeed have observed that religion's rituals devoutly for all of my 
young life; nevertheless, I can entertain the question whether the metaphysical 
beliefs of that religion are true or its rituals meaningful, and I can reject that 
faith if I find it rationally or spiritually wanting. These are capacities that I have 
because I am a rational being, able to bracket my beliefs so as to think critically 
about them. 
A communitarian would say that the community, whether in the form of a 
village or in the form of a state, has the right to insist on obedience and loyalty 
from its citizens because the formation, nurturing and identity of those indi-
viduals come from the state and its traditions.4 Rather than a stress on rights 
as permissions or liberties to do what one likes, the stress is on the duties and 
responsibilities that arise from one's membership of the community. The com-
munity represents a consensus on a set of values that constitutes a shared con-
ception of a good life (Sandel 2005). Accordingly, the first expression of one's 
identity within the community is to conform to its ways and fulfil its require-
ments. The community represents the most overarching and totalizing frame-
work for the formation of the identity and will of its people. On this view, the 
people cannot but remain loyal and obedient to that community and cannot 
but align their own hopes and aspirations with those of the community without 
being misfits and criminals. In the political form of this doctrine, the commu-
nity in question is the state. The state articulates the best selves of the people 
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and gives expression to the general will. It would therefore be a denial of self 
and a form of insanity to repudiate the goals of the state. Dissent is a repudia-
tion of the people's own hopes and can be justifiably repressed. It threatens the 
economic well-being of the people as well as their cultural progress towards 
forms of life marked by freedom and fulfilment. As Rousseau (1968) put it, we 
can be forced to be free. 
The individualist, by contrast, stresses the rationality and autonomy of the 
individual. Every individual, on this view, has the capacity to plan their own life 
and make their own choices. The state exists in order to facilitate and protect 
these capacities by providing economic and cultural opportunities and by pro-
tecting basic freedoms through the rule of law. Given the inherent tendencies 
of states to acquire and abuse their power, individuals have the right to band 
together to engage in political actions to protect their liberties and to protest 
against illiberal policies. The power of reason defends us each individually from 
being totally absorbed into the worldview of our societies and is the basis on 
which our right to political and social independence is based. Autonomy is a 
basic value in this outlook, while the basic value in the communitarian outlook 
is loyalty. An individualist may applaud solidarity, but she will see it as the com-
ing together of autonomous and rational individuals in a common cause rather 
than as a form of absorption of the individual into a collective identity. 
Rather than this debate being seen in black and white terms, however, it is 
better seen as marking the poles on a spectrum of possibilities (Taylor 1989; 
see also Appiah 2005: ch. 2). Rather than claiming that there exist two kinds of 
human being in this world - an unencumbered autonomous social atom who is 
the subject ofthe Western, capitalist and individualist lifestyle, and an embed-
ded member of a community whose identity and worldview depend entirely 
on her social relationships - we might suppose that there is a wide variety of 
forms of human life, which may be arranged on a spectrum of variations. At 
,me end of this spectrum will be the individualist and on the other end of it will 
be the communitarian. But the figure that appears at either end of this range 
IS an "ideal type": a theoretical construct that presents certain possibilities of 
;ocial existence in their most extreme form. The radical individualist epito-
nizes features of the individualist way of life in an extreme form. It is hardly 
)ossible for any real person to live in a fully autonomous manner as if there 
Nere no social affiliations to which she had to be loyal and as if there were no 
;ocial or family relationships through which she attained her independence. 
\s Habermas puts it: -
From the standpoint of the theory of intersubjectivity, autonomy does 
not signify the discretionary power of a subject who disposes of himself 
as his own property but the independence of a person made possible by 
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relations of reciprocal recognition that can exist only in conjunction with 
the correlative independence of the other. (1993: 43) 
As well, the notion of a totally communitarian person could only be exemplified 
by an individual who had no thoughts expressed with the first-person pronoun, 
''1': Such a person would see himself only as a member of a family or community 
and have no ideas or plans that he could claim as uniquely his own. Neither of 
these extremes is a realizable or desirable form of human existence. 
It would seem, therefore, that actual people should be described as stand-
ing somewhere along the range of possibilities between these two extremes. 
Everyone enjoys some of the features of individualism and also some of the 
features of communitarianism. Some people live lives in which choice and self-
sufficiency are more marked and for whom social links and responsibilities 
are felt as less important. Other people live lives in which conformity to social 
norms and traditional ways is a more prominent feature but in which they are 
not prevented from making up their own minds on a variety of issues. Societies 
in their turn can be described in terms of the kinds of social existence they 
foster. Some societies will be more individualistic and provide incentives for 
creativity and entrepreneurship motivated by self-interest, while othersocie-
ties will be more communitarian and will reward people for their contribu-
tion to the common goals and projects of that society. So long as societies and 
their peoples differ in these ways, we can expect disagreement and contestation 
about their goals and aspirations and about the rights that they consider to be 
important. 
Tan, in privileging autonomy, is adopting the more individualist position 
typical of liberalism, while Rawls is more tolerant of political forms of com-
munitarianism. For Tan, autonomy is a substantive value espoused by com-
prehensive liberalism, while Rawls's political liberalism implies tolerance of 
non-liberal forms of life. Political liberalism avoids reliance on any substantive 
conception of the good such as might be taught by religion, tradition or even 
secular modernity. It sees the ideal of autonomy as a substantive conception 
and will therefore be more tolerant of departures from that ideal. Peoples that 
have political structures that are merely consultative rather than fully demo-
cratic - that look after their members but do not give them political rights 
- will be acceptable from that perspective. The only social actions or institu-
tions that political liberalism will not be tolerant of are actions or institutions 
that deny a limited set of human rights centred on the rights to life, property 
and economic participation. Comprehensive liberalism, in contrast, includes 
autonomy in all aspects of life as its grounding ideal. Accordingly, it is less tol-
erant of non-liberal practices in the allegedly private sphere. Such liberals will 
insist that, within a given state, all citizens should be able to exercise autonomy 
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no matter what identity-forming group they belong to, and that, in the inter-
national sphere, the full range of human rights, including those that guarantee 
political freedoms, should be protected in all nation-states. 
With which of these two positions should cosmopolitanism align itself? It 
would seem that Tan's position, with its stress on autonomy, is too far towards 
the individualist end of the spectrum I have described, while Rawls is too 
accepting of the communitarian norms that typify the other end of the spec-
trum. Cosmopolitans should endorse a form of liberalism that might not go as 
far as that comprehensive form that values individualist conceptions of auton-
omy, but one that is more substantive than a purely political form that will tol-
erate denials of political rights for the sake of cultural coherence, international 
stability or economic advantage. The key to this form of liberalism will be the 
espousal of free and uncoerced public discourse (Habermas 1973).5 If the com-
munitarian way of life of a people contained non-liberal values that everyone 
in that community was willing to live by, then those values should be able to be 
discussed, critiqued and endorsed publicly. It will not be for anyone outside the 
community to critique or endorse them, but it must be possible for observers 
to certify that everyone in the community is free to engage in such discourse. If 
it is open to anyone in the community to discuss the values and norms of that 
community without fear of repression, then outsiders can be tolerant of those 
values and norms no matter how illiberal they may seem to those outsiders. 
In this way, outsiders may acknowledge that the way of life of that community 
does not encourage autonomy, but still tolerate that way of life for the fact that 
it permits internal critique. The only basis for intolerance will be the presence 
in that community of structures or forces that prevent open discussion of that 
community's way of life in both the public and private spheres. Once again, it 
is Kant with his insistence on the openness of public discourse who has antici-
pated this idea. 
Lest the insistence that no departure from such a cosmopolitan form of 
liberalism should be tolerated sounds too hegemonic or imperialistic, Tan 
reminds us that there are many means short of force to try to influence for-
eign regimes towards liberalizing their states. One could propagate liberal ideas 
through international conferences, diplomatic meetings, propaganda, the work 
of NGOs, or granting favoured trading partner status to states that improve 
their record on human rights. Many liberals argue that the spread ofliberalism 
is an inevitable historical process that accompanies education, secularization 
and cultural enlightenment. The recent growth in power and importance of 
autocratic regimes in Russia and China, however, make this confidence seem 
somewhat utopian. Freedom remains the object of struggle and cosmopolitans 
should exercise solidarity with that struggle. It should also be remembered 
that there is no necessary connection between liberal political rights and the 
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actual democratic institutions that exist in the world. Many of the worHs lead-
ing democracies fall far short of the liberal ideal through corruptions and dis-
tortions of their political institutions. Cosmopolitans need not champion the 
political systems of any specific nation-state in order to champion democratic 
political rights. To champion such systems might be imperialistic but to cham-
pion such rights is legitimate advocacy. 
The cosmopolitan form of liberalism I am advocating will not be tolerant of 
illiberal political arrangements for the sake of global stability. Even Rawls does 
not take stability to be the sole goal of political liberalism. There are political 
values other than stability. It is not only because they lead to stability that jus-
tice and human rights are valuable. If the world is to be seen as a community 
it must converge on more values than stability. If there is to be genuine peace 
there must be agreement on a range of fundamental values. This is not merely 
something that cosmopolitans hope for. Global justice and respect for human 
rights, including political rights, have been agreed to, through the UN, as the 
basis on which a global community exists. While there are frequent and egre-
gious departures from this ideal, the UDHR continues to be the agreed basis 
for a world community. There is no need for anyone to resile from it in order 
to make compromises with states that refuse to live up to that ideal. It would 
make no sense for cosmopolitans to speak of moral rights, moral obligations 
or the moral status of individuals unless there were a community that accepted 
these moral concepts and realized them in its way of life. Through the UN, the 
world has become such a community. 
Global democracy 
Some cosmopolitans insist that liberal and democratic political values should be 
institutionalized not only within all nation-states but also in whatever forms of 
governance the global community creates for itself internationally. Even global 
institutions would only be legitimate if they were democratic. In the face of the 
downgrading of the importance of the sovereignty and autonomy of nation-
states, such theorists advocate forms of global democracy in which international 
bodies such as the UN would be forums made up not only of nation-states, but 
also of individual world citizens or their representatives. As Daniele Archibugi 
puts it: 
What distinguishes cosmopolitical democracy from other such projects 
is its attempt to create institutions which enable the voice of individu-
als to be heard in global affairs irrespective of their resonance at home. 
Democracy as a form of global governance thus needs to be realized on 
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three different, interconnected levels: within states, between states and at 
a world level. (2003: 8)6 
The second level he refers to is the UN and other international bodies. However, 
members of these bodies are spokespersons and ambassadors for the sovereign 
states they represent and are constrained by the policies of those states. As a 
result, these forums become highly constricted and provide opportunities for 
states to pursue their national interests through verbal posturing and bluster. 
Admittedly this is an improvement on their doing so by force of arms, but it 
hardly allows for a genuine exchange of views and the growth of mutual under-
standing. Especially in the Security Council, where the major powers hold the 
right to veto any proposal with which they disagree, the chances of genuine 
dialogue are very slim. However, through many of its other bodies, through 
international conferences and by recognizing the right to participate ofNGOs, 
representatives of peoples and of religions, gender advocates and other non-
state actors, the UN has created international forums through which not only 
states, but also global citizens, can make their voices heard. This creates what 
James Bohman (1997) has called a "cosmopolitan public sphere': 
Unlike international civic society, in which membership is still based on 
having the status of a nation, this would be a public sphere in which cosmo-
politan ideas such as that of human rights are used to hold governments to 
account. Such a public sphere would influence states and political institutions 
through democratic processes at national levels but also through international 
public opinion. In the face of difficulties arising from the private ownership of 
most of the media of communication, the new public sphere makes increasing 
use of the internet and stages dramatic events that the media cannot ignore. 
All this gives the public sphere an effective role within political institutions 
and not just the marginal role that those within mainstream political national 
institutions would prefer to see. Just as the public sphere is an important quasi-
institution in national polities, so it needs to become one in the cosmopolitan 
sphere. Such a cosmopolitan public sphere must be relatively free from main-
stream institutions in order to maintain its power to innovate and to critique 
the existing order (Held 1992). There must always be ways to renew the agenda 
of existing institutions, including the UN, the World Bank, the IMF and all of 
the many international bodies that regulate so much of the world's affairs from 
outside those institutions. 
The third level that Archibugi refers to suggests that individuals should be 
able to participate in international bodies directly rather than as representa-
tives of their peoples or states. A practical form of this idea might be to sug-
gest that political parties should become international in their membership 
and operation. The model for such forms of global democracy might be the 
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European parliament, to which representatives are directly elected by the peo-
ple of Europe rather than being delegates sent by governments. The existence 
of the EU with its parliament, which can override national parliaments on 
some matters, is taken to be a demonstration that such global institutions are 
viable. 
The principle at issue in this proposal is the fundamental democratic idea 
that all those who are affected by a decision - especially if the effect is a poten-
tial harm - should have a say in the making of that decision. Given the global 
reach of the economy and of the political institutions of powerful nations, all 
members of the world community should playa democratic role in world gov-
ernance. Representatives of nations pursue only the interests of those nations. 
Moreover, the representatives sent by governments to world bodies will not 
be truly democratic representatives of their peoples if those governments are 
themselves not democratic. Given the number of despotic governments in the 
world, a global body to which governments send delegates will be a clique of 
ruling elites acting without any democratic checks and balances on their capac-
ity to order world affairs so as to secure their own benefit. Accordingly, many 
cosmopolitans argue for a form of global democracy that can bypass the system 
of nation-states. This echoes Kant's insistence that, for the sake of world peace, 
there should be a public space in which there is free and uncoerced discourse 
through which anyone is able to participate in debates on public policy and 
global justice. 
Tolerance and pluralism 
If cosmopolitans reject Rawls's form of political toleration in the context of the 
global community of peoples, they do not reject religious and cultural toler-
ance and an acceptance of a global pluralism of values. Aside from the political 
institutions through which people are ruled in various parts of the world, there 
is also a great variety of cultural practices and beliefs that cosmopolitans who 
stand in the tradition of the Western Enlightenment might call into question. 
Religious beliefs around the world are based on metaphysical beliefs and con-
ceptions of the self that are not universally shared. By themselves, many of these 
are harmless enough and need not attract the attention of those concerned for 
human rights and global justice. People should be allowed to hold what beliefs 
they like. However, it is when those beliefs lead to practices that deny human 
rights or threaten justice that questions might be asked. 
Christianity used to condone burning heretics at the stake and drowning 
witches, and we consider it to be an example of moral progress that we no 
longer do so. Today we would not tolerate such practices and feel ourselves 
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justified in this intolerance. When we look around the world, however, we see 
many cases of injustice and the violation of human rights that seem to be con-
doned or even encouraged by deeply held beliefs. We see religious violence, 
such as mobs tearing down mosques and temples and attacking each other 
in the street. We see religiously inspired laws that condemn female adulterers 
to death while male adulterers go free. We see women forced to cover them-
selves head to foot. We see female genital mutilation, the burning of widows 
and an inflexible caste system based on ancient beliefs about reincarnation. In 
many societies, homosexuality is punishable by death, witchcraft is practised, 
children enslaved and animals systematically mistreated. Does the respect that 
cosmopolitans are urged to show for cultures other than their own require 
that such practices should be tolerated? Is cultural tolerance a cosmopolitan 
virtue? 
Summarizing McKinnon (2006), we can describe the key structural features 
of the virtue of tolerance as involving: 
(i) Difference: what is tolerated differs from the tolerator's conception of what 
should be done, valued, or believed. 
(ii) Importance: what is tolerated by the tolerator is not trivial to her. 
(iii) Opposition: the tolerator disapproves of and/ or dislikes what she tolerates. 
(iv) Power: the tolerator believes herself to have the power to alter or suppress 
what is tolerated. 
(v) Non-rejection: the tolerator does not exercise this power. 
(vi) Requirement: toleration is right or expedient, and the tolerator is virtuous, 
just, or prudent. 
It might be suggested at the outset that (iv) does not apply to most cosmopoli-
tans in the global context. While there might be domestic situations in which 
one person or a group of people has the power to prevent others from doing 
what they disapprove of, this does not normally apply in the global context. 
Certainly no individual - not even so eminent a moral leader as the Pope or 
the Dalai Lama - has the power to prevent others from doing what they deem 
immoral in other parts of the world. But even powerful states are limited in 
this power. There have been cases where a powerful state has placed condi-
tions on medical aid that it was not to be used in the procurement of abortions, 
for example (USAID n.d.), but even if such states have the military capacity 
to impose their moral prejudices on other states or communities, the price of 
doing so measured in diplomatic, military or economic terms will be so great 
that the pragmatic stance advocated by Rawls and others should hold sway. 
One would have to be a superpower of grand proportions to be able to impose 
one's own moral predilections on the world. The history of the humanitarian 
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interventions that have been endorsed by the international community through 
the UN shows how vulnerable even superpowers are in this context. So, even 
if there were individuals or states that believed themselves to have the power 
to suppress the perceived immoralities of others, it would seem that the actual 
power to prevent those practices of which one morally disapproves is largely 
lacking in the international arena. Accordingly, the question of whether toler-
ance is a cosmopolitan virtue is relatively moot. If (iv) does not obtain, then the 
conditions for the exercise of tolerance are not present. 
There is still, however, an issue for cosmopolitanism. I have said that cosmo-
politanism is a virtuous attitude. Let us focus then on the attitudes that both 
private individuals and public officials should adopt. Is tolerance a virtuous atti-
tude (Engelen & Nys 2008)? Suppose an anti-Muslim bigot who had the power 
to deny a job to a Muslim applicant declined to do so; would we describe that 
person as displaying the virtue of tolerance? On McKinnon's account we would 
have to say that he was. He was opposed to a difference he saw in the other, 
took it to be important, had the power to act, but refrained from doing so. But 
this judgement will depend on our attitude to bigotry. Why was the difference 
important to him? For my part, I see no justification for the anti-Muslim atti-
tude. Accordingly, I would not regard as virtuous a person who had such an 
attitude even if that person declined to act on it. Such a person is prejudiced 
even if his view is based on a rejection, for example, of the stoning of women 
adulterers. To have such an attitude is already a failure of virtue. What this argu-
ment shows is that (iii) is problematic. By what right do we disapprove of the 
moral practices or cultural beliefs of others? A truly tolerant or cosmopolitan 
person would show genuine respect for other cultures and not have any feelings 
of moral disapproval for their practices, no matter how different those practices 
were from the norms that that person adheres to (Appiah 2006: chs 4, 5). 
The reason that this may seem difficult is that it involves morality. If your 
disapproval of the actions of others or the practices of other peoples is based 
on moral convictions, it is likely to be absolute, dismissive, condemnatory, self-
righteous and vehement. It is likely to be moralistic (Coady 2006). It will usually 
involve no attempt to understand sympathetically the practice in terms of its 
cultural context and in terms of the understanding that its participants have 
of it. Indeed, McKinnon argues that there is a kind of existential contradiction 
between (iii) and (v). If you disapprove of something morally, why would it be 
virtuous to not act on that disapproval? Surely your moral feeling that a prac-
tice is morally wrong should lead you to oppose it to whatever limits of power 
you might have. That is what it means to disapprove of it morally. One cannot 
consistently disapprove of some practice morally and yet not be inclined to 
oppose it. But this is the impetus towards both moralism and fundamentalism. 
Fundamentalists take an absolute view of moral and religious matters and find 
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it impossible to accept practices and beliefs that are different from their own. 
They are often militant in their opposition and enraged by what they see as the 
immorality or infidelity of those whose practices and beliefs are different from 
their own. This is a form of fanaticism. It condemns what it disapproves of out 
of moralistic indignation rather than out of compassion for the victims of the 
condemned practices. Our ability to understand others and enter sympathetic-
ally into their lives depends on our being able to imagine ourselves in their 
situation. It does not depend on there being one standard to which all must 
subscribe. 
In this context it might be suggested that tolerance consists in the nega-
tion of (iii). That is, it consists in adopting an attitude of not condemning what 
others do on moral or religious grounds. There are a number of ways in which 
one might do this. One is to adopt an attitude of irony towards one's own con-
victions, much as I advocated an attitude of irony towards nationalism? If one 
considers that one's own views are not so absolute and may be incorrect, or at 
least seen as strange by others, one will not be so inclined to insist on them or 
disapprove of those who think differently. Of course this may be difficult. It is in 
the very nature of moral views that we hold them with a high degree of convic-
tion and commitment. They seem to us to be self-evident and unquestionable. 
Perhaps a better strategy therefore would be to seek to understand the moral 
and religiOUS practices of others as sympathetically as we can. 
What is striking about many of these practices and what is often most sur-
prising to outside observers is that the apparent victims of these practices often 
approve of them. The burnt widow wanted to be burnt. The "victim" of genital 
mutilation considers that she would have been "unclean" if it were not done. 
The Muslim woman who wears the burqa sees herself as modest and socially 
acceptable. What needs to be understood is that none of these practices - any 
more than our own - are options laid out before a person as if they were goods 
in a cultural supermarket. As I noted earlier, many individualist philosophers 
seem to think that religious beliefs and moral convictions are a matter of choice. 
They are not. Even in liberal societies that valorize choice and autonomy, they 
are not. They are structures of identity. This is the point that communitarian-
ism highlights and that Tan's stress on autonomy obscures. It is through your 
cultural practices that you define who you are. If you are a Muslim you will not 
eat pork and if you are a Muslim woman you will dress modestly. This is not 
a matter of choice. Nor is it merely a matter of conditioning or indoctrination 
through one's upbringing, although that is surely involved. It is a matter of 
identity (Appiah 2005). It is a matter of how you understand yourself and your 
place in the world. A Muslim would no more eat pork than you or I would eat 
a rat. Both foods are quite nutritional, but to eat them is, for the relevant com-
munities, unthinkable. 
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Recognizing this should give us pause. If the participants in these practices 
can accept them, then perhaps there are ideas and beliefs involved that render 
them acceptable to those who participate in them even if they do not seem 
acceptable to me. This thought alone should serve to reduce the vehemence 
with which I am inclined to reject those practices. Studying the religious tradi-
tions and the histories of the moral practices of those peoples may also help.s 
However, it remains the case that it is difficultto sympathetically understand 
and adopt an attitude of approval towards many of the practices of which I have 
given examples. Value pluralism is endemic in the human condition. We must 
not expect that the whole world will converge on a single set of religious and 
moral beliefs. As Appiah puts it, "Cosmopolitans suppose that all cultures have 
enough overlap in their vocabulary of values to begin a conversation. But they 
don't suppose, like some universalists, that we could all come to agreement if 
only we had the same vocabulary" (2006: 57). The beliefs and practices of others 
may be seen as reasonable by those others no matter how strange or objection-
able they may seem to us. We must not be intolerant of difference, no matter 
how secure we feel in the correctness or self-evidence of our own views. 
A further step in taking moralism out of our attitude to foreign practices 
would be to think of them in terms of the real and demonstrable harm they 
might cause. If a practice results in physical injury or death - such as widow 
burning or many forms of female genital mutilation - then it can be con-
demned in terms that do not rely on moral concepts. Physical injury and death 
are harms that everyone wants to avoid, unless they see the latter as martyrdom 
or justified self-sacrifice. If we return to the kind of common-sense, reasonable 
and practical thinking that was exemplified by Nussbaum's Jist of capabilities, 
we can say that any practice that reduces those capabilities causes harm that 
should be avoided. We could even say that everyone has a right to not have 
those harms done to them and that societies have a duty to ensure that such 
harms do not occur within them. Indeed many individuals in the communities 
that engage in the kinds of practices we are considering have made this point 
and are opposing those practices from within those traditions. By identifying a 
practice as harmful within a common-sense or reasonable conception of what 
constitutes harm, we can oppose it without thereby seeking to impose our own 
moral convictions. We would be appealing to reasonableness rather than to our 
own moral commitments. 
The least moralistic and most respectful way to express one's disapproval 
of harmful but culturally condoned practices, aside from trying to understand 
them and to respect them, is to encourage and protect the political space 
within the relevant communities that would be needed for members of those 
communities to voice their opposition to those practices themselves. This is 
why cosmopolitans need a stronger stance on political rights than is provided 
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by Rawls's political liberalism. The liberalism that underpins the cosmopolitan 
attitude seeks to encourage those political conditions - freedom of speech and 
right of exit - that ensure that cultural practices and norms are not oppres-
sively imposed on those who participate in them. 
Conclusion 
The concept of global community gives us a theoretical basis for combining the 
cosmopolitan themes of human rights, global justice, the pursuit oflasting peace 
and the embrace of values pluralism. The principle of humanity addresses each 
of us individually and asks of us that we respond to the misfortunes of others 
by rendering assistance. This principle, if accepted universally, would begin to 
constitute our globalized world as a community. But within a communitarian 
outlook a community would be seen as a body of people committed to reci-
procity rather than just assistance for the needy. If one lives in a community, as 
opposed to a collection of individualists, one is obligated to help others in times 
of trouble and one is entitled to expect that one will be assisted in such times. 
The difference between suffering bad luck and suffering an injustice where the 
harm is the same in both cases is that, in the case of bad luck, no one could have 
prevented what happened. An injustice occurs when someone is able to prevent 
the harm or ameliorate its effects, has an obligation to do so but does not do 
so. It is only in a community that injustices can occur because a community is 
a system of mutual obligations. If a person is not part of any community, then 
no injustice can be done to them since no one has any obligations to them. The 
harms that befall them are therefore cases of bad luck. They are no less harmful 
for that and they frustrate the desires of the victim just as greatly, but the victim 
has no grounds for feeling aggrieved. Victims of misfortune have grounds for 
feeling aggrieved only if there were others who had an obligation to prevent or 
ameliorate the misfortune (Ci 2006). Only in a context of community would the 
victim have a right and a reason for complaint. It is when we recognize others 
- no matter where they live and no matter what their nationality, religion, race, 
caste or ethnicity - as fellow members in a global community that we shall see 
that we have an obligation in solidarity to stand by them in the pursuit of justice, 
and to defend their human rights. Even the greatest cultural differences between 
us do not expunge that obligation. 
The nations of the world declared themselves to be such a global community 
and committed themselves to the cosmopolitan vision through the charter of 
the United Nations and the UDHR. All that remains now is for us to live up to 
that declaration. 
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Moral Selves: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). 
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Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (New York: Free Press, 1993) and Kristen Renwick Monroe, 
The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996). 
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16. For wide-ranging discussions of the demands of justice, see James P. Sterba (ed.),justice: 
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ity from the notion of responsibility based on social connection. In the liability model 
we look for the person who is to blame or who should be held accountable. But there 
may not be any individual or group who is responsible. The problem might be institu-
tional or collective. "The social connection model of responsibility says that all agents 
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(accessed April 2009). 
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Citizens: The Case for Open Borders'; Review of Politics 49(2) (Spring 1987), 251-73, 
and by Robert E. Goodin, "If People Were Money .. :; in Free Movement: Ethics Issues in 
the Transnational Migration of People and of Money, B. Barry & R. E. Goodin (eds), 6-22 
(University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1992). 
21. For further references to this debate, see Jiirgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National 
Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe'; Praxis International 12(1) (April 1992), 
1-19; David A. Hollinger, "Not Universalists, Not Pluralists: The New Cosmopolitans 
Find Their Own Way'; in Vertovec & Cohen (eds), Conceiving Cosmopolitanism, 227-39; 
Desmond Manderson, "The Care of Strangers'; Res Publica 10(2) (2001), 1-4; Julian 
Burnside, "Ethics and the Outsider'; Res Publica 12(2) (2003), 1-6; Emma Larking, 
"Please Consider'; Res Publica 12(2) (2003),7-12. Seyla Benhabib has written exten-
sively on this topic. Her The Rights of Others argues for what she calls "porous boundaries" 
between states, while in Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) she questions the rights of states to define who will be citizens of that state when 
such decisions affect non-citizens and aliens. Given that they are affected, the principle 
of democracy would suggest they should be involved in the decision. 
22. The UN's Millennium Development Goals can be found at www.un.org/millennium-
goals/ (accessed April 2009). 
4. Lasting peace 
1. Although this theory is often repeated, not everyone agrees with it. For example, Hilary 
Putnam suggests that only powerful democracies do not attack each other. The Vietnam 
War was a war against a government that had popular support and it was fought in 
defence of democracy. Moreover the USA unseated democratic governments in Chile 
and Costa Rica. British, French and Israeli attacks on Nasser's Egypt during the Suez 
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crisis were also attacks on a democracy. See Hilary Putnam, "Must We Choose between 
Patriotism and Universal Reason?'; in Nussbaum (ed.), For Love of Country?, 91-7. 
Michael W. Doyle defends the thesis that democracies do not go to war with each other 
in his Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: Norton, 
1997). 
2. To highlight the link between Kant's arguments and democracy, David Held argues that 
"Universal hospitality is not achieved if, for economic, cultural, or other reasons, the 
quality of the lives of others is shaped and determined in near or far-off lands without 
their participation, agreement, or consent" ("Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global 
Order: A New Agenda'; in James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann reds], Perpetual 
Peace, 235-51, esp. 244). 
3. Parekh, in "Cosmopolitanism and Global Citizenship'; challenges the centrality of the 
notion of sovereignty. International interdependence and the existence of international 
treaties all limit state sovereignty. No state can quarantine itself from the wider world. 
Moreover, according to Benhabib, "The exercise of state sovereignty even within domes-
tic borders is increasingly subject to internationally recognised norms that prohibit 
genocide, ethnocide, mass expulsions, enslavement, rape, and forced labor" (Another 
Cosmopolitanism, 29). 
4. Another argument for the necessity of states in a cosmopolitan world is given in Steven 
Slaughter, "Reconsidering the State: Cosmopolitanism, Republicanism and Global 
Governance'; paper presented at "Questioning Cosmopolitanism'; the Second Biennial 
Conference of the International Global Ethics Association, Melbourne, 26-8 June 
2008. 
5. Like dragons the causes of war sometimes sleep and sometimes wake but they will not 
go away unless men can change or modify their institutions and at the same time over-
come - somehow! - the natural propensity to aggression lurking inside their heads. 
(Jenny Teichman, The Philosophy of War and Peace 
[Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2006], 16). 
6. For a good introduction to the pacifist tradition see Mark Kurlansky, Nonviolence: 
Twenty-five Lessons from the History of a Dangerous Idea (New York: Modern Library, 
2006). 
7. As Bryan Turner puts it, "If human beings are to have the capacity to articulate their 
needs and interests, then cultural rights to language, religion, and identity are funda-
mental to the generic right to enjoy rights" (Vulnerability and Human Rights [University 
Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2006], 45). 
8. For a striking example of the damage caused by forced assimilation see Jonathan Lear, 
Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008). 
9. See also Avashai Margalit & Joseph Raz, "National Self-Determination'; Journal of 
Philosophy 87(9) (1990), 439-61; Peter Jones, "Group Rights and Group Oppression'; 
Journal of Political Philosophy 7(4) (1999), 353-77. 
10. This charge is also made in Daniele Archibugi, "Cosmo political Democracy'; in Strauss 
et al. (eds), Debating Cosmopolitics, 1-25. 
5. Towards a global community 
1. Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: Allen Lane, 2006) 
argues that identity is not a single all-embracing classification through which social actors 
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can be understood or through which they should be encouraged to see themselves. Our 
identities are multiple. I might be a Catholic, an Australian, of European descent, male 
and a Greens party voter. None of these "identities" implies any of the others and each 
interacts in complex ways with the others to express themselves in my behaviour. To sup-
pose that I am predestined or morally obligated by any of them to act in a certain way is 
to ignore the all-important role of choice in my life. A truly multicultural society is not 
a collection of mono cultures living in social federation, but a society of equal citizens 
who have, alongside their common citizenship, a variety of other group identifications 
and cultural practices. 
2. Henry Shue has argued that "It is obvious nonsense to describe the international arena, 
as some self-styled 'realists' do, as an 'anarchy; and mean thereby a complete free-for-all 
in which outcomes are determined entirely by the distribution of power, while attributing 
a right to sovereignty to any of the players in the arena" ("Conditional Sovereignty'; Res 
Publica 8[1] [1999]: 1-7, esp. 2). There would be neither rights nor duties in an anarchic 
world: a Hobbesian world without law. Accordingly, leaders cannot argue that the world 
is an anarchy and then also claim that they have sovereign rights. If they claim sovereign 
rights they must accept that the international sphere is not anarchic, and they must then 
accept the duties that go with the rights that they claim. 
3. He is supported in this by Catherine Audard in her "Cultural Imperialism and 'Democratic 
Peace"; in Rawls's Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, R. Marttin & D. A. Reidy (eds), 
59-75 (Oxford: Blackwell. 2006). 
4. As Charles Taylor has put it "Humanity is something to be realized, not in each individual 
human being, but rather in communion between all humans .... The fullness of human-
ity comes not from the adding of differences, but from the exchange and communion 
between them" ("Living with Difference'; in Debating Democracy's Discontent: Essays on 
American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy, A. L. Allen & M. C. Regan [eds], 212-26 
[New York: Oxford University Press, 1998], 214). 
5. Benhabib subscribes to a universal discourse ethics in the manner of Habermas. She 
argues that the "discursive scope" (Another Cosmopolitanism, 18) of discourse ethics is 
universal and embraces the whole of humanity. 
6. See also D. Archibugi, D. Held & M. Kohler (eds), Re-imagining Political Community: 
Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1998); Torbjorn Tannsjo, 
Global Democracy: The Case for a World Government (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2008); and Carol Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
7. Such irony is also advocated by Richard Rorty in his "Justice as a Larger Loyalty': In 
Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation, P. Cheah & B. Robbins (eds), 
45-58 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). See also his "Solidarity'; 
in his Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 189-98 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1989). 
8. For a good place to start, see Sullivan & Kymlicka (eds), The Globalization of Ethics. 
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